No Peace Without Victory

[unionblue]

To All,

An interesting article concerning the idea of peace negotiations during the Civil War, to include attempts by France & England & Greely.

No Peace Without Victory, 1861-1865, by James P. McPherson.

http://www.historycooperative.org/jo...mcpherson.html

It seems to me that England & France came a lot closer to intervening in the war than I thought.

Comments?

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[ole]

Thanks for providing that link. Will give it some attention later, but it does look like there was more activity than is common knowledge.
Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Thanks for the post Neil. There is much there that I haven't thought of for a good while. The Southern states were a formidable force internationally aside from military might. The lack of industrial development to any significant amount continued to be a hindrance. That probably also kept the British and French at bay long enough for matters to proceed far beyond the expectations of early war promoters, at least in terms of bloodshed. One thought that struck me was that the Europeans seemed to ignore that fact that this was civil war, that the participants were brother and cousin against often relatives on the other side; civil war, not nation against nation. There were rumblings of negotiated peace, compromise etc. that might have caught flame given enough spark or a desperate enough military situation. The fact the war was fought essentially in two theatres made that possibility far more unlikely. Just too many pieces to bring together. Lincoln's political manuevering probably added to the separation even while he was trying to bring about an early conclusion.

[ole]

Quite simply, the south was a supplier of a commodity that could be done without for a while, if necessary. On the other hand, the north was a buyer. Just for fun, if two of your friends fall into a disagreement, you're going to try to patch it up ..... but one buys from your company quite heavily, the other provides something you need, but you can get along without it for a while by tightening up and developing other suppliers. If push comes to shove, where are your loyalties going to settle? Of course, you wish they'd stop fighting and you try to patch things up, but you have a business to run with employees depending on you.

Interposing yourself will get you nothing. Each has a non-negotiable demand. Would you not back away and issue soothing words without getting personally entangled?

Lincoln had one demand. Davis had another. Lincoln's "political maneuvering" was no more than on might expect from a war-president. Make nice with the Europeans and keep them from even thinking about siding with the south.
Ole

[SpiritofPickett]

It is a good article. I do wonder, if communications had been quicker. Sort of 'CNN' type of,'on the spot' coverage, whether public opinion would have had more sway? Today politicians are under pressure as soon as a story hits. The reporters look for the 'sound bites' and expect policy 'on the hoof'. The public demand an instant solution.

Lincoln always had time to think. A luxuries today's politicans don't have.............(time or thought. )

[whitworth]

"Gladstone privately urged his colleagues to acknowledge "that the South cannot be conquered"

"By September 1862, Palmerston and his foreign secretary, Lord John Russell, the two men whose opinion counted most, were well-nigh ready to agree with Gladstone"


The plain truth is Palmerston and Russell did not want war with the United States. Early in the war there was a surplus of cloth in England and no great need for cotton.
By 1862, Great Britain had a large wooden navy. Britain was in-between on technology. They took their time developing an ironclad fleet. The Confederacy wasn't important enough for Britain to appropriate large sums of money for ironclad ships that might be soon obsolete. The U.S. on the other hand, did not care if the monitors were soon obsolete.

The great weakness of any British foreign policy in North America was Canada. The U.S. could supply its army by railroad to at least the Canadian border. Unlike the War of 1812, the U.S. could potentally send an army of 40,000 into Canada. A lot of Irish in the U.S. would have joined that war.

By 1862, the Confederacy was not in a position to negotiate. It would not end the war with the loss of the border states and the New Mexico territory. The Confederacy wanted an expansion of slavery. That was a key point in their secession. Lose the border states and the territories, by negotiation, the Confederacy "loses" the war, in their eyes. Such a loss would serious affect the future economic worth of slaves.

[trice]

Originally Posted by ole

Quite simply, the south was a supplier of a commodity that could be done without for a while, if necessary. On the other hand, the north was a buyer. Just for fun, if two of your friends fall into a disagreement, you're going to try to patch it up ..... but one buys from your company quite heavily, the other provides something you need, but you can get along without it for a while by tightening up and developing other suppliers. If push comes to shove, where are your loyalties going to settle? Of course, you wish they'd stop fighting and you try to patch things up, but you have a business to run with employees depending on you.

