LAST MAJOR CONFEDERAT OFFENSIVE

[rivrrat]

Well guys, I can’t disagree with your answers. Both Franklin and Westport have been called the “Gettysburg of the West.” You have to remember that I was born in Missouri and am inherently incapable of thinking of any thing East of the Mississippi River as “West.” Hell I was born in Western Missouri; “back east” to me is St. Louis. All I ask is that you concede that my answers are as good as yours.

Edward, that is exactly what I am saying. Fort Davidson was militarily insignificant. Price had no supply lines; he carried some supplies and relied on foraging or capture for the rest. The garrison was too small, 150 men, to be a threat to Price’s troops. He should have bypassed it as Gen. Shelby urged him to. The decision to storm the fort was another mistake. Price held the high ground around the fort; he had sufficient artillery to reduce it by shelling. He didn’t due to the presence of civilians in the fort.

[ewc]

Doug,

I agree with you as to Price and Ewing at Ft. Davidson. I think Ewing's presence there presented a mortal stumbling block to Price's plans in his offensive. Several things:

-First off, his initial destination was St Louis and its glittering array of supplies, which Price felt he had a chance of taking with a rapid descent upon what would initially have been a smallish garrison force;

-I understand the Union force at Ft Davidson to be about a thousand men. It would be dangerous for Price to leave such a force operating in his rear. If it could be scooped up with little delay and slight cost, the supplies and arms gained would be very providential, and the victory gained would be a fine and relatively easy feather in the cap of the Confederates to embolden the troops and the home folks and go a good way towards helping Price accomplish his goals with his offensive;

-And now the hated Ewing is at hand and at a disadvantage. In fact, at such a disadvantage that Price and the Missourians in his column must for the most part have salivated at the idea of putting the noose about this devil's neck.

Here is Eve's Apple in Price's Eden however. Sacrifice time and take this devil Ewing, and possibly lose out on despoiling St Louis? Bypass Ewing and Ft Davidson, thereby not only losing a military and moral victory, but sowing doubts in his Missourian Army's heads as to their abilities (and Price's decision- making) and sending an equivocal message to Missouri citizens of both sides? If Ewing is not at Ft Davidson, this moral dilemma does not exist for Price- it is then a mostly military decision, whereby Shelby's advice to bypass this place might have been taken and properly made.

So could Price really have left Ewing behind? I think for Price it's a matter of 'It's the devil in my right hand and the devil in my left hand.' I don't think he could afford to bypass Ewing, so he opted to take on Ft Davidson, but not to give up the purpose of advancing on St Louis and Jefferson City. Hence he tried a frontal assault when besiegement and bombardment were what was necessary if he was going to commit.

This is his undoing. Otherwise, I think the purpose and planning of Price's offensive are appropriate strategy. What do you think, Doug?

[rivrrat]

Edward,
I agree with you on some points but not on others. I agree that it was politically impossible for Price to by-pass Fort Davidson. The effect of General Order #11 on the people of the western border was devastating. IMHO the counties of Missouri south of Kansas City never fully recovered, I grew up in the region and still live close. Ewing was the most hated man in Missouri, at least among southern sympathizers and many unionists thought he had gone too far. I think that Price couldn’t have just ignored him on that basis.
Militarily, on the other hand, Price’s assault on the fort made no sense what so ever. I disagree that Ewing’s 1500 men presented a threat to Price’s rear. (The 150 men I mentioned in an earlier post was a typo.) I have seen estimates of Ewing’s strength ranging from 1,000 to 1,500. I tend to think the higher figure is closer. You have to remember that Price’s Primary objective, the capture of St. Louis, depended on speed. Price had no supply lines to be cut. He had brought all the supplies available with him. Remember that 4,000 of his troops had no weapons he was counting on capturing weapons and supplies as he moved. His ability to hold St. Louis was predicated on recruiting troops as he moved in Missouri and the capture of supplies and weapons to support them.
The purpose of Price’s invasion of Missouri was mostly political in my opinion. He was trying to affect the 1864 election. Had eh succeeded in capturing St. Louis and installing a Confederate government in Missouri, it is possible that Lincoln would have been defeated. In which case a negotiated end to the war was possible. I think that Confederate sympathy in Missouri was less that price expected and his plan was doomed for that reason.
There is also some indication that Price was thinking of forming a second Confederacy, Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas, in case a negotiated settlement would give them away. But, that’s another thread.

[ewc]

Doug-

Yeah, Ewing seems to have been a bee in Price's bonnet alright. Seems to have got him and poisoned his brains. Price's decision, I think, was quickly reached, but his handling of the assault on Ft Davidson was abysmal- poorly planned,arranged, and executed. Yet all could have been salvaged had the forces surrounding the fort been properly posted after the assaults had failed and a proper watch kept. However, Ewing and the garrison got away in the night, while successfully blowing the magazine to deprive Price of the badly needed munitions and stores. Thus did Ewing abort any success Price may have been hoping to claim in this endeavor right at the get-go!

The descent upon St Louis had to be known to Price as something of a gamble. Until it could be reinforced, a swift movement upon it was his only real chance of success. Therefore I don't see how he could have hoped to capture the city and hold it. Capture and loot and gain his objectives of disrupting the Union war effort, gaining needed supplies, recruits, and prestige to his and Southern arms I can all see. There is no way though that he could have hoped to hold St Louis- unless all his eggs were off the cracked variety. That may be the case if he was planning some type of Western Confederacy as you explain.

