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Lee's 'peace proposal' is really his 'suggestion' To President Davis, that now might be time for the confederate gov't to approach the Federal Gov't about recognition of southern independence.
His basic premise, is that the northern voters would not sustain war effort, if informed of southern peace proposal, his real intent seems to fight the war in northern newspapers.
I am sure this is right; it is obvious that early September of 1862 is the best position the Confederacy had yet been able to achieve. Lee was crossing the Potomac after thrashing Pope, Bragg was rolling the Union back from Chattanooga to Louisville and Cincinatti, while Price and Van Dorn were moving aggressively by Iuka and Corinth.
But Lee was not a man who put his faith in politicians or foreign intervention. He was a realistic soldier who had seen enough hard war for a lifetime. He was also an active member of the Napoleonic Society while he was Superintendant at West Point.
Napoleon had a thought that I am sure must have run through Lee's mind at this time, in concept if not word-for-word. Bonaparte told his generals that the best time to negotiate peace was while you were pursuing the enemy full-speed with the point of your bayonet in the small of his back. I think that is what Lee sees here: a wavering Union, fatigued by Seven Days, 2nd Manassas and hopefully one more victory north of the Potomac, might concede if pressed.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
Once again we have evidence of Southern misconception about the north, namely that its desire for peace, translated into a willingness to sacrifice the Union to attain that desired peace, many democrat politicians would often stumbled over that fact, as did many southerners, apparently including Lee.
Many of these men (Davis, Bragg, Beauregard, Davis, etc.) all came from the common background of West Point. In some ways, they didn't need to say much about concepts they had ingrained 30 years earlier. I think when Lee said "now might be the time", he and Davis were probably on the same wavelength about what they meant.
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Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
P.S. Lee's appeal to the people of Mayland seems not unlike Braggs appeal to the people of Ky in his invasion of that state, with the same results in both instances.
Does anyone know if Lee's exit from Maryland was faster or slower than Bragg's from Kentcky?
Lee was only above the Potomac a short time. The first skirmishes in MD are on September 3-4. The ANV is crossing the Potomac Sept. 4-7. The battle at Antietam is the 16-17th. The ANV is back across the Potomac by Sept. 20th.
Bragg's/Kirby Smith's invasion had progressed to the battle of Richmond, KY on August 30. Bragg's siege of Munfordville, KY was on Sept. 14-17. The Battle of Perryville, KY was on October 8. The Confederates retreated through Cumberland Gap from Sept. 19-24[Note: this is really Oct 19-24], and the Union pursuit was discontinued at London, KY on Sept. 22 [Note: this is really Oct. 22].
Bragg covered a lot more miles, though. The western theater covered much more territory.
Lee's experience in Maryland was the same as Braggs in Ky at approximately the same time. Expecting a general uprising by the populace to assist an invading confederate army in driving the enemy out of their state. Both army commanders did not realize, that what the majority of the citizens of Md and Ky saw was an invading army maneuvering against major Union forces and had not actually won any major battle to establish, the fact that the southern army could or would, be able to protect them. Very humanly, the majority of the populace took a wait and see posture.
What they finally saw was the southern armies were retreating invaders, rather than as liberators, come to stay.
This somehow suggests a similar contemporary invasion.
They are similar. In both MD and KY, slavery was in decline and the association with the concepts of slave-ownership/Southern unity/secessionism were becoming more local to specific counties rather than state-wide as the Civil War approached.
Economics was one main reason for this. In KY, before 1850 the path of commerce ran down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to New Orleans, orienting the state towards the South economically and societally. After 1850, the path ran across the Ohio to the new rail;heads on the northern bank, leading to the Great Lakes and the Eastern cities, particularly New York and Philadelphia.
This in turn led to a flood of European immigrants along the Ohio. It also seems to have led to a migration of Southerners who disliked slavery to the North bank of the Ohio, which accounts for some of the pro-South feeling there. But KY in 1850 and before was a much more "Southern" state, and by 1860 was turning to a different path. I think if the Civil War had been 10 years earlier, KY would have seceded. By 1860, there was substantial opposition to such a move, and much more at stake economically for KY in severing ties with the North.
MD was a state where slavery had been on the decline for decades. It tended to exist south and east of Baltimore, and the slavery on the Eastern Shore seems to have been different in attitude (more freedmen and more of an idea that the slaves should be treated a little better/made more of a contribution to the economy) than down near where Booth escaped through Dr. Mudd country. Baltimore (200,000) supposedly had close to 25,000 black residents, mostly free (only about 87,000 slaves in the entire state). Baltimore was a city of textile manufacturing and a port of shipping interests and traders, tied closely to the Midwest by the B&O RR. While slavery still had a strong grip, economic ties to the North were also very strong and growing -- and the area Lee invaded twice was exactly the area where support for slavery and secession was weakest, and where Lincoln received the few votes (about 3,000?) he got in 1860.
Probably the odds of MD seceding before 1850 would have been greater, assuming that a Civil War had broken out. Here again, the growth of America and the arrival of the RR were bringing interconnections that changed society, so that MD was less "Southern" than Confederates wanted to believe. Given the history and the existence of slavery in both KY and MD, they had good reason for seeing it that way, but in hindsight the trends were making association of both these states with an independent Confederacy less likely with every year that passed.
