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The Confederacy was never a viable nation, as the secessionists understood it.
Since they lost territory early and were blocked in others, the Confederacy would have severely compromised their initial goals, and seek a peace, while losing some of "its territory". It was something they never did, fighting to the bitter end, to preserve it "all".
The British never intended to enter the war. The British, better than all, recognized the naval inferiority of any Confederate Navy.
The British asked the Confederate representative in Great Britain, about four areas, that heavily depended on waterways and steamboats. The British with a superior knowledge of naval warfare, quickly recognized, by early 1862, the serious problem the Confederacy had in holding Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and western Virginia. Except for temporary raids, the Confederacy was never able to hold these areas for any significant period of time. The British Foreign Minister had foreseen this shortly after the Civil War started.
All these areas, mentioned, were supplied by Union steamboats and provided forward supply bases the Confederates could not match.
Early in the war, much of the control of the Mississippi River was lost by the Confederacy. Kentucky was never significantly controlled by the Confederacy, as it was adjacent to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.
Missouri was never significantly controlled by the Confederacy because it layed adjacent to the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. Tennessee was never significantly controlled by the Confederacy because a significant part of that state layed adjacent to the Mississippi, Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
If the Confederacy intended to remain free with 14 slave states and the U.S. Territory of New Mexico, it lost control in a number of these areas, early in the war. Even early in the war, the Confederacy had lost significant territory in Virginia. Quite a number of Virginia's counties were near navigable streams, which the U.S. Navy controlled.
Some of the eastern counties were lost because they were near the Potomac River, Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. Western counties in Virginia were too near the Ohio River and the Kanawha River, giving the U.S. the forward base edge in those areas. In the far northwestern part of Virginia, the Confederacy never had the logistics to hold or control the B&O Railroad. It would be a supply asset of the United States for a great deal of the war.
Any intent to become viable was lost because a Confederate navy was barely existing. A naval historian wrote later in the 19th Century, ...."it would hardly be possible to imagine a great maritime country more destitute of the means for carrying on a naval war than the Confederate States in 1861."
As history proved, any Confederate state near navigable water was in serious jeopardy. The inability of the Confederacy to carry out its territorial aims because the lack of a navy was significant, much of the Confederacy was sure to be lost. The Confederate ego would never continence such significant losses. At first, the Confederacy could not gain all its goals; it fought until all its goals were lost.
Most students of the Civil War study army warfare. The British studied naval warfare and could see how the winning of the Confederate's war, with the initial goals, was impossible.
That's certainly a Mahanian view of things. However, it could have been offset by having agents buy ships abroad. Dick Taylor made the observation that the South hoarded cotton at war's start, hoping to drive up prices and induce foreign intervention. He believed that if the cotton was sold immediately, that the revenue generated could have been used to buy arms. If Gen. Taylor is correct, the South could or should have bought some Warrior or Gloire class ironclad ships with which to wrest control of the sealanes from the North (or at least preserve their own waters). However, this would only help partially as the inland waters could (and were) seized by the superior ironclad fleet of the North.
The very nature of the Confederacy made it difficult for it to prevail. The lack of cooperation between states (refusal to share resources) gave the Federals a clear advantage.
"Warrior or Gloire class ironclad ships with which to wrest control of the sealanes from the North"
The HMS Warrior was the first ocean going iron hulled ship. However, it did have a distinct disadvantage because it had three masts and used sails. One would wonder how long it would have lasted, operationally, in U.S. near shore waters, against the U.S. monitors, using their Dahlgren cannons.
I doubt the British would have allowed the Confederacy to purchase a ship of this type, which contained advanced technology. Great Britain only made two of this class ship, so it's doubtful many could be made to save the Confederacy.
During the Civil War, the U.S. was building four Kalamazoo class, monitors, designed for sea-going duty. Each of these ships was as formidable as any ironclad built in Europe. The U.S. actually launched the Dunderberg, an ocean going vessel, just after the end of the Civil War, but never commissioned.
"Dick Taylor made the observation that the South hoarded cotton at war's start, hoping to drive up prices and induce foreign intervention."
The Confederate leadership made a horrendous error in assuming cotton was king.
It might have been in 1859 and 1860, but British mills had overproduced fabric and there was a surplus of fabric in Britain at the start of the war. The British shutting down of mills was inevitable. Now, the British could blame it on the American Civil War, and not link it to British overproduction.
Historians wll note the cotton mill closings, but seem to always, in most cases, not note the poor harvests in Great Britain and Europe, and the fortunes made transporting wheat and corn in British merchant ships, from the United States.