As to leaving Ewing in his rear, I agree it wouldn't have been a great deterrent to a large, mobile cavalry force. However part of the problem Price had as he swung west from St Louis to Jefferson City and Kansas City and south from there was that he had 3 large forces moving against him from different directions. To stand up and fight anywhere after St Louis was to invite annihilation. As it was, he avoided annihilation- barely; his army was only decimated.

Still, Price's invasion was probably the right call. Just those two days at Pilot Knob he would have best just have stayed home in bed!

Regards, ewc

[rivrrat]

Edward,
He wouldn’t have to have held it long, a few weeks would have sufficed, enough to put doubt in the northern population and swing the election. However, I think that he envisioned a grander plan. Remember that he brought the Confederate governor of Missouri with him, hoping to install a Confederate government in Jefferson City. He thought that there would be enough support and recruits from the people of Missouri to make this feasible. I think that Price had been overestimating the southern sympathy in Missouri from the beginning. While there was a lot of support particularly in the early years, there was never enough to actually pull Missouri out of the Union. Remember that Missouri contributed a lot more Union Regiments to the war than it did Confederate.
One more observation, most of price's troops were mounted infantry rather than cavalary.
I would like your thoughts on the other end of the invasion, Westport and the Kansas City area.

[ewc]

Doug

I'm afraid I don't know as much about the Civil War in the West as I would like. My knowledge comes basically from long histories such as Shelby Foote, bits and pieces gathered here and there, and from articles in ACW magazines. I am going to go back and look through my magazines as well as Foote and review. In the meanwhile, I will say that my impression is that Price managed his affairs rather well passing west from his abandoned goal of relieving St Louis of its Union affiliations. He overwhelmed Union detachments in his way at various places while staying ahead of and with an eye out for converging Union forces about him. At Westport and the actions surrounding it, I believe Price acquitted himself very well- as well as could be hoped for. That is not to say he should have defeated the Yanks, but his plan was a bold one, the risks were evaluated and prepared for, and he relied heavily on his commanders, who were good and able men, one of whom, Jo Shelby, was the finest commander in the Trans-Miss. So holding off Pleasanton's cavalry in the rear at Big Blue Creek with Marmaduke's horse, he tried to overcome Curtis and the Frontier Army along Brush Creek with Shelby and Fagan's divisions, succeeding initially, but Curtis is the Western Yankee equivalent of Pap Thomas- he held then made his own gains. With too many Yankees prowling about north, east, west, and rapidly south; he had to pull out southward. But the plan to hold off one opposing force while striking the other and prevailing- to swing back and overcome the other- due credit for his courage and audacity accord to Price. Sounds very much like something from the 'Confederate Cavalry Commander's Playbook', doesn't it?

As to the retreat South, Price had to continually make choices about retaining his train of much needed plunder, or saving his troops. That he consistently chose to protect his trains I think goes a long way to illustrating the dire, if not hopeless, physical condition of the south West.

regards,ed

Your views on all this i am very much looking forward to reading.

[rivrrat]

Ed,
Sorry to be so long in posting on this. Yeah, I agree with your assessment of the situation facing Price in October 1864. Once he realized that there was no possibility of taking St. Louis or establishing a Confederate State Government in Jeff City, his backup plan was the capture of desperately needed military supplies and equipment and disrupting the flow of union troops from Missouri to the east. He was doing it pretty well too, as he let Pleasanton chase him across Missouri. By the time of the Battle of Westport most accounts agree that he had a wagon train consisting of about 1,000 wagons. Most sources also agree that he had his eye on Fort Leavenworth Kansas, hoping to capture the supplies there before he moved south. I think he was again a little greedy.
Having said that, I have to also say that he wasn’t totally crazy. You must remember that most of the union troops, which were involved in the pursuit, and the Battle of Westport, were militia and not regular or veteran troops. Price’s Army of Missouri, on the other hand, while containing a large number of draftees and new volunteers, had a strong veteran base. These men were the survivors of Price’s Missouri State Guard who had followed him into Confederate Service, and Jo Shelby’s famous “Iron Brigade,” at this time under command of M. Jeff Thompson, the “Swamp Fox,” they had been fighting since 1861.
However, by the time Price got to Westport he was outnumbered by more than 2 to 1. I think that his decision to divide his forces in the face of these odds was just flat wrong. He should have concentrated on escape. There are those, including some of Price’s survivors, who complain that too many of those wagons were filled with “loot” as opposed to militarily useful supplies. In any case the end result was utter disaster no supplies and the destruction of Price’s army as an effective fighting force. The only reason he escaped at all was the squabbling of the union commander’s after the battles of Westport and Mine Creek.
Briefly, Gen. Pleasanton’s Provisional Division was from Rosecrans’ Department of Missouri in St. Louis. The other union troops were from Gen. Curtis’ Department of the Border, along the Kansas Missouri border with headquarters at Fort Scott, Kansas. Pleasanton refused to submit to Curtis’ command and Curtis refused to continue the pursuit. He was also under a great deal of pressure from Gov. Robinson of Kansas to get the Kansas boys home in time to vote, there was a nasty fight going on for the governor’s office that year.
I agree that Price’s invasion was an act of desperation. I also agree that he did pretty ****ed well given the difficulties he faced.
The study of the war in the Trans-Mississippi is fascinating; I hope you continue your interest. If you would like I can recommend a starting bibliography. In any case I would recommend, “They deserved a Better Fate” by Roy Bird. Roy is a Topeka Kansas historian and the book is about the Second Kansas Militia and Price’s invasion.

Doug