McClellan AND Grant

[tamaroa]

Hope you all are recovering nicely from all that Turkey. I had Roast Pork myself since Turkey isn't good for the gout-ridden . Over the last couple of years, my opinion of McClellan has changed somewhat. To the point where I believe that had he not had the Army of the Potomac and trained it as he did, I wonder if Grant would have done as well without McClellan being on the scene previously.

I was brought up in the 50's. Back in those days, McClellan was pretty much lumped into a class of buffoons with Pope and McDowell, Hooker, Burnside, etc. All historians practically looked upon Grant as the second coming of Christ. I too fell into this trap but over the last several years, I must admit to appreciating Mcclellan more and more.

McClellan trained and equipped the Army of the Potomac. He had seen what a great fight can do to an army since he had been an observer in the Crimean War. Little Mac was loved my his troops. McClellan's fault was that he loved his troops so much that he could not bear to bring them into fierce combat to destroy that thing he loved so much. Grant whom I have little respect for save one thing was stubborn, saw a goal and went for it. He took the army that Mac had melded together and dashed it against the rocks so to speak. So here is my question, do you think that as inept as McClellan was as far as committing and fighting troops in a pitched battle, that he contributed to Grants success by forging the Army of the Potomac into a fighting machine or do you think that McClellan's influence was transitory and gone by the time Grant took over.

I know he had his problems was pretty vain and pompous and did not exactly treat Lincooln with respect. He also illustrated how unwilling he was to commit his troops to a major engagement by his three piece-meal attacks at Sharpsburg, but all that aside, he DID put the AOP together and trained it well.

Personally as time has gone by I have learned to appreciate McClellan's influence more and more.

Regards,

Bill

(Message edited by Tamaroa on November 29, 2003)

[hoosier]

Yes, I think McClellan definitely deserves a great deal of credit for molding the Union Army into an effective fighting force.

We have to remember that the Civil War forced a massive increase in the size of the army, which necessarily meant that, all of a sudden, the majority of the army consisted of men who had never been soldiers before and who were totally unaccustomed to military life. Had McClellan not done such a good job of whipping the newcomers into shape, I sincerely doubt that Grant would have enjoyed the success he did. For that matter, I'm inclined to think that the Confederates might have won the war before Grant ever had the chance to take control.

[johan_steele]

My only problem w/ the theory that Grant wouldn't have done as well if he hadn't taken over an army trained & equiped by Mclellan is that Grant won several campaigns in the west w/ troops who had never seen Lil Mac.

George remember that the South had the same problem and they lacked the benefit of the Regular Army...

Frankly I think after 63 it was just a matter of time...

Lil Mac's worst enemy was himself.

I have long been a defender of Little Mac. Not only did he "make" the army but his fighting ability was under-rated as well. It was a matter of style. Mac loved his troops. He wanted to avoid wholesale slaughter of his own men. He would rather wear down the enemy and jockey for position until the odds were in his favor. Not just numerical superiority but terrain, positioning etc.

Of course too, by the time Grant appeared in the east the Confederate army had lost much. The Anaconda Plan had played it's part. As well as the loss of manpower that could not be replaced. The new confederate troops could not train as well in arty due to lack of resources.

Don't forget Mac had major debilitating political pressures daily that Grant did not have. If Mac had the free reign Grant did, he might well have won the war with far less casualties. It just would have taken longer.

I also think Hooker and Burnsides were better than they have been given credit.

Just my two cents.....

YMOS
tommy

[rivrrat]

Hooker could be. Burnside nah. But, I agree Little Mac deserved better than he got. Was it Marse Bob that said something to the effect that to be a good officer you have to love the army, to be a good commander you have to be willing to destroy the thing you love? The second part was Mac's problem.

(Message edited by rivrrat on November 29, 2003)

[tamaroa]

We can only speculate, but I believe that Mac whipped the army into a fine fighting machine. And I believe that had he concentrated his forces at one point at Sharpsburg, Lee would probably have been defeated. With the attacks spread out as they were, Lee had the opportunity to move his battle-weary troops from one place to another to reinforce the Mac's next target. That explains the Confederate's high casualty percentage during Sharpsburg, about 33 percent because the same troops were exposed to fire two or maybe three times as they were shifted around in battle.