"Warrior or Gloire class ironclad ships with which to wrest control of the sealanes from the North"
The HMS Warrior was the first ocean going iron hulled ship. However, it did have a distinct disadvantage because it had three masts and used sails. One would wonder how long it would have lasted, operationally, in U.S. near shore waters, against the U.S. monitors, using their Dahlgren cannons.
I doubt the British would have allowed the Confederacy to purchase a ship of this type, which contained advanced technology. Great Britain only made two of this class ship, so it's doubtful many could be made to save the Confederacy.
During the Civil War, the U.S. was building four Kalamazoo class, monitors, designed for sea-going duty. Each of these ships was as formidable as any ironclad built in Europe. The U.S. actually launched the Dunderberg, an ocean going vessel, just after the end of the Civil War, but never commissioned.
Dunderberg (launched 1865)
Became French Navy ship Rochambeau in 1867.
Warrior entered active fleet sevrice in June, 1862. She was faster, larger, and more powerfully armed than any other ship in the world at the time (10 110-lbers and 26 68-lbers; 17.5 knots) The most powerful Union warship at the time would have been the Monitor, (2 x 11" Dahlgrens;8 knots in quiet water) or perhaps New Ironsides (2 x 150-pounder Parrott, 2 x 50-pounders and 14 x 11" Dahlgren smoothbore cannons; 8 knots). Out at sea, Warrior or her sister Black Prince would have had a major advantage; in close waters both would have been severely restructed by their size and small rudders.
The following thought is from the website http://www.hmswarrior.org/warbat.html, based on some notes from Warrior's first commander about how he would have fought La Gloire.
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In the event of an action against the Monitor, Cochrane's likely course of action can be discerned. Assuming Warrior, whilst stationary, opened fire at 4,000 yards with her bow chaser, it would take 20 minutes for Monitor to close to within 1,500 yards. In this time 22 rounds would have been discharged from the chaser. Assuming 15% of the projectiles hit their target, we would expect 3 hits before Monitor closed to open fire with her two Dahlgren guns. At 1,500 yards the 68 pound guns of Warrior could be brouht to bear, with perhaps 1 in 3 shot hitting their taget. The remaining 110lb guns could also be used, with a hit rate of 45%. In the ensuing quarter of an hour it would take Monitor to close on Warrior, Warrior would discharge 213 68lb shot and 108 110lb shot. During this time Monitor would be hit by 71 68lb shot and 48 110lb shot, whilst returning no more than 4 shot.
We know from tests that Monitor's guns could not pierce Warrior's armour plating, which consisted 4.5" of wrought iron, 18" of Teak, a further 5/8" wrought iron and finally 1 3/4" pine cladding. Warrior could pierce 6 inches of Monitor's turret armour plating at up to 500 yards.
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Basically, bad news for Monitor in any action where she faced a Warrior-class alone, particularly at extended range. If the situation is such that Monitor can face Warrior at short range, in tight waters where Warrior cannot easily maneuver, and particularly in reduced visibilty conditions, Monitor might be able to maneuver in close and possibly get a clear shot at Warrior's major vulnerability: an unarmored stern.
In 1862 terms, no single ship would be likely to best Warrior in open water. But naval war is not usually about single-ship actions, or Yamato would have blown her way through the US fleet in WWII.
The four ships of the La Gloire class (36 × 6.4 in guns; 12 knots) were poor ships in heavy seas, but with armor apparently impervious to the British 68-lber. They were slower and inferior in armament to the Warrior-class., as well as hard on the crew and poorly ventilated.
While ships of either of these classes in Confederate hands would have been fearsomely effective in some ways, it is doubted they could have afforded more than one or two of them. Those would have been able to keep any single Confederate port free of the blockade for a period of time, or possibly to raid a major Union port like Boston or New York.
But they could not have been effectively used as commerce raiders, IMHO, and they could not have been kept in repair in the Confederacy. Outside of England, I think the British might have had one drydock capable of handling a Warrior, and that in Bermuda or the Bahamas. The only possible Confederate drydock would be the massive one in Norfolk Navy Yard, lost back to the Union in Spring of 1862 when Monitor defeated the Virginia.
