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By 1863, the Confederacy could not win the war by their own actions.
Gettysburg and the Pennsylvania campaign was a desperate campaign, when one considers the logistic problems of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee wasn't sure if even Ewell's Corps, the first to enter PA, could live off the land.
Hood's Winter Campaign was total desperation for an army that saw no future, but only probable defeat.
Sterling Price's march to Westport, Missouri, near Kansas, in October, 1864, was another of the desperate campaigns to grab victory from the encircling jaws of defeat.
Certainly Lee must have seen the necessity of victory in 1863, as he risked so much. He saw the size and logistical strength of opposing army, that only had to find a capable commander. If not in the summer of 1863, when could the Confederacy expect victory.
Defeat did not come at Appomattox. Defeat had been marking time since Vicksburg and Gettysburg. In ways defeat started the very first year of the war, when the Confederacy could not control Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, western Virginia and the U.S. Territory of New Mexico. By July, 1863, much of the Confederate potency for victory was gone. Much of it was never there.
Through the years I have had considerable trouble unraveling the rationale for Lee's Gettysburg Campaign. At times it seemed that the desperation was focused more upon Keeping Lee and All of the AoNV in Va., rather than on it being a Make or Break campaign or Forlorn Hope.
While I realize there is a plethora of modern publishing backing up your arguments, I tend to disagree.
I am not sure there was ever a realistic chance for the Rebellion to win an all-out conflict with the United States; however, if there was even a glimmer of hope, it came with the Spring and Summer of 1864 and the Overland Campaign. Because of the pending Presidential elections, the staggering losses of Union arms in Virginia (and the West), and seeming lack of any real progress, the Federal cause reached all-time lows. Had anyone but Grant been in command of the Army of the Potomac, I am not sure even Sherman's successes would have overcome the gloom of the North, as a whole.
We like to discount the importance of the Eastern Theater, but to do so is to disregard the reality of the situation. At that time, the Army of the Potomac and their Southern adversaries were seen as the first armies of their respective governments. What happened there effected the overall perception of events to a greater extent than any other field of operation. So, when Lee was apparently able to stymie what had to seem the "last, best, hope" of the Union cause (Grant), depression and outcry against the Lincoln government naturally followed.
So, as I said, I don't know that you can accurately say that the Confederate opportunity for victory evaporated after July 3rd, 1863.
But, that's just my two cents on the matter...
Cheers and Fairwinds,
Brett Silver
I wonder how much the thought of sending VERY good soldiers, from a tactically victorious army, under a more than competent commander away,to a general who had proven that he was slow to move, chafed under orders, and was doing little to improve his record, kept Lee and Davis from detaching forces to the Vicksburg front?
Deep down, even if they wouldn't have said as much publicly, they had to know that Joe Johnston was not going to do a thing to seriously deter Grant from overpowering Vicksburg.
With their naval superiority, the Feds had an overwhelming advantage to begin with. Add in a rickety command structure on the Reb side. Top it all off with the lack of a mobile reserve (for the Confederates) under a dynamic commander to come to the aid of Pemberton, and the conclusion was clear. It made little sense to send off irreplacable men from the ONLY Southern force that had shown itself equal to their opponents, in order to march them in to witness the surrender of Vicksburg from the sidelines.
And, with Johnston's history, there is no reason to believe he would have been willing to return any soldiers loaned to him. In that case, Richmond would be compromised. This was unthinkable, and for good reason. Without Richmond, there is no Confederacy.
In short, though I am not certain Pennsylvania was an ideal destination (given 140-some years of hindsight), I really can't see sending prefectly good soldiers who were doing real good for their cause, off to march around Mississippi, watching Grant pound down the earthworks of Vicksburg.
Again, just my two cents worth...
Cheers and Fairwinds,
Brett Silver
but, this thread is more recent, so ..............
"'THE CLIMATE IN JUNE WILL FORCE THE ENEMY TO RETIRE': MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY OF A SAMPLE OF WISCONSIN MEN IN THE CIVIL WAR"
In May 1863, Confederate General Robert E. Lee advised his secretary of war and president not
to send any reinforcements to the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg, not because he doubted the
importance of holding that strategic location, but because he stated that "the climate in June will
force the enemy to retire." In other words, Lee made a calculation that the illness and death that a
Union army force would face in the Mississippi swamps would be more of a deterrent than any
number of new Confederate soldiers. Of course, we know that history proved him wrong. The
Union forces besieged Vicksburg throughout the month of June and it was the Confederates who
broke, not the Union."
Here is a link to a PowerPoint presentation which the above refers to, it's pretty interesting and has neat graphics. It gets a bit dull about half way thru, but don't miss picture 58.
Its fall precipitated the abandonment of Kentucky and Nashville. The Confederate's High Water Mark wasn't Gettysburg but rather around Perryville and Antietam. It was the closest they came to foreign recognition and with it, aid and assistance. Without such help, the Confederacy was doomed. Yep, there were plenty of desperate attempts in '63 to recapture the momentum, but the viability was already lost.
BTW, if Vicksburg hadn't fallen and Grant was shelved, the war may have lasted long enough for the Copperhead Democrats to unseat Lincoln. Rosecrans' defeat at Chickamauga buoyed Confederate spirits (especially after Vicksburg and Gettysburg) as much as it disheartened the Union. If the trapped army (now under Thomas) was captured or starved out, it is possible that the Copperheads could have won the election and that was the last great hope of the Confederacy to make it own its own.
Happily, things turned out the way they did. We still got plenty of great reading material from it.
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The Desperate Confederate Campaigns 
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