Regarding Hooker and Burnside. I believe Hooker was better than we generally give him credit for. On the other hand, Burnside in my opinion was terrible. He showed no sense of vision at Fredricksburg. He also made a disaster of the crater and his crowning moment of indecisiveness and incomptenece shown through at Bermuda Hundred toward the end of the war where the Confederate troops kept him bottled up at the Penninsula and effectively elimininated him from the war. Where I do give Burnside credit is his refusal initially to take command of the AOP. The average soldier had little faith in him as well.

Ah .... I am not going to put up too strong a fight defending Burnsie. Mainly since it is near impoosible to do. The failure at the Crater though, while he always gets the blame, was more Grant's fault than anyone else's. Burnsie had drilled his one division that was the least debilitated. He drilled them specifically to attack the Crater and beyond. He trained them thoroughly. But once Grant found out they were black he refused to let them lead the assault. When the black troops finally did hit the hole, it was so clogged and Confed reenforcements arriving it was too late for their specialized training to do any good...So it is Grant who deserves the blame. Burnsides idea was extremely sound.... Fredericksburg could have likely never succeeded but one thing was apparent. Before, during and after the battle. His subordinates were trying to submarine his command from day one.

But there ya are.....

YMOS
tommy

(Message edited by aphillbilly on November 29, 2003)

[tamaroa]

These are diary entries pertaining to Burnside and the army in the weeks after the battle. From the 1863 diary of Caspar Tyler then Captain, 141st PVI.

Monday, January 19, 1863
Cold and cloudy today. Marching postponed until tomorrow at 2 o'clock. Speculation ripe as to where our destination is. Probably a flank movement, and so far as I can see points toward the enemys left. It must be done with great dispatch if successful. Our Generals have yet to learn that quickness of movement is the one thing needful to success. Burnside addressed his troops today telling them the auspicious moment has arrived. Hope tis true.

Tuesday, January 20, 1863
Warmer than yesterday with indications of a storm. Orders came changing the hours for marching to 11 o'clock instead of 2. Don't feel like marching but can't bear the idea of being left behind. Ready with full haversack. While in line the chaplain handed me a letter from L. She is soon to go to Elmira to school. I am glad to hear such good news. We marched some 12 miles to a point on the river on the enemys left. At dark it commenced raining a sad commencement for this move The success of which depends so much on the quickness with which it is executed.

Wednesday, January 21, 1863
Rain, rain, rain. It has rained all night with the army wallowing upon a sea of mud. The pontoons instead of spanning the river are stuck fast in the sand. Our reg. is detailed to help haul them out. We worked until noon when we were relieved. Such work! It is enough to discourage even a patriot! Saw Gen. B. on the ground. He looked careworn and disappointed. Poor man! Lt. Col. Warner of his staff with him. Saw him a moment. He is looking well. A good position. I wish I had as good. The move will have to be abandoned. We are literally stuck in the mud. Rained all day.

Thursday, January 22, 1863
The "skedaddelle" has commenced. The day is heavy with portending storms. The soldiers are at work "cordoroying." The roads are terrible, it taking from 8 to 12 hours to move a single piece of ordinance. This is what comes of making a winter campaign in Virginia. Alas, the poor Country lies bleeding in every (form?) because its friends are disunited, (imbecile?) & corrupt. Would that God would raise up an arm strong enough to save us. Salvation now can only come from above.


Friday, January 23, 1863
Foggy, cloudy, damp, miserable day. The troops are moving slowly back to their camps. What terrible days these have been-exceeding in horror those of the peninsula; so says the "old soldier." The boats we are compelled to leave. The artillery is floundering in the mud. We are ordered back to camp. We leave (illegible) and straggle across lots to our old "place of abide," which we find in a dilapidated condition. Oh, how tired and sick I am tonight. As soon as our primitive bed was fixed I turned in and slept until Saturday morning, when....

[gary]

I think Bruce Catton said it first. McClellan was excellent in raising and training armies. However, when it came to committing his cherished army to blood, he was extremely reluctant. Granted he suffered from poor intelligence during the Peninsula Campaign (thank you Pinkerton Detective Agency), but he should have redeemed himself at Antietam where he could have finished Lee off but didn't.

Brilliant organizer, but not a battlefield leader.