Lee the Enigma

[OpnDownfall]

There was no ambivalence, in Lee's loyalty to Va. He did not take up arms against the Old Flag, in defense of slavery OR states rights. Lee's decision to go with his beloved Va. (WHEREVER that might lead) may have caused him great anquish, but his choice was clear and never in doubt, by him.
Lee patterned his life on the historical George Washington 'Father of his Country' Everything he did through his life (or said) was filtered through his concept of what Washington would have done (or said) in any similar situation, that Lee might find himself.
Although a Virginian, Washington had a broader vision of nationhood that Va. It is not clear that Lee had a similar vision outside Va. but that lack of clarity is not so much enigmatic as it may be descriptive of a limitation of Lee.

[JohnTaylor]

I would agree with what's been written here, especially Tim and Opn OpnDownfall.
I would only add that there was a straightjacket of duty in play with Lee and even to an extent Davis.
Lee, it would seem, felt contrained to fight on until his President told him to stop (or until further fighting would entail further effusion of blood for which there would be no compensation to his country's cause). This standard was met definitively on the morning of April 9th, 1865. After Lincoln's re-election, should Lee have advised Davis to seek the best terms he could get? Certainly. I believe (without checking the record) he did this. Could he have been more forceful? Probably, but that evaluation would depend on how forceful he was in fact with Davis.
Davis, on the other hand, seemed to feel that he could not surrender until the member States (or their representatives in Congress) had told him to. Until the States told him to seek terms, I would wager that Davis felt he was not at liberty to seek terms that woudl effectively disband the Confederacy.
This is what I mean by the straightjacket of duty. The decisions taken (or not taken in, say, February 1865) were not rational unless one views them from this legal perspective.

[JohnTaylor]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

I agree Trice, my point is, that Lee was Not an Enigma, his reasons for his beliefs and actions were simple and straight forward and well documented.
Fighting for Va., meant that Lee saw the war through a restricted lense, what was good for Va. May not have been what was good for the Confederacy.
After 2d Bull Run (or even Chancellorsville), would not sending significant reinforcements to Johnston, to save Vicksberg or Bragg in Tn, have been a better solution to Confederate chances of winning the war?

When Davis and Seddon suggested sending troops to Mississippi in May 1863, Lee doubted the sense in sending troops to Mississippi, because of questions on the time required for their movement (O.R. XXV, Part 2, pg. 713) and their “application” on arrival (O.R. XXV, Part 2, pg. 790.). One can interpret this latter reason in two ways, Lee had said elsewhere that the weather would be too hot for campaigning in Mississippi in June. Alternatively, Lee could have been making a comment on Joe Johnston’s willingness to use aggressively any troops sent to him. Given Johnston’s performance in Virginia in 1862, this was not a worthless consideration. Sending troops to Mississippi so Joe could do nothing with them would seem to be a poor use of these troops.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

This is not necessarily a matter of hindsight, attention to the gathering storm in the West, was being paid by officials in Richmond, including the President and, even, some in the AoNV officer corps. But, one of the main reasons that relief to the West was not forthcming, until too late, was the quiet but uncompromising opposition of Lee, who saw the safety of Va. as THE paramount reason for the existence of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The loss of Richmond and its military resources (Tredegar, etc.) and the embarrassment of moving the national capital, and the effect of such a move on popular will would lend credence to Lee’s views that Richmond should not be given up lightly. When Richmond did fall, the Confederacy survived less than a month.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

IMO It was no accident that Lee's army was not just the Army of Va.

Armies were named after the Departments of Districts in which they were stationed. The Department of the Potomac was renamed the Department of Northern Virginia in March 1862, before Lee took command.
Jackson referred to his unit as the Army of the Valley District for months after leaving the confines of the Valley District.

