Early and Longstreet Fued

All that work and I step back and look at it and see that I spelled feud wrong....sigh....hangs head and walks away...

In this article, which first appeared in the Richmond Dispatch in 1899 (20 years or more after Early's or Longstreet's), and subsequently printed in the Southern Historical Society Papers, Henry Alexander White attempts to settle the Early/Longstreet Gettysburg controversy once and for all.




Southern Historical Society Papers
Vol. XXVII. Richmond, Va, January-December. 1899.

Gettysburg Battle.

Some Literary Facts Connected Therewith.
A QUESTION OF GREAT INTEREST.
Discussed in the Light of Some Late Revelations
General Early's Theory - Many Writers Passed in Review - A Myth.
[From the Richmond, Va., Dispatch, March 5, 1899 ]

By HENRY ALEXANDER WHITE,
Washington and Lee University.

At what hour on the morning of July 2, 1863, did General Longstreet's troops present themselves, in readiness for battle, on the Seminary Ridge in front of Gettysburg? Strange to relate, it has required a period of thirty-three years to question, and yet this question bears upon the point that is most essential, perhaps, in the entire discussion of Longstreet's part in that great struggle. The chief facts in the case are as follows:

So long as General R. E. Lee remained alive, no utterance in public fell from any Confederate officer's lips concerning the loss of the field of Gettysburg. On January 19, 1872, at the Washington and Lee University, General J. A. Early felt impelled to make reply to William Swinton's published criticism of General Lee's management of the battle. Swinton's strictures were based upon alleged private statements by Longstreet. Early's reply involved the charge that Longstreet himself was responsible for the repulse of the Confederate army at Gettysburg. In support of this charge, Early referred to a conference held by Lee, Ewell, Rodes and Early, late in the afternoon of July 1, 1863, and declared that Lee left that conference “for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's corps in time to begin the attack at dawn next morning. That corps was not in readiness to make the attack until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day.” (Southern Historical Society Papers, December, 1877, page 284.) Early's statements were repeated in the Southern Magazine, September-October, 1872. One year after Early's address - January 19, 1873 - Dr. William N. Pendleton substantiated the charge against Longstreet by reciting Lee's personal statement, made in the evening of July 1, 1863, that he had ordered Longstreet to attack “at sunrise the next morning.” Dr. Pendleton's address was published in the Southern Magazine, December, 1874.

In November, 1877, Longstreet made answer by publishing in the Philadelphia Times a detailed account of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg. This article was reprinted in Southern Historical Society Papers ( January-February, 1878). In this he denied that Lee gave him the order to attack at sunrise on July 2, 1863. To sustain his assertion, Longstreet published extracts from letters written by members of Lee's staff and members of his own staff, declaring that they had no knowledge of Lee's order. Among these extracts there was one from a letter written to Longstreet by Hood, who commanded the rear division in Longstreet's marching column as the First corps drew nigh to Gettysburg. As the quotation from Hood's letter plays an important part in the later stages of the discussion, we may pause here long enough to say that this letter itself, as cited by Longstreet, bore no date. The extract ran thus:

I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, when the troops were allowed to stack arms and wait until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of the same morning, we (Longstreet and Hood) were both engaged, in company with Generals A. P. Hill and Lee, in observing the position of the Federals. ... General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us.' You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division, at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack, and you said to me subsequently, while we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'General Lee is a little nervous this morning. He wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into a battle with one boot off.' (Southern Historical Society Papers, January-February, 1878, page 79.)

Upon its face this note is rather indefinite as to the time of the conversation among the officers, the time proposed for the attack, and the time of the arrival of Hood's infantrymen. It is interesting to mark the significance attached to Hood's statement by Longstreet himself. He held that it completed his chain of evidence to disprove the assertions in regard to the “rumored order for a sunrise attack.” (Southern Historical Society Papers, January-February, 1878, page 79.)

Hood's statement, however, in Early's mind, was given a different interpretation. Early re-entered the lists, in the pages of the Southern Historical Society Papers, and cited Hood's letter as the last link in his chain of evidence to prove that Longstreet was ordered to make an attack in the early morning of July 2d. Hood's letter, said Early, indicated the partial execution of Lee's order in the actual arrival of Longstreet's troops upon Seminary Ridge between dawn and sunrise. “If there had before remained any doubt,” wrote Early, “as to who was responsible for the failure to strike the blow at the proper time, the very clear and explicit statement by General Hood, which is a most valuable contribution to the history of the battle, would settle that doubt beyond dispute, I think. General Hood's statement furnishes information not before given in regard to the time of the arrival on the ground of Longstreet's troops, and renders it very certain that the orders for the attack to begin were given very early in the morning, if not the night before.” (Southern Historical Society Papers, December, 1877, page 269.) “Hood got up before sunrise, and he gives several circumstances tending to show that General Lee was anxious to make the attack at once.” ( Idem, June, 1878, page 580.) At the same time, Early set forth a detailed statement of the conference held after the close of the battle of July 1st; he expressed the opinion that Stuart and Ewell were not responsible for the loss of the field, and reiterated, as his final conclusion, the charge that Longstreet was responsible for the failure, because he was “so persistently averse to the attack and so loth to take the steps necessary to begin it.” ( Idem, December, 1877, page 291.) Early's conclusion is based apparently upon the following interpretation of Hood's note: That Hood's division, bringing up the rear of Longstreet's marching column, in obedience to Lee's previous command, actually arrived at Lee's headquarters in readiness for battle before sunrise; that Lee wished to make the attack upon the instant; that Longstreet's opposition to the plan of attack was made while the troops were thus at hand and ready for orders, and that in view of this opposition by Longstreet, General Lee delayed, and did not give peremptory orders to advance into battle until a much later hour - about 11 o'clock. ( Idem, December, 1877, pages 291-292.)

