Civil War History - General DiscussionFor Discussions on Civil War Era Personalities, Politics, Issues, Campaigns, Battles, and more. Serious Civil War Discussions Only Please! All other posts will be deleted.
Just the opposite Ole, it was Lee's determination to Not break faith with Va. that limited him as a general of Confederate Armies.
The logic of the direct cause and effect of Lee's decisions in Va. with the war in the West, as the commander of the Confederacy's main army is a little more, than tenuous.
Lee did not fail Va., he failed the confederacy.
Lee did invade Pennsylvania without adequate supplies. That was one of the reasons for the move into Pennsylania - his army wasn't getting adequately supplied in Virginia.
The Army of Northern Virginia lacked shoes for many of the soldiers, horseshoes for the mules and horses, adequate forage for the artillery and wagon mules/horses on the trip north, and limited amount of ammunition, both artillery and small arms.
There may have been logistical reasons why Lee failed to take a wagon train loaded with pontoons, that might be needed for the Susquehanna River. One fact is sure - General Lee did not anticipate the rain, that would flood the Susquehanna and Potomac Rivers. To capture Harrisburg, Lee needed either captured bridges or low water, so the army could have access to the fords. General Early could not cross at Wrightsville, after the more than mile long bridge was burned. He had no access to cross fords, because of the frequent rain.
Stuart's Cavalry, which was the last large Confederate force to cross the Potomac River on the invasion north, had much difficulty getting his artillery over the Potomac River, because of the already rising river.
Few if any historians note that any hope of capturing Harrisburg, Lee's first objective, were dashed by rain.
The logic of the direct cause and effect of Lee's decisions in Va. with the war in the West, as the commander of the Confederacy's main army is a little more, than tenuous. Lee did not fail Va., he failed the confederacy.
The Confederacy was not Lee's responsibility; that fell on the Commanding General who was not Lee. Lee's position was commander of the AoNV. He may still have held the position of advisor to the CnC, but his involvement with the western armies were therefore limited to advice which was neither sought nor "needed." And was the AoNV the "main" army? What makes it so other than its proximity to the capitals?
I'm a bit perplexed with this trend to point fingers at Lee's failure to rescue Jeff Davis' tunnel vision. Lee made some moves out of desperation to keep the AoNV and the eastern war viable. That these moves contributed to the loss of the west is understandable, but to make Lee responsible for the loss is pushing it. Lee lost in the east; Jeff Davis lost the Confederacy.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
How threatened by McClellan was the AoNV after 2d Bull Run? How threatened by the Hooker led AoP, was Richmond after Chancellorsville?
Even AFTER Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, when Longstreet and his corps was detached from Lee and sent West, after all (when it was definitely too late), how threatened was the depleted AoNV (Or Richmond, for that matter) by the AoP led by the much superior army commander, Meade?
The importance of Vicksberg, was not lost on Davis, a Mississippian, but due to his misguided respect for the ever defferential opinions of Lee, on strategic matters, he abetted disaster. Davis, was misguided, Lee was blind.
As an aside, I am not denigrating Lee as a man or as a general. In fact, I admit that Lee's generalship was of a high order and those abilities were limited by his inability to see the war for Southern Independence as being of a different order than a war to save Va. An Independent Confederacy might have required the temporary loss of Richmond or even Va. itself. Could Lee have accepted that? Could Lee have retreated out of Va. and not see it as his abandoning Va. in her hour of need for an idea (southern independence) that he probably, did not believe in anyway?
Lee had so much more to offer the Confederacy, that his infatuation with the 'Ideal of Va.' seems almost tragic in its consequences.
So Much for Sending VA Confederate Troops to Mississippi
Sending troops from Virginia to Mississippi was logically and logistically impossible, in any wartime reasonableness.
Confederate rail transportation was abysmal and poorly connected.
Longstreet went from Virginia to northwest Georgia, but many of his troops did not arrive in time for the Battle of Chickamauga and he had none of his artillery, shipped from Virginia.
If rail transportation was viable for sending troops from Virginia to Mississippi, I've seen no historical attempt to route the troops on what railroad lines, the forage needed for the horses/mules, how many trains and cars were available to move how many troops, where their final terminal point by rail was, how far they would have to take "ground" transportation, and the estimated time of arrival.
I turn to Ole et al, who have superior details at their fingertips than me. Was there not a confederate RR trunk line going directly to Tn, but was broken by Union forces sometime just before Or after Gettysburg, necessitating the circuitous route by Longstreet?
It would have been available, I believe, if the decision to reinforce the West had followed either 2d Bull Run Or Chancellorsvile.
P.S. And it is possible that if the decision to reinforce the west had been decided upon AND communicated to the Western commanders, they might have made a major effort to protect that RR Line.
I believe the only two rail lines existing in Tennessee at the time of the war were the Nashville-Decatur and the Nashville-Chattanooga. The line to Decatur ran through Brentwood, Franklin, Columbia, Pulaski and then to Decatur. The Nashville-Chattanooga after completion about 1863 was the supply line to Sherman's troops in Atlanta and for a while as he moved eastward. That line remained in service for the most of the time with a strong Union guard. This line from Nashville through Smyrna, Murfreesboro, Shelbyville, Cowan to Stevenson, Alabama then linking with an east west line that generally followed the Tennessee river to Chattanooga. The terrain prevented other rail construction until well after the war.
I have come across two RR references for a direct, Va. to Tn. troop movement. One of them is the E. Tn & Va. which is, apparently the one I am referring to because it goes through Knoxville, which Gen Burnside took on Sept. 3-4 before the first elements of Longstreets Corps moved out Sept. 9.
However, I have run accross a reference to the Richmond, Bristol, Chattanooga Line, as the line broken that forced Longstreets circuitous rerouting through Atlanta. It is possible that these are two different names for the same RR.
In any case, a movent after 2d Bull Run or Chancellorsville, seems to have been feasible, not to say necessary.
I have come across two RR references for a direct, Va. to Tn. troop movement. One of them is the E. Tn & Va. which is, apparently the one I am referring to because it goes through Knoxville, which Gen Burnside took on Sept. 3-4 before the first elements of Longstreets Corps moved out Sept. 9.
However, I have run accross a reference to the Richmond, Bristol, Chattanooga Line, as the line broken that forced Longstreets circuitous rerouting through Atlanta. It is possible that these are two different names for the same RR.
In any case, a movent after 2d Bull Run or Chancellorsville, seems to have been feasible, not to say necessary.
As you may have guessed, I haven't concentrated my thoughts outside of middle Tennessee. I am however interested in the evolution of the railroads. I'm reasonably confident the east-west line through Knoxville would not yet (by 1865) have crossed the Cumberland Plateau. My guess is no further west than about Harriman. Many of those east Tennessee lines were built later for coal extraction. No references that I've seen here in Nashville talk about a line coming into town from the east. Certainly Forrest wasn't dealing with anything except the Nashville-Chattanooga in 1864, so I don't think there was another line this far west. 1860-65 mapping here in this area leaves a bit to be desired. Obviously a closer look is called for. There was no railroad into North Carolina since the first line to Asheville came with the Biltmore estate in the late 1890s from the NC side of the ridge. Line construction from Knoxville to Greenville and on to Virginia would have been relatively easy grade. Knoxville must have been a large enough town to warrant the construction unless there was a connection to the coal fields to the northwest of Knoxville, which is likely. Union occupation of course made anthing in that area of little interest to the Confederacy. The CSA effort could greatly have benefited from another 10 years worth of rail road construction, but it was simply not to be.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Lee the Enigma?????? 
Linear Mode