[JohnTaylor]

whitworth
I think that two considerations effected Lee's conduct.
1. Just because its difficult doesn't mean you don't do what you think is right, regardless of personal cost.
2. Previous periods of extreme trial gave reason to hope when the situation looked hopeless. In May of 1862, the Confederacy had suffered a string of serious setbacks (Donelson and the fall of Nashville, fall of New orleans, loss at Shiloh, capture of fort ouotside of Savannah, effectively closing off that town, retreat to the gates of Richmond, etc.) Falliong to these depths, and then recovering, by September to the point of invading non-Confederate States like Maryland and Kentucky, gave hope that, even if things looked bleak, the situation could improve. Also, in Lee's case, he no doubt knew of just how bad things got in the life of his personal hero, George Washington, when the Colonies were pretty darn close to folding in the winter of 1776-1777. Washington was able to pull things through a very difficult period, and eventully win. I believe that this had an effect on Lee (and probably others).

[OpnDownfall]

The question facing the leaders of the Confederacy, was not whether to reinforce the West, But, when.
Lee made two, essentially, pointless invasions of the North. After
Second Bull Run, Lee would have been facing McClellan, after Chancellorsville he would have been facing Hooker. After Gettysburg, Lee was forced to send Longstreet and his Corps, West anyway, and Lee manuevered, with no problem, against the AoP, under Meade, a much better army commander that either 'Little Mac" Or 'Fightin' Joe'
Longstreet, ended up being sent to Bragg, because the delay in the movement had already lost Vicksberg, the Mississippi River And the State of Mississippi.
If Lee's estimation of Johnston was that low, then it was his duty to so inform Davis, without being mealy-mouthed about it. That estimation directly influenced the loss of the Mississippis'. The point is, the biggest threat to Southern Independence was in the west not in front of Richmond. The threat from either McClellan OR Hooker (after their defeats), was surely not as pressing as that from Grant on the Mississippi Or even Roscrans in Tn, Longstreet certainly didn't think so.
Was Lee still opposed to sending reinforcements west After Gettysburg?.

[JohnTaylor]

OpnDownfall
Good post. I have a couple of comments.
1. I believe that Lee probably did offer assessments on Johnston, but verbally. My observations come only from the written record. Johnston had his advocates in the Confederate Congress, and he got the job (actually, he had the job all along because of the super-department over both Bragg and Pemberton, but had been reluctant to take charge until Grant was already across the Mississippi).
2. I am of the opinion that while the Confederacy lost its independence in the west, its best chance of winning was in the east. This was because of the relative superiority of the ANV (compared to the AOT, not over the AoP), Lee (compared to Bragg, not over Hooker or Meade). The relative imbalance was less in the east. Also, the chance of bringing about a decisive victory was greater in the east than in the west. Even if the AoC was decisively defeated (not exactly a likely outcome with Bragg in command of the effort), the defeated Union army could just fall back and regroup. The same would apply to Grant’s AoT. But in the east, a Union army defeated in south-eastern Pennsylvania would present an interesting choice to the commander of the AoP: (a) retreat towards Washington, and allow the ANV to cut off rail communications to Washington, or (b) fall back across the Susquehanna and expose Washington. Given the roll that the ANV was on in May 1863, this was not an unlikely outcome of a potential battle in July 1863. Around the first of June, Lee confided in BG Armistead L. Long. If events occurred in accordance with Lee’s plans, “the Federal Army, if defeated in a pitched battle, would be seriously disorganized and forced to retreat across the Susquehanna – an event that would ... very likely cause the fall of Washington and the flight of the Federal government.” (Armistead Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, pg. 269.)
In May 1864 Lee said:
If I could do so – unfortunately I cannot – I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I believe it to be our true policy, notwithstanding the failure of last year. An invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all of his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources. The question of food for this army gives me more trouble and uneasiness than every thing else combined; the absence of the army from Virginia gives our people an opportunity to collect supplies ahead. The legitimate fruits of a victory, if gained in Pennsylvania, could be more readily reaped than on our own soil. We would have been in a few days' march of Philadelphia, and the occupation of that city would have given us peace (Harry Heth in S.H.S.P., volume 4, pg. 153.)
Sending troops to the West would have been playing not to lose. Keeping the ANV together in May 1863 was playing to win.
3. By August-September 1863, Lee did not, I believe, object to sending Longstreet west, given the renewed menace from Rosecrans who had finally stirred himself in later June 1863, and taken Chattanooga on September 6th.

