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Have been working my way through Steven Woodworth's "Nothing But Victory" and came upon what I found to be a very bold statement by Dr. Woodworth with respect to Sherman given my ever growing but limited study. Citing pgs 280-281 on the discussion of Chickasaw Bayou where he clearly lays the blame of the Federal repulse on Sherman, Dr Woodworth writes:
" In a war in which nearly all generals struggled to find successful offensive tactics to cope with the new weapons of the mid-nineteenth century, Sherman stands out for exceptional ineptitude on the tactical offensive. A splendid defensive tactician, a tower of strength in the midst of intense fighting, a profound thinker about the nature of the war, and a brilliant strategist and logistician, Sherman simply did not have the knack for planning and executing successful assaults. A sense of his own weakness in this area may have prompted him to turn over direction of the Chickasaw Bayou operation to Smith and Morgan. Sherman's success as a general was going to depend on how well he could work around this one glaring gap in his abilities."
Covering Sherman in a very positive light through most of my reading of Dr Woodworth's work to this point, I found this to be quite an indictment and bold position to step out on. Would most who have studied him in any detail, pro or con, agree with this assessment?
Respectfully,
Spartan
Sherman on Grant (and on himself):
"Wilson, I'm a ****ed sight smarter man than Grant; I know more about organization, supply and administration and about everything else than he does; but I'll tell you where he beats me and where he beats the world. He don't give a **** for what the enemy does out of his sight but it scares me like hell. I'm more nervous than he is. I am much more likely to change my orders or to countermarch my command than he is. He uses such information as he has according to his best judgment; he issues his orders and does his level best to carry them out without much reference to what is going on about him...."
__________________ -
"It was a very peculiar time." - Franklin D. Cossitt
Ancestors in USA Army: 6th IA Inf, 11th IL Cav, 1st AL Cav; 122nd NY Inf; 6th MI Cav; 35th MA Inf; 100th IL Inf; 1st CO Inf/Cav; 22nd IN Inf
Have been working my way through Steven Woodworth's "Nothing But Victory" and came upon what I found to be a very bold statement by Dr. Woodworth with respect to Sherman given my ever growing but limited study. Citing pgs 280-281 on the discussion of Chickasaw Bayou where he clearly lays the blame of the Federal repulse on Sherman, Dr Woodworth writes:
" In a war in which nearly all generals struggled to find successful offensive tactics to cope with the new weapons of the mid-nineteenth century, Sherman stands out for exceptional ineptitude on the tactical offensive. A splendid defensive tactician, a tower of strength in the midst of intense fighting, a profound thinker about the nature of the war, and a brilliant strategist and logistician, Sherman simply did not have the knack for planning and executing successful assaults. A sense of his own weakness in this area may have prompted him to turn over direction of the Chickasaw Bayou operation to Smith and Morgan. Sherman's success as a general was going to depend on how well he could work around this one glaring gap in his abilities."
Covering Sherman in a very positive light through most of my reading of Dr Woodworth's work to this point, I found this to be quite an indictment and bold position to step out on. Would most who have studied him in any detail, pro or con, agree with this assessment?
Sherman was an excellent general in many ways, but not all. His ability as an offensive tactician seems particularly bad. His performance at Chickasaw bluffs was bad, but not unusual for him. At Chattanooga a year later, Pat Cleburne with about a reinforced division of Confederates bloodies Sherman with 4 divisions. Sherman's attack is badly planned and uncoordinated, done without mutual support.
His performance throughout the Atlanta Campaign shows Sherman in the same light, and this seems to be how Sherman saw himself, as a poor tactician. At an operational or strategic level he was often excellent. Someone suggested Castel's work on the Atlanta Campaign earlier; I think you'll find much the same opinion on Sherman expressed there.
With all due respect Wild Rose in reference to your comment on his failure to "square off in front of the Confederate army", unless I am reading revisionist history if Johnson would have stood his ground at Kennesaw Mtn, perhaps the tale of Atlanta might have been a different tale to tell.
I could be wrong, but I am pretty sure it was Johnson doing the Georgia two step backwards. The scorched earth policy, well thats another issue for another day and one we are much more on the same page with.
Respectfully,
Spartan
After Sherman's attack and failure at Kennesaw, he resorted to his flanking maneuvers and would have flanked Johnston out of Atlanta had Joe not retreated. Atlanta was the AOT's supply depot and the south's last connection with the east. Seems to me to have been the smart thing to do, No?
