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On the vary day that General Lee addressed the people of Maryland:
TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND
Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia
Near Fredericktown
September 8, 1862
It is right that you should know the purpose that brought the army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.
The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties.
They have seen with profound indignation their sister State deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province. Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned upon no charge and contrary to all forms of law. The faithful and manly protest against this outrage made by the venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt; the government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed; words have been declared offenses by an arbitrary decree of the Federal Executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by a military commission for what they may dare to speak.
Believing that the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore independence and sovereignty to your State.
In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled.
This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned.
No constraint upon your free will is intended; no intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army, at least. Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech.
We know no enemies among you, and will protect all, of every opinion.
It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint.
This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will.
R. E. LEE,
General, Commanding.
he also sent to Jefferson Davis a suggestion that it was a good time to propose peace to the Federal government:
HEADQUARTERS, Near Fredericktown, Md., September 8, 1862.
His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, President of the Confederate States,
Richmond, Va.:
Mr. President: The present position of affairs, in my opinion, places it in the power of the Government of the Confederate States to propose with propriety to that of the United States the recognition of our independence. For more than a year both sections of the country have been devastated by hostilities which have brought sorrow and suffering upon thousands of homes, without advancing the objects which our enemies proposed to themselves in beginning the contest. Such a proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded as suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the world that our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the attainment of an honorable peace. The rejection of this offer would prove to the country that the responsibility of the continuance of the war does not rest upon us, but that the party in power in the United States elect to prosecute it for purposes of their own. The proposal of peace would enable the people of the United States to determine at their coming elections whether they will support those who favor a prolongation of the war, or those who wish to bring it to a termination, which can but be productive of good to both parties without affecting the honor of either.
I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,
The difficulty would have been in wording such a proposal between Lincoln and Davis, that could/would have been acceptbal to both Washington DC and Richmond at the same time. .
Later in the War, reinforced by the knowledge that the war was almost over, Lincoln unbent just enough to meet some southern representative at Hampton Roads. But, If they had ever met in 1862, there would still have been little to discuss besides personal pleasantries, as in 1865.
The difficulty would have been in wording such a proposal between Lincoln and Davis, that could/would have been acceptbal to both Washington DC and Richmond at the same time. .
Later in the War, reinforced by the knowledge that the war was almost over, Lincoln unbent just enough to meet some southern representative at Hampton Roads. But, If they had ever met in 1862, there would still have been little to discuss besides personal pleasantries, as in 1865.
Lee seriously underestimated Lincoln's resolve to save the Union. Little more than a week after this letter was sent Lee should have realized the war would continue until one side was the victor.
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"Those who forget to remember the past are condemned to repeat it", George Santayana.
Lee seriously underestimated Lincoln's resolve to save the Union. Little more than a week after this letter was sent Lee should have realized the war would continue until one side was the victor.
Freddy,
September of 1862 was probably the best chance the Confederacy ever had for imposing peace on their own terms.
At that time, Lee had just thrown back McClellan at Seven Days, thumped Pope at 2nd Manassas, and was headed across the Potomac into Northern territory.
To the West, Braxton Bragg had just out-maneuvered the Union, striking north from Chattanooga and Knoxville deep into Kentucky. Further West, Price and Van Dorn were also moving north, threatening Grant's rear and Nashville, or a move still further to join with Bragg.
As Lee moves into Maryland, Britian is considering whether the time has come to join with France and offer to serve as intermediaries here to end the war.
We know now that all this would collapse rapidly: Antietam, Perryville, Iuka and Corinth would throw all the Confederate advances into retreat. But at that precise moment when Lee wrote to Davis, the opportunity looked very favorable. If Lee had managed another victory, this one North of the Potomac, and Bragg had done something in Kentucky, things would have looked very dire for Lincoln, the Republicans, and the Union cause.
Naturally, that is all in the "what-if" category. We know it did not happen. In early September of 1862, though, it was nowhere near that clear.
I know before Antietam the South was at its height. It was this battle that stopped Lee in his tracks and forced his retreat.That is when he should have realized that his peace proposal would fall on deaf ears. If Grant had been in command on September 17, 1862 Lee might not have escaped to fight another day. Perhaps Lee knew deep down the South's only chance for victory was to invade the North and capture Washington. The North could replace men and supplies even after disasters like Fredericksburg. It was like this big dumb fighter that kept getting hit hard but somehow just kept on coming and got some new manager, Grant, and eventually landed the big blows that ended the fight.
__________________
"Those who forget to remember the past are condemned to repeat it", George Santayana.