[ole]

Now this is an interesting, pleasant discussion. Advancing ideas rather than pressing them. Many thanks, gentlemen.

In May 1864 Lee said:
If I could do so – unfortunately I cannot – I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I believe it to be our true policy, notwithstanding the failure of last year. An invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all of his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources. The question of food for this army gives me more trouble and uneasiness than every thing else combined; the absence of the army from Virginia gives our people an opportunity to collect supplies ahead....

Question, John: The statement makes a good deal of sense, but I get just a glimmer of a hint of a hunch that there is touch of self-justification in there. Probably not, but did you squint at the date he wrote this? Did it not cross your mind as well?

Excellent series of posts, by the way. Thank you.
Ole

[OpnDownfall]

The strategic and tactical justifications for the Gettysburg Campaign, seem to be a mish mash of various objectives and happenstances, from which it was apprently hoped that some advantage would accrue to the Confederacy, although no single one is very convincing. Looking at it as objectively as possible, I cannot help seeing an over large raiding expedition. Lee's transport system was as rickety as ever and had no pontoon train anywhere near, for a major fording of the Susquehanna (if that was his intent, where was the train?) Meade was intent on protecting Washington D.C. and in case of defeat was planning a fighting retreat into the Washington Lines. Threatening the Capital was not a paralyzing blow, as Early discovered a year later.
Lee's justifications for invading the North was valid, as the South (but apparently, Not Lee) was learning in the West. The North was employing a two pronged attack by Armies in the West, while Lee is leading a raid, with only one army, in the East. Indeed, it is evidence of a great disparity of resources, and it behooves an intelligent commander to use his resources to the best advantage (wandering around in southern Pa., while the Mississippi is lost and Tn on the brink of the abyss. is not IMO, the best use of limited resources).
I, Agree that this was a matter for the President and his War Dept. to be aware of, but Lee was Davis' advisor on Military matters and his council was based on what was happening in Va. to the exclusion of the needs of the Confederacy a whole.
Again this is not meant as a criticism of Lee, the man ,or his Generalship, but as an observation that Lee may have had a lot more to do with 'lost cause' being lost, than many are willing to admit (Most especially by Lee, himself)

[JohnTaylor]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

The strategic and tactical justifications for the Gettysburg Campaign, seem to be a mish mash of various objectives and happenstances, from which it was apprently hoped that some advantage would accrue to the Confederacy, although no single one is very convincing. Looking at it as objectively as possible, I cannot help seeing an over large raiding expedition.

I think that it was at least that. At a minimum, it would have kept the ANV and the AoP out of Virginia for a summer. But it also presented an opportunity to strike a decisive blow should an opportunity present itself. The fact that Lee’s subordinates fumbled (and Stuart, Hill, Ewell, and Longstreet all of them did in one way or another) doesn’t make the concept unsound.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Lee's transport system was as rickety as ever and had no pontoon train anywhere near, for a major fording of the Susquehanna (if that was his intent, where was the train?)

In April 1863, Lee ensured that 600 feet of pontoon bridging was assembled at Gordonsville. (O.R. XXV, Part 2, pg. 735) This latter fact was interesting in its implications. The Potomac up-stream from Great Falls has numerous fords and often does not require bridging except after heavy rains, as Lee knew from the previous fall. The fact that the next closest river requiring that much bridging was the Susquehanna may be an indication of the breadth of Lee’s thinking. On July 3rd, this pontoon train was on the Potomac. Union cavalry destroyed most of it.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Meade was intent on protecting Washington D.C. and in case of defeat was planning a fighting retreat into the Washington Lines.

There is quite a difference between sending 17,000 men across the Potomac and sending 89,000. If Lee had pulled off another victory in southeastern Pennsylvania, and Meade had retired south into the massive MDW fortifications, then Lee could easily have cut the rail lines into Washington from the north (check the map, the junction north of Baltimore was a single point of failure). Then, President Lincoln would have faced some tough choices.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Threatening the Capital was not a paralyzing blow, as Early discovered a year later.

