I think that it would be interesting as we approach the aniversary of these events, to know what Pres. Lincoln was thinking about the issue of Sumter. Here is a memorandum he wrote for himself seemingly to clarify his thoughts on the matter:
Memorandum on Fort Sumter
March 18[?] 1861
Some considerations in favor of withdrawing the Troops from Fort Sumpter, by President Lincoln.
1st. The Fort cannot be permanently held without reinforcement.
This point is too apparent too [sic] need proof
The cutting off supplies and consequent starvation, not to mention disease, would compel surrender in a few months at ****hest, without firing a gun
2 The Fort cannot now be re-inforced without a large armament, involving of course a bloody conflict and great exasperation on both sides, and when re-inforced can only be held by sufficient number to garrison the post and to keep open communication with it by means of the harbor.
3. The Fort in the present condition of affairs is of inconsiderable military value, for: It is not necessary for the Federal Government to hold it in order to protect the City of Charleston from foreign invasion, nor: Is it available under existing circumstances for the purpose of collecting the revenue: and, It is difficult to see how the possession of the Fort by the Secessionists can be rendered a means of annoyance to the Federal Government. Every purpose for which the fort can now be made available would be better subserved by Ships of War, outside the harbor.
4 The abandonment of the Post would remove a source of irritation of the Southern people and deprive the secession movement of one of its most powerful stimulants.
5 It would indicate both an independent and a conservative position on part of the new administration, and would gratify and encourage those, who while friendly to the Union are yet reluctant to see extreme measures pursued.
6 It would tend to confound and embarrass those enemies of the Union both at the North and South who have relied on the cry of ``Coercion'' as a means of keeping up the excitement against the Republican Party.
7 If the garrison should, while in an enfeebled condition be successfully attacked, or from want of proper supplies should be cut off by disuse the administration would be held responsible for it and this fact would be used by their opponents with great effect.
8 The moral advantage to the Secessionists of a successful attack would be very great.
Objections
1st The danger of demoralizing the Republican Party by a measure which might seem to many to indicate timidity or in common parlance, "want of pluck.''
That this may be the first impression is probable but if the measure is justified upon the double ground of the small importance of the post in a military point of view and the desire to conciliate wherever this can be safely done a second thought will discover the wisdom of the course, and increase rather than diminish the confidence of the party in its leaders.
2d The danger of the movement being construed by the Secessionists as a yielding from necessity, and in so far a victory on their part
Annotation
[1] Copy, DLC-Welles Papers. There is some uncertainty about this three-page manuscript. It is not in Lincoln's handwriting. It may be a copy of a memorandum submitted to the cabinet, or a resume of conflicting views as Lincoln orally presented them to the cabinet. Although the first and third pages are dated March 18, 1861, this date seems to have been added later. There is no Lincoln autograph in the Lincoln Papers that resembles the manuscript, but its presence in the Welles Papers seems to justify its inclusion here. Presumably Lincoln was recapitulating the opinions of the several members of the cabinet submitted on March 15 and 16 in response to Lincoln's letter of March 15, supra.
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