Other than comerce raiding, what the Confederacy really needed to do in the naval war was:
1) keep New Orleans out of Union hands (both as a potential port of entry through the blockade and to restrict Union access to the Mississippi/maintain the connection to the Wesern Confederacy;
2) find a way to break the blockade at some other port (Mobile/Savannah/Charleston/Wilmington) and keep that port open
Perhaps a ship of the Warrior or La Gloire class might have done #2 for them -- but it will not keep the harbor free of blockade unless it can be kept maintained. Confederate shipyards were generally not capable enough to make this likely for such advanced ships.
OTOH, a Warrior or La Gloire sitting in the Mississippi or the mouth of Mobile Bay will keep out any Union naval force. On second thought, I am not even sure you could get a Warrior or La Gloire up the Mississippi to New Orleans, or be able to turn them broadside in the river if you did. Maybe they could in Mobile Bay. No clue about Charleston, Savannah, or Wilmington.
Maybe any extra funds the Confederates scraped up would have been far better spent on a few commerce raiders and a lot of Enfields. Maybe even better on RR iron and equipment.
"it would take 20 minutes for Monitor to close to within 1,500 yards."
Why would the Monitor need to close to that distance? The XI inch Dahlgren used on the Monitor did have greater range than that.
A 20-pound propellant charge would give 136-pound shell ranges up to 3,650 yards at 15 degrees elevation and 16.5-second time of flight, capable of damaging the masts on the HMS Warrior.
Proofing tests after the the Monitor-Virginia showed the XI Dahlgren cannon could use more than the 15 pounds of black powder charge, used against the Virginia.
By wars end the U.S. Navy was using charges as great as 30 pounds of propellant to sink Confederate ironclads, with the XI Dahlgren..
However the proof is in the pudding. The Warrior never saw a sea battle and the British stayed out of the war, and never even recognized the Confederate States.
But I think the London Times said it best in 1862, shortly after the first all ironclad battle, with a good perspective.
"Whereas we had available for immediate purposes 149 first-class
warships, we have now two, these two being the WARRIOR and her sister IRONSIDE [sic, BLACK PRINCE]. There is not now a ship in the English Navy apart from these two, that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little MONITOR."
Gents, I greatly enjoyed your discussion of the Confederacy's lack of a navy and inability of the seceded states to function as a supply mechanism. I can't argue with much of that, nor will I attempt.
What bothers me a bit is the apparent concept that you young men apparently have that all of a sudden the Confederacy was a different country, that Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida had all of a sudden fallen into enemy hands. The land and people were still there in 1862. Only thing that had changed was the result of a few papers flying around.
The spirit of the people of those states was not broken. They, in many many cases, prayed and fought for the long life of the Union created six or seven decades prior. Don't tell the people of Lauderdale County, Alabama or Sullivan County, Tennesse that the Union was lost or that hope for the future was depleted. They won't believe it.
If you wish to do the country some good, frown at a politician.
__________________
Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Gents, I greatly enjoyed your discussion of the Confederacy's lack of a navy and inability of the seceded states to function as a supply mechanism. I can't argue with much of that, nor will I attempt.
What bothers me a bit is the apparent concept that you young men apparently have that all of a sudden the Confederacy was a different country, that Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida had all of a sudden fallen into enemy hands. The land and people were still there in 1862. Only thing that had changed was the result of a few papers flying around.
The spirit of the people of those states was not broken. They, in many many cases, prayed and fought for the long life of the Union created six or seven decades prior. Don't tell the people of Lauderdale County, Alabama or Sullivan County, Tennesse that the Union was lost or that hope for the future was depleted. They won't believe it.
If you wish to do the country some good, frown at a politician.
Lincoln probably had too much faith in that spirit, but he believed in it. The actions of the local citizens showed that he had been partially right when troops in blue could reach the areas those people were in. But by and large, most of the people in the South ended up fighting against the Union, and mainly through their own actions and choices.
Some of the elections were unfair (TX and TN come to mind). Some were rushed to use momentum to overcum inertia and resistance. But in general the eleven states left the Union because they chose to do so, and fought a war because they wanted one. It didn't matter to those people what the people of West Virginia, or East Tennessee, or several other places wanted.
[quote=whitworth]"it would take 20 minutes for Monitor to close to within 1,500 yards."
Why would the Monitor need to close to that distance? The XI inch Dahlgren used on the Monitor did have greater range than that.[quote]
I'd say they are talking about this: "We know from tests that Monitor's guns could not pierce Warrior's armour plating, which consisted 4.5" of wrought iron, 18" of Teak, a further 5/8" wrought iron and finally 1 3/4" pine cladding. Warrior could pierce 6 inches of Monitor's turret armour plating at up to 500 yards."