Early’s op was a raid, designed to draw as much of the AoP away from Petersburg-Richmond as possible. It did draw the VI Corps (Grant’s best corps) away for a few months, but at the eventual cost of the Army of the Valley District.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Lee's justifications for invading the North was valid, as the South (but apparently, Not Lee) was learning in the West. The North was employing a two pronged attack by Armies in the West, while Lee is leading a raid, with only one army, in the East. Indeed, it is evidence of a great disparity of resources, and it behooves an intelligent commander to use his resources to the best advantage (wandering around in southern Pa., while the Mississippi is lost and Tn on the brink of the abyss. is not IMO, the best use of limited resources).

If wandering around southern Pennsylvania was all Lee had in mind, you might be right.
I would offer two other factors:
1. Once Grant got his army across the Mississippi in early May 1863, the most valuable asset in Vicksburg was Pemberton’s army. The smart play was to delay the fall of Vicksburg as long as possible, but under no circumstance allow the army to get trapped inside. 97% of the Union vessels that attempted to sail past Vicksburg’s supposedly massive guns did so without sinking. 97%! And the last major move of Confederate forces from the Trans-Mississippi to the Cis-Mississippi occurred in April 1862, before Shiloh. Since that date, the Trans-Mississippi was not a great source of men or materiel for the Confederacy (beeves, maybe, but they could get those form central Florida).
Once Grant had taken Vicksburg, he was at an operational dead end. To move across Mississippi towards Alabama would have meant abandoning his river lines of communication for a long time, not the two weeks he did so in may 1863. And Holly Springs had shown Grant how vulnerable overland lines of communication were. I believe that Grant would have had to go elsewhere, maybe down to New Orleans, to try Mobile from the sea.
2. Lee was looking toward a new concept, which I would call political warfare. Noting the growth of Copperheadism that spring, Lee suggested to Davis that the Confederacy “should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening [its] enemies.” (O.R. XXV, Part 2, pg. 881.) I believe that the Pennsylvania campaign was to play a part in that dividing and weakening, not by destroying armies, but by undermining northern national will.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

I, Agree that this was a matter for the President and his War Dept. to be aware of, but Lee was Davis' advisor on Military matters and his council was based on what was happening in Va. to the exclusion of the needs of the Confederacy a whole.
Again this is not meant as a criticism of Lee, the man ,or his Generalship, but as an observation that Lee may have had a lot more to do with 'lost cause' being lost, than many are willing to admit (Most especially by Lee, himself)

I believe that Lee had some pretty obvious shortfalls in terms of generalship. The concept for the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863 wasn’t one of them.
Giving Lee the go ahead that spring was like giving the ball to Michael Jordan down by one point with 10 seconds to go in the game. He is your best player. He is the one that got you this far. Put the ball in his hands, and give him a chance to win the game for you.

[JohnTaylor]

Originally Posted by ole

Question, John: The statement makes a good deal of sense, but I get just a glimmer of a hint of a hunch that there is touch of self-justification in there. Probably not, but did you squint at the date he wrote this? Did it not cross your mind as well?

Ole, I don't recall for sure, but I believe that the topic of the conversation was how hard it was for Lee to feed the ANV. That was how Lee got onto the topic of the Pennsylvania Campaign.
But at the same time, I believe that lee was offensive enough to see the value of winning a large battle north of the Potomac. Numerous observers commented that the morale of the ANV was never better than in June 1863. They all believed they were unbeatable. Since Malvern Hill, they had won or fought to a draw the AoP every time: Cedar Mountain, Second Manassa's, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and in all of these (except the lop-sided Confederate victory at Fredericksburg), circumstances had conspired to keep portions of the ANV away from the battlefield (straggling at Second Manassa's and Sharpsburg, Longstreet's detachment at Chancellorsville). There was abundant reason to believe that if the army were kept well in hand, the trend would continue in Pennsylvania.