Lee's 'peace proposal' is really his 'suggestion' To President Davis, that now might be time for the confederate gov't to approach the Federal Gov't about recognition of southern independence.
His basic premise, is that the northern voters would not sustain war effort, if informed of southern peace proposal, his real intent seems to fight the war in northern newspapers.
As we know fron historical facts, Lincoln would not even agree to meet with those purporting to represent a gov't that he and his gov't refused to accept as even existing, much less negotiate a peace with them that did not include reunion.
Lee implies, Lincoln's rejection of Confederate overtures could cause the northen voters reverse their support in upcoming election (not unlike Johnston's apparent plan on his way to Atlanta).
The time frame was too short for Davis to fully accept what little reasoning Lee gives for any such proposal, much less to find ways to even talk to Lincon in the first place AND prepare the forth coming newspapers campaign in the north after Lincoln's inevitable rejection, If it ever reached his desk, before Antietan.
There were as many loyal newspapers as Coppehead in the north and it is not a given than the Republican Party or Lincoln, both fighting for Union And their political lives would have been outmaneuvered or out politicked by the soggy anti war democrats (the ones who would have to carry Richmond's warter in this effort). The sight of democrats fighting the south's battle for Independence in the newspapers would not have been an edifying sight to the northern voters.
Once again we have evidence of Southern misconception about the north, namely that its desire for peace, translated into a willingness to sacrifice the Union to attain that desired peace, many democrat politicians would often stumbled over that fact, as did many southerners, apparently including Lee.
P.S. Lee's appeal to the people of Mayland seems not unlike Braggs appeal to the people of Ky in his invasion of that state, with the same results in both instances.
Does anyone know if Lee's exit from Maryland was faster or slower than Bragg's from Kentcky?
Towards the end of 1862, it was clear that the Confederacy could not hold Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, significant parts of Tennessee, western Virginia, and none of the U.S. New Mexico territory.
Logistically and strategically, it was evident that the Confederacy could not accomplish its original goals in many areas.
How would one expect the Confederacy to negotiate away significant parts of the territory it sought, or wanted to keep?
It one only looks at Virginia, one would assume that the war was a draw. But for the Confederacy, it was far from a draw. It had already lost territory, and most of the control of the Mississippi River.
Lincoln and the Congress were fighting and supplying a long war, by this time. The U.S. was prepared to spend billions to get its territory back. Lee would realize that after Antietam, if not before then.
This was a war entirely different than the one Lee experienced in Mexico.
One also, must be aware of the disconnect in Lee's mind concerning the war for the Confederacy and the War For Va. It, sometimes, seems that to Lee they were two separate wars, not always forming a coherent whole in his thinking.
Lee's stunning victories in Va. sometimes, clouded the advice he felt constrained to offer from time to time to his Commander In Chief.
Although, his proposal in this instance was appropriate and fairly logical, in a normal war against a foreign power, but it ignored the fact that the war was a Civil War (or a Revolution, if you prefer) and standard military and political precepts do not always apply to such conflicts.
Viewing the war from Va. only, the south 'seemed' to be winning. But from Washington D.C's perspective, Lee was only holding his own, not necessarily winning AND the war in the west was 'in the process' of being won.
From Lincoln's perspective; although the war could be lost in the East, it was being won in the West, thus Lincoln's constant agonizing over the AoP and it's commanders, the one Army that could lose the war in a day.
Ironically, Lee, the military man, was essentially looking for a political solution to the war, while Lincoln And Davis, the politicians, knew it would have to be a military solution.
Whether Lee considered the eventual fate of the Confederacy, he seemed tied forever to his initial decision - to fight for Virginia.
If he was the great general, he would know better than most, that the Confederacy was in deep trouble, wherever there were navigable bodies of water.
Lee, perhaps, was too non-political. A great general lead by a fail group of legislators and president. Lee never seemed to accept defeat, until it was the next course in the dinner, at Appomattox.
By 1863, a significant part of the Confederacy was lost. If peace had come in mid-1863, much of its "original" territory was lost in any negotiated settlement.
The claim is frequently made that the Confederate soldier was fighting because the Yankees were down here.
Well they were down here. Down here in Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, Maryland and western Virginia. By 1863, a lot of "down here" was permanently lost to the Confederacy.
By the time of Lee's surrender, the U.S. occupied parts of every Confederate state east of the Mississippi. I would not consider Lee every made a significant peace proposal to Jefferson Davis, since he fought to the very end.
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Lee's Peace Proposal 
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