That's a pretty good analogy, but there should be a little more to it. The North was also a commodity provider to Britain: food from the Midwest went through New York to Britain.

So both provide something Britain needs: food from one, cotton from the other. You need the cotton for industry/jobs in the future -- but there was a surplus in Europe in 1861 because of the bumper cotton crops of 1859 and 1860. You can go for quite a while without more cotton, and other cotton producers will be coming along in a couple of years to help alleviate the problem. Food, OTOH, is a more immediate problem.

Originally Posted by ole

Interposing yourself will get you nothing. Each has a non-negotiable demand. Would you not back away and issue soothing words without getting personally entangled?

Lincoln had one demand. Davis had another. Lincoln's "political maneuvering" was no more than on might expect from a war-president. Make nice with the Europeans and keep them from even thinking about siding with the south.

Napoleon III in France was more likely to intervene, particularly after he started trying to build an empire in Mexico. But he was unlikely to do so without the British in support.

In Britain, many of the upper classes had a sentimental feeling they should support the South (or a business interest that led them to support the South), and a feeling that it would be nice to see those arrogant Americans humbled. The middle and lower classes seem to have had more of an anti-slavery, support-for-democracy affiliation with the Union.

The British military was far from enthusiastic about getting involved in a war in North America. They had done that twice before with the Americans, and it had not worked out well. Defending the Canadian border would be costly and bloody, if even possible once the Union had armies in the hundreds of thousands of men.

Naval actions far from home were problematic. While the US Navy would have been a joke to the RN in early 1861, the mammoth ship-building program for the blockade would have made a naval war a sobering thought by 1863.

While all this was going on, Europe was a powder keg getting ready to explode. The first small wars had raged for more than a decade: the 1st and 2nd Danish wars with Prussia, the Crimean War, the Austro-French war in Italy in 1859. In 1864 the Austrians joined the Prussians for the 3rd Danish (or "Potato War"). Earlier that year, the entire continent almost went up in flames over Poland -- which is why the Russian fleet unexpectedly showed up in New York and San Francisco, trying to make sure they were not blockaded at home. In 1866, Prussia smashed Austria, and four years later smashed France.

While there might have been saber-rattling and posturing, I think sober military considerations would have viewed any potential conflict in North America as foolish for Britain in such a situation.

Regards,
Tim

[OpnDownfall]

In it's foreign polcy, Great Britain always preferred to remain aloof from entangling alliances, if possible.
In 1914, France thought she had a treaty with Britain that firmly guaranteed that she would send her main army to France against German as an ally. Fixing precise times, dates, movements, size etc. of great Britain initial contribution to the alliance.
When the time came for action, France suddently discovered that the British Gov't was less than entusiastic about being allied with France or sending her army across the Channel any time soon.
After much anguished hand wringing and great reluctance Britain honored it's commitment, but only slowly and with less force than what France had expected. This was the actions of only the political leaders, the people of Great Britain and its military were hot to go.
As others have noted, the times were not really propitious for Great Britain to entangle herself in a war across the atlantic. But, if intervention had occurred, it is likely that the south would have soon been muttering about 'Perfide Albion' (probably in unison with its' new French ally).

[whitworth]

Great Britain had no reason to go to war in North America in 1861, because of the surplus of material in Great Britain, making cotton an unessential commodity.

The U.S. Monitor made most of Great Britain's navy, a wooden navy, primarily, obsolete by early 1862.
While the monitors were not a threat in Great Britain's home waters, they would have been a great threat in close-in American waters and on the St. Lawrence River.

[ole]

Great Britain had no reason to go to war in North America in 1861, because of the surplus of material in Great Britain, making cotton an unessential commodity.

Yes. Britain's warehouses were full when the war started. The lack of cotton didn't start to pinch until the 1863 crop wasn't there. By that time, a couple of bad years had left Europe's granaries quite short. The farce of King Cotton had become the very real King Wheat. Given the choice of having their people starve or look for work away from the weaving mill, it might be considered judicious to opt for food.

Ole