Chances of the Confederacy to win

[whitworth]

We have posters with a great variation of background and research and study levels.

Anyone by their research and reading, think the Confederacy had a better than 50% chance of winning indpendence at the start of the war? Any reasons why?

Anyone think secession was a great mistake, that the Confederate Founding Fathers never clearly understood at the start of the war? Your thoughts if so.

[ole]

Could be an excellent thread, Whitworth, with thoughtful discussions. Thanks for thinking it up.

I think there was a chance at the beginning for a Confederate win. Don't know if I'd put it at 50 percent and I certainly wouldn't make it more than that. Only in the beginning stages did the Confederacy enjoy equality of military assets. Had they wielded that parity with greater vigor early on, they might have taken Washington and scattered the government to the four winds. The chances of winning began a downward slide from that point on.

I can't wait for the opinions that secession wasn't a great mistake. "Never clearly understood"? Is anything of such magnitude as a war every clearly understood before the fact? If the secessionists clearly understood what they were getting into, they'd not have started. But they were too emotionally involved in that "honor" thing and irrational outrage to think of consequences. Better you should die than I should suffer the insult.
Ole

[samgrant]

Sure they had at least, if not more than a 50% chance to win Independence. After all, they did not need to defeat their enemy by conquest, etc. but only to resist the enemy. If they did not fire on Ft. Sumter or engage
in a similar act of aggression, there might not have been the will on the part of the North to pursue an armed conflict. There was, at the time, some of the attitude that the South be let go from the Union, and even 'good riddance'.

Clausewitz said something like you did not need to physically destroy the enemy, but you needed to defeat the enemy's will. We see that that will was severely strained at several points during the war.

Here's some observations by Edward Porter Alexander which somewhat address your question:

"In spite of all the odds agains us, it is my individual belief that on two occasions in the four years we were within reach of military successes so great that we might have hoped to end the war with our independence .... Possibly there were three such occasions. If so the first was at Bull Run July '61, when a vigorous pursuit might have caused the abandonment of Washington. This chance of June 30th '62 impresses me as the best of all." [Glendale] "The 3rd or last chance was Jun.13, 1864...."

"Perhaps the South never had any real chance of success in the war, from the start. Perhaps, the only real crisis of the war was the day she ventured to undertake it ....
When the South entered upon a war with a power so immensely her superior ... she could entertain but one single hope of final success. That was, that the desperation of her resistance would finally extract from her adversary such a price in blood & treasure as to exhaust the enthusiasm of its population for the objects of the war. We could not hope to conquer her. Our one chance was to wear her out."

There is also the 'chessboard' of war; in that from one opening move might result an almost infinite number of outcomes.

From Mark Grimsley:

"Complexity or chaos theory invites us to extend our metaphoric palette to encompass nonlinearity–the idea that small changes in inputs can produce huge changes in outputs. This is the famous Butterfly Effect—the idea that a butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon River basin can produce a typhoon in the far reaches of the Pacific Ocean. It’s also exemplified by the famous phrase:
For want of a nail the shoe was lost
For want of a shoe the horse was lost
For want of a horse the rider was lost
For want of a rider the message was lost
For want of a message the battle was lost
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail."

-http://warhistorian.org/wordpress/?p=271

[larry_cockerham]

Gentlemen, I fear you're once again standing too aloof (try spelling that one?) from reality as if the war was a game of chess and that all could be controlled from a nerve center. That's what SHOULD have happened, in the Congress of the United States. Dealing with humans, just didn't work out that way. Strategy, political and otherwise, just sort of went to the winds when the slugging started. Seems to me the combatants didn't much care why it started, just that if be over and the intruders or defenders be punished.

[ole]

As ever, Larry, words of wisdom. However, it doesn't apply to Whitworth's question.
Ole

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by whitworth

We have posters with a great variation of background and research and study levels.

Anyone by their research and reading, think the Confederacy had a better than 50% chance of winning indpendence at the start of the war? Any reasons why?

Anyone think secession was a great mistake, that the Confederate Founding Fathers never clearly understood at the start of the war? Your thoughts if so.

The point of my earlier attempt at responding in such a vague fashion was that looking at this war in such simplified terms is not doing the situation justice.

The "Confederate Founding Fathers" understood, but they were an extreme minority in numbers compared to the eventual participants. The chance that the Confederacy had at the beginning of the war was there because of the lack of readiness on the part of the Federal government and it's armies. Washington could have been toppled had the Confederate organization been truly organized and ready to go. Lee still came close for an instant, but no cigar. I don't believe the Confederate legislators who started this mess ever thought things would explode on so grand a scale. 50% was the apex. It fell from there.

[ole]

I don't believe the Confederate legislators who started this mess ever thought things would explode on so grand a scale. 50% was the apex. It fell from there.

An enthusiastic second to your motion.
Ole

[LAURN]

Due to the Southern way, they had little chance of winning (as dissappointing as that can be). If the South had been able to fight defensivly and just hold back the Union until they grew tired, they may of had a better chance of winning. But, this not being the case because two of the fatal battles of the south being offensive attacks (Antietam and Gettysburg). Nor, did the south have the right economy for a war. But, they had potential allies that would have given the South a good chance of winning. But at the beginning and throughout it was inevitable for them to loose due to the economical disadvantages and the fact that they were probably not willing to fight a defensive war.

The South was bound to seceed. From an early period of America, politics, lifestyles, and economy were split by region(north and south). The regions continously grew apart and everyone was looking out for the interests of it's own region. Though simplified, the great differences between te North and the South practically made secession unavoidable. I think the Confederate Founding Fathers uderstood perfectly what they did (not the war itself) but they understood reasons why they seceeded/ why they deemed it necessary.

[matthew mckeon]

Laurn: Be forward!

I would disagreed with you about events being "unavoidable." I think the CW was an avoidable event, or could have occured in a very different way. Because the event has already happened, it seems like it was inevitable, but I'm not so sure its true. Certainly the folks of the time had no idea. Secessionists may have hoped that fighting wouldn't occur, or for a quick victory, but some, like Davis, figured on a long struggle, which given the advantages of defense, they could win.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by LAURN

But, this not being the case because two of the fatal battles of the south being offensive attacks (Antietam and Gettysburg). .

The South was bound to seceed.

Laurn, I must agree with much of what you have posted,
but Lee was not on the offensive at Antietam.

The South may have been bound to secede, but not bound to succeed.