If you look at this wargame-related site (http://www.wargames.co.uk/RandomS/Library/Warrior.htm), you'll find an interesting article that contains this:"Penetration trials carried out by the Admiralty during the 1860s showed that British 68lb shot would penetrate upto 8 inches of composite plate armour similar to the Monitor's at upto 100yds and 6 inches at upto 500yds. Performance of the 110lber is difficult to gauge, as, although it had an aerodynamic shot, it generated a lower muzzle velocity than the 68lber due to defects in its breech mechanism. Monitor's 11 inch guns, even fully charged and firing wrought iron shot could not penetrate Warrior's armour at any range. Although later 15 inch Dahlgrens would penetrate with wrought iron shot at 100yds and steel shot at upto 500yds. " If they are accurate, then Monitor's only chance would be to close the range and hope to maneuver against the unarmored stern of Warrior.
Quote:
Originally Posted by whitworth
A 20-pound propellant charge would give 136-pound shell ranges up to 3,650 yards at 15 degrees elevation and 16.5-second time of flight, capable of damaging the masts on the HMS Warrior.
See above for the armor problem. But it takes 2-3 minutes to reload one of those guns in theory (real life: 6-8 minutes against Virginia), and there are only two of them. The 110-lb Armstrong breechloader could be reloaded in 50 seconds and had a range of 4,000 yards. Warrior carried 10 of them, with six bearing on either broadside. The Armstrongs are rifled guns, more accurate than the Dahlgren smoothebores.
Monitor is a smaller target, of course. A long range duel looks like a bad idea other than that, while at close range the handy Monitor might out-maneuver the clumsy (large turning circle due to hull design and small rudder) Warrior.
At 1500 yards, Warrior opens up with the 13 or so 68 lbers she can bring to bear, in addition to the 6 110-lbers. They will have a plentiful supply of solid shot to pierce armor, which Virginia did not have on the fateful day.
It is also worth noting that Union ironclads had an accuracy rate of about 33% shooting at Ft. Sumter from 500 yards or more. Warrior is a big target, but smaller than that fort and potentially moving. Monitor herself managed to miss Virginia with 35 of 55 shots at ranges of about 100 yards. Odds of a Monitor hit at long range are not good.
Quote:
Originally Posted by whitworth
But I think the London Times said it best in 1862, shortly after the first all ironclad battle, with a good perspective.
"Whereas we had available for immediate purposes 149 first-class
warships, we have now two, these two being the WARRIOR and her sister IRONSIDE [sic, BLACK PRINCE]. There is not now a ship in the English Navy apart from these two, that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little MONITOR."
Agreed. Any attempt to fight such a war off the American coast in the 1860s would have been a disaster for the British, even if the French were with them. Logistically, all other factors aside, it would have been a nightmare.
Logistically, all other factors aside, it would have been a nightmare.
Logistically, it would have been impossible. What does a steamship require? Coal. Provisions. Ammunition. Facilities for repair and refit. What was available? Canada, Bermuda and the Bahamas. Where were Bermuda and the Bahamas to get coal? Provisions? Ammunition? Facilities? The requisite necessities for operating even a single British warship were simply not available for anything outside of an occasional raid.
Conversely, should Britain cast its lot with the Confederacy, Canada, Bermuda and the Bahamas would become fair game for US ships, however inferior, and US Marines. Naaah. In siding with the Confederacy, Britain couldn't find a potential gain to justify potential loss. The loss of cotton, to be sure, was crimping -- but a few years would see the supply renewed one way or another. "Cotton will be back. No sense in getting our nose bloodied (or worse) by mixing in.
Was it this thread or another when the withholding of cotton from export was mentioned? It was stated that England had an overstock of finished cotton in the warehouses, which is correct so far as I understand it. But it also had warehouses bulging with cotton bales it didn't need to use. A classic case of lousy timing. "Let's persuade England to side with us by using our bulging warehouses to show them how important we are to their economy." The result: no Confederate income, (total aside: what income would the Confederate nation derive from the sale of cotton that was grown by some of its citizens?) and an industrial England that wouldn't, for more than a year, feel its effect. (And, as noted earlier, American food grains transcended cotton in importance anyway.)
Seems that if it weren't for bad luck, the Confederacy wouldn't have had any luck at all. Bad timing. Over-optimism. Bad judgement. I keep bouncing back and forth between finding some sense in the war, and being quite amused by the apparent lack of judgement shown by JD and Company.
Interesting topic, by the way. Thanks for opening it up.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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