Plus, if you were MD, would you have rushed to be the northernmost Confederate state in a Civil War? Particularly when MD has a long and exposed border with no defensible geographic barriers?
As a result, when the Confederates enter both states, their hopes meet with disappointment. Real support is absent; the states do not rally to them and recruits are few. Support is divided and evident mainly in well-wishers.
Regards,
Tim
No Negotiations -The Secret of U.S. Debt/Appropriations
By the middle of 1862, it was too late for the United States to negotiate. One need only realize that the U.S. Congress had made their appropriations for the Budget that ran until the middle of 1863.
The United States was beyond accepting the loss of land to the Confederacy. There was too much money expended and too much debt to accept anything but victory by the United States.
For the budget year, here are the actual costs for the U.S. Budget 1862-1863, ending June 30, 1863.
for the War Department, $599,298,600.83;
for the Navy Department, $63,211,105.27;
for payment of funded and temporary debt, $181,086,635.07,
Actually, with Lincoln and Davis in their respective offices, there very little to negotiate. To both men the cost of losing the war, was incalculable, in money terms.
Actually, with Lincoln and Davis in their respective offices, there very little to negotiate. To both men the cost of losing the war, was incalculable, in money terms.
I don't know if I agree with this. Neither Davis nor Lincoln seems governed by money in their actions.
I think Lincoln would have gladly swallowed any cost to reunite the nation, including the acceptance of slavery, during the first 12-15 months of the war. Davis, OTOH, would not accept anything less than the total victory of independence.
Even in 1865, Lincoln would have gladly made a deal that reunited the country, although I doubt he would have rolled back the Emancipation. He might have modified it somewhat, but I think be that point the Union was going to end slavery anyway by Amendment, so it would be only a minor concession, whatever he did.
In 1865, Davis is still insisting on the terms of the original secession: full independence. He was living in a dreamworld, with the Confederacy crashing down in ruins about his ears.Even in April, he has trouble realizing that the Union is about to crush Lee's ANV until the news of Sailor's Creek reaches him -- as Lee is surrendering at Appomattox.
They were both strong-willed, determined men. Lincoln, however, would compromise to get what he considered essential -- he was top-notch as a deal-maker. Davis had only one idea of how to make a deal: give him what he wanted.
Trice, that is what I was trying to say too (clumsily), that it was never a matter or money for either leader.
But, Lincoln and Davis were both equal in their willingness to compromise their positions to obtain, their incompatible goals.
Davis would have sacrificed anything, including slavery for independence and Lincoln would have sacriced everything (except eventualy emancipation) for Union.
Their war goals were equally incompatible with the other. There could have been peace, if only one or the other had weakened their stand on what the war was all about (from their views) and it was not money.
Trice, that is what I was trying to say too (clumsily), that it was never a matter or money for either leader.
But, Lincoln and Davis were both equal in their willingness to compromise their positions to obtain, their incompatible goals.
Davis would have sacrificed anything, including slavery for independence and Lincoln would have sacriced everything (except eventualy emancipation) for Union.
Their war goals were equally incompatible with the other. There could have been peace, if only one or the other had weakened their stand on what the war was all about (from their views) and it was not money.
OK, I understand you a little better now. But I still don't think I totally agree.
Davis position ends up being very different than Lincoln's. By the Winter of 1864-65, the Confederacy has essentially lost. Union armies can move wherever they wish without any realistic, effective Confederate opposition (certainly true East of the Mississippi, and would be true West of it when the Union turned its' eye that way.) Even in Virginia, Lee knows he cannot hold when the Spring weather brings the new Union offensive.
In that situation, why in the world would Lincoln compromise on anything important? Union victory is now all but assured; the only reason to negotiate is to try to make the end smoother, to reduce the horrible toll in life and property to both sides, and to make the next phase easier. But Lincoln is willing to negotiate and let the South down easy.
Davis, OTOH, still demands peace on his terms, and is still not willing to negotiate -- no matter the cost to his own people. For him it is total victory only; nothing else can be considered.
I think that, if the positions were reversed, Lincoln would have come to the table in 1865 prepared to swallow his pride and accept Union terms, if for no reason other than to spare the 10-20,000 Confederate casualties (guesstimated) that did happen in a hopeless cause after that. Davis refused to do so. That is a huge difference between the men.
Of course, if Lincoln had led the South ... maybe the Confederacy would have survived.
There certainly cannot be any real disagreement that Lincoln was much more far seeing and politically adept than Davis.
At Hampton Roads both Presidents expected little to be accomplished by the formal talks planned. Davis was using it as a clever ploy to discredit his political enemies in Richmond. Lincoln, ever the good politician, wanted to use it as a means to meet face to face with official representatives of his rivals. To, perhaps, establish personal relationships that might be useful in leading to more substantial meetings in the future.
Even with the war well enough in hand, to risk such a meeting, Lincoln was still looking and searching for ways to end the conflict as soon as possible, even in the most unpromising of circumstances.
Davis, with the Confederacy visibly disintegrating, was reduced to merely playing clever games against his political rivals.
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