Civil War international - Page 2

OpnDownfall · #11 10-13-2006, 05:34 PM

An interesting foot note, concerning the long reach of the Civil War, Perhaps.
Apparently the only real lesson from the CW for the European Military, was the need for an integrated rail transportaion system designed for rapid deployment of troops and supplies to any of a countrys frontiers.
During the battle of the frontiers at the beginning of WW I the German Army expended great time and effort and treasure building a complex integfrated rail transportation system. The German General Staff expended the talents of of its members prodigiously to control and expedite the rapid buildup of an overpowering number of troopps to its Left Wing to roll through Belgium and crush the right wing of the French Army to the South of Belgium. The whole plan was predicated on the Maximum number of troops to be on the left wing and the minimum numbers of troops on all other frontiers.
When war was declared, every went according to plan until Russia made an unexpected (sooner than the Germans expected) the German High Command lost its nerve and removed 2 or 3 corps (I forget how many) from the left wing to be sent by rapid rail East, Ludendorf, Hindenburg's Chief of Staff, in the East opposing the Russian advance, had been a staff officer involved in the planning for the attack against France, was surprised, he notified his superiors that he did not think such a drastic step was necessary, besides which the diverted troops could not reach the East until after the imminent battle had been decided, in any case.
It is interesting speculation what would have happened with 2 or 3 extra corps available against the British flank attack on the Marne.
It is possible that a too faithful a reading of the Rail Road War in the American Civil War, caused the Germans to underestimate (or ignore) the frailties of the humans who still have to control and run a war, even if it was based on the detailed planned and use of the latest technology.

trice · #12 10-13-2006, 07:11 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

An interesting foot note, concerning the long reach of the Civil War, Perhaps.
Apparently the only real lesson from the CW for the European Military, was the need for an integrated rail transportaion system designed for rapid deployment of troops and supplies to any of a countrys frontiers.
During the battle of the frontiers at the beginning of WW I the German Army expended great time and effort and treasure building a complex integfrated rail transportation system. The German General Staff expended the talents of of its members prodigiously to control and expedite the rapid buildup of an overpowering number of troopps to its Left Wing to roll through Belgium and crush the right wing of the French Army to the South of Belgium. The whole plan was predicated on the Maximum number of troops to be on the left wing and the minimum numbers of troops on all other frontiers.
When war was declared, every went according to plan until Russia made an unexpected (sooner than the Germans expected) the German High Command lost its nerve and removed 2 or 3 corps (I forget how many) from the left wing to be sent by rapid rail East, Ludendorf, Hindenburg's Chief of Staff, in the East opposing the Russian advance, had been a staff officer involved in the planning for the attack against France, was surprised, he notified his superiors that he did not think such a drastic step was necessary, besides which the diverted troops could not reach the East until after the imminent battle had been decided, in any case.
It is interesting speculation what would have happened with 2 or 3 extra corps available against the British flank attack on the Marne.
It is possible that a too faithful a reading of the Rail Road War in the American Civil War, caused the Germans to underestimate (or ignore) the frailties of the humans who still have to control and run a war, even if it was based on the detailed planned and use of the latest technology.

Interesting thought.

To put this in perspective, the two leading RR nations in the world at that time were Britain and the US. Also, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Chief of the Prussian (eventually German) Great General Staff in the 1860s and 1870s, was an early investor in RRs (having discovered how easy it made the trip home to see his sweetheart while still a young officer).

Moltke stressed mobilization and quick movement to contact, based on RRs, from the time he came to power. It was the basis for the victory over Austria in 1866 (quick mobilization on the Austrian border and a multi-probged invasion before the Austrians were set). But they were unable to use the RR after crossing the border until it was rebuilt -- and no one had ever been anywhere near as good at that as the Union had been in the Civil War.

Moltke had also commanded in the field for the second half of the 3rd Danish War in 1864 where there were some tough logistics issues (called the "Potato War" because of all those Danish, Austrian, and Prussian soldiers digging up farmer's fields).

In 1870-71, a quarrel broke out between Bismarck and Moltke. This was after the French field armies were smashed, in the siege of Paris phase. Bismarck wanted Moltke to shell the city to speed up the negotiations (the French were stalling). Moltke refused. The Germans had only been able to get a single RR line working from the border to Paris. If he was going to shell the city, he would have to put more artillery ammo up front -- and he needed every car for food and forage for his armies.

The negotiations dragged on. Eventually the Germans got a second RR line working to the front. Moltke sent artillery ammo forward and opened up on Paris. Suddenly the French were a lot more willing to talk, and a treaty was worked out.

After this, the Germans seem to have decided Something Had To Be Done. They adopted the Civil War USMRR organization wholesale.

The plans for WWI with the incredible RR timetables for troop movements were a feature of all the European nations as that conflict approached. If a nation could get its troops mobilized on the border a few days earlier than the enemy, it could possibly win the war in a week or two. This was the lesson of 1866 and 1870, the Age of Moltke. Fanatical attention to this was a survival need -- although the Germans were conspicuously devoted to it. Von Schliefen made a mania of it during his term as Chief of Staff, and even after he retired he exerted vast influence. But that also extended to the march routes and timetables of the infantry after they crossed the border, marching on foot.

Also, if you actually look at a detailed map of where the Western Front ended up after the "Race to the Sea" In September-October 1914, you will find that the positions are determined largely by where the railheads of the different sides were. This was because the support requirements were such that only RR transport made sense. In particular, the incredible use of artillery required ready access to a RR for resupply, and reinforcements could be moved up faster by RR than any other way.

Regards,
Tim

matthew mckeon · #13 10-14-2006, 11:53 PM

Excellent post Tim: is the Great War an interest of yours?

Back to how others viewed the War, a question and an anecdote:

Question: Why would France want to see the US breakup? Because of their ambitions in Mexico? If the CSA had triumphed, would it have been more tolerant of European intervention in Latin America than the US?

Anecodote:
I dimly recall that the great Italian patriot and general Girabaldi was offered a command in the Union Army. Does anyone know the particulars?

On the "Civil Warriors" blog, there are excerpts of the diaries of two French officers, and members of the royal family who joined McClellan's staff. Very worth checking out.