I believe with a little browzing you can find several long threads here concerning Bill Sherman and his US Army in Georgia. The fact is that he was in deed a very good soldier. The folks in his path in Georgia simply didn't appreciate all that due to his scorced earth policy. The folks who met him face to face and fed him chickens, hogs and furniture that they were planning on using for themselves just never became enamored. That pretty much sums it up. They still call him a yankee in Georgia.
I believe the proper pronunciation is "damyankee!" With emphasis "goddamyankee!"
After Sherman's attack and failure at Kennesaw, he resorted to his flanking maneuvers and would have flanked Johnston out of Atlanta had Joe not retreated. Atlanta was the AOT's supply depot and the south's last connection with the east. Seems to me to have been the smart thing to do, No?
Don
Sherman could not have flanked Johnston out of Atlanta from Kennesaw. Atlanta had multiple lines of supply at the time, notably from the west and south through West Point, GA and from the east and south through Macon, GA.
At Kennesaw, Sherman did flank Johnston (imagine that) to the west and Johnston fell back to a fortified line which had been prepared well in advance.
Sherman then flanked Johnston to the north/east and Johnston fell back across the Chattahoochee River and into Atlanta from there.
Johnston soon afterward departed the scene altogether.
discussing the Sherman damage to the south which more or less diss's it.
Don
Thank you for the link to Mr Grimsley's article. I had it saved on my old computer before viruses trashed it and had not managed to find it again. Well written and pretty ****ing about the mythology that permeates the march.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
discussing the Sherman damage to the south which more or less diss's it.
Don
More thanks for that link. I am currently reading Grimsley's The Hard hand of War - Union Military Policy Towards Southern Civilians 1861-1865, which is a very interesting study and I would expect might be a broader view of the Sherman thing. I'll do a book report for you in the Book Reviews section when I finish it.
__________________ -
"It was a very peculiar time." - Franklin D. Cossitt
Ancestors in USA Army: 6th IA Inf, 11th IL Cav, 1st AL Cav; 122nd NY Inf; 6th MI Cav; 35th MA Inf; 100th IL Inf; 1st CO Inf/Cav; 22nd IN Inf
More thanks for that link. I am currently reading Grimsley's The Hard hand of War - Union Military Policy Towards Southern Civilians 1861-1865, which is a very interesting study and I would expect might be a broader view of the Sherman thing. I'll do a book report for you in the Book Reviews section when I finish it.
I've read snippets of the book and ordered the cursed thing twice both times being told they were out of stock...
Grimsley's & Woodworths Shiloh Battlefield guide is superb. and if you can get your paws on his Diary... I don't recall the title but it is a splendid example of an average IOwa soldier.
His Hard Hand of War is a priceless study of policy towards civilians. Another Grimsley work that I have read snippets of... most of the book actrually but never manage to buy the thing. I blame the library... too easy to get via interlibrary loan.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
After Sherman's attack and failure at Kennesaw, he resorted to his flanking maneuvers and would have flanked Johnston out of Atlanta had Joe not retreated. Atlanta was the AOT's supply depot and the south's last connection with the east. Seems to me to have been the smart thing to do, No?
As long as he was in the mountains north of Atlanta, Sherman was limited by the need to keep his army close to the RR. It was discovered that the limit was 3 days haul by wagon from the railhead. After that, the horses and mules began starving, as they could not haul enough fodder for the roundtrip. In the rough and broken terrain of north Georgia, this prevented truly wide flanking movements.
Once in the more open country around Atlanta, Sherman had more maneuvering room.
Have been working my way through Steven Woodworth's "Nothing But Victory" and came upon what I found to be a very bold statement by Dr. Woodworth with respect to Sherman given my ever growing but limited study. Citing pgs 280-281 on the discussion of Chickasaw Bayou where he clearly lays the blame of the Federal repulse on Sherman, Dr Woodworth writes:
" In a war in which nearly all generals struggled to find successful offensive tactics to cope with the new weapons of the mid-nineteenth century, Sherman stands out for exceptional ineptitude on the tactical offensive. A splendid defensive tactician, a tower of strength in the midst of intense fighting, a profound thinker about the nature of the war, and a brilliant strategist and logistician, Sherman simply did not have the knack for planning and executing successful assaults. A sense of his own weakness in this area may have prompted him to turn over direction of the Chickasaw Bayou operation to Smith and Morgan. Sherman's success as a general was going to depend on how well he could work around this one glaring gap in his abilities."
Covering Sherman in a very positive light through most of my reading of Dr Woodworth's work to this point, I found this to be quite an indictment and bold position to step out on. Would most who have studied him in any detail, pro or con, agree with this assessment?
Respectfully,
Spartan
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