At this point in his line of reasoning the thought evidently arose in Early's mind that his conclusions were calculated to place General Lee's reputation in great jeopardy. If the reason for a disastrous delay of several hours duration was merely General Lee's deference to Longstreet's opposing opinion, what shall be said of Lee's capacity to carry out his own carefully-arranged plan of battle? Early's mind was too clear not to see this issue, and he faced it as follows:

There is one thing very certain, and that is that either General Lee or General Longstreet was responsible for the remarkable delay that took place in making the attack. I choose to believe that it was not General Lee, for if any one knew the value of promptness and celerity in military movements, he did. It is equally certain that the delay which occurred in making the attack lost us the victory. ( Idem, December, 1877, page 293.)

This statement shows us that in the last analysis the gallant old soldier, General Early, was compelled to fall back upon his personal loyalty to General Lee and his personal knowledge of Lee's conduct upon other battle-fields to find vindication for Lee's management of the Confederate troops at Gettysburg.

The central truth, however, of the whole matter is that Early misinterpreted the fragment of Hood's letter. Early's chief premise was wrong and his conclusion was, therefore, entirely wrong. Early set forth his views in 1877-'88. Since that time additional facts have come to the light to show that Longstreet's troops did not arrive on Seminary Ridge until long after sunrise on the morning of July 2d; that the difference of opinion between Lee and Longstreet was not matter for discussion one moment after the coming of the infantry of the First corps, and that Longstreet's subsequent delay on the right was perpetrated during Lee's tour of observation to the Confederate left wing.

The first installment of fresh evidence concerning the time of the arrival of Longstreet's troops was published in the Southern Historical Society Papers for February, 1879, in the form of an address by General Lafayette McLaws. He had delivered a similar address as early as 1873. McLaws was in command of the advance division of Longstreet's men as they approached Gettysburg. By Longstreet's order McLaws went into camp on the western side of Willoughby Run after 12 o'clock in the night that followed July 1st. The head of his column was more than two miles from Lee's headquarters, on Seminary Ridge. McLaws wrote these words: “Some time after my arrival I received orders from General Longstreet to continue the march at 4 A. M., but the order was afterwards countermanded, with directions not to leave until sunrise. The march was continued at a very early hour, and my command reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg early in the morning. Just after I arrived General Lee sent for me, as the head of my column was halted within a hundred yards of where he was, and I went at once and reported. General Lee was sitting on a fallen tree with a map beside him. After the usual salutation, General Lee remarked: 'General, I wish you to place your division across this road,' pointing on the map to about the place I afterward went to” (the Peach Orchard).

McLaws said further that “if the corps had moved boldly in position by 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning, as it could have done,” the attack would probably have succeeded. (Southern Historical Society Papers, February, 1879, pages 68 and 76.)

Another fragment of testimony was added in the following year - 1880 - when Hood's volume, entitled “Advance and Retreat,” was issued from the press. This volume contained the entire letter from Hood, of which Longstreet had printed only an extract, and it now appeared that Hood made his statement concerning the time of the arrival of his troops “from memory,” on June 28, 1875, twelve years after the morning of July 2, 1863. It may, at this point, be noted further that Hood's phrase concerning the time of the conversation held by Lee, Longstreet, Hill and Hood is this: “During the early part of the same morning;” presumably before the arrival of Hood's troops.

In 1883 the Century Magazine began to publish an extended series of articles written by both Federal and Confederate actors in the great tragedy of Gettysburg. E. P. Alexander set forth the movements of the Confederate artillery on July 2d and July 3d, in such complete detail that all subsequent writers from that time forward could do nothing else than adopt his statements. Kershaw likewise told how he led a brigade of McLaw's division at the very head of Longstreet's column on the morning of July 2, 1863. (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, page 331.) These articles in the Century anticipated by a few years the publication of the official reports of the participants in the battle, in Volume XXVII of the official records.

Kershaw's report concerning the movements of his brigade on July 1st and afterwards, was thus set forth: “We marched to a point on the Gettysburg road, some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M. The command was ordered to move at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, but did not leave camp until about sunrise. We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg with only a slight detention from trains in the way, and moved to the right of the Third corps, and were halted until about noon.” (Official Records, Volume XXVII, Part II, page 366.)

E. P. Alexander's report states that his battalion of artillery “marched with the First corps, and accompanied it .... to Gettysburg, Pa., where we arrived at 9 A. M. on July 2d.” (Official Records, XXVII, Part II, page 429.) Captain O. B. Taylor, commanding a battery in Alexander's battalion, reports thus: “We arrived there (Gettysburg) about 10 A. M. July 2d.” (Idem, page 432.) It may be remarked in explanation that Alexander's battalion marched at the rear of Longstreet's column, and that it took a leading part in the battle of the 2d day of July. The Washington Artillery marched with Longstreet's troops. In 1885 appeared W. M. Owens's volume, entitled “In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery.” On pages 243-4 we find this statement concerning the journey made on the morning of July 2, 1863: “After waiting until 2:30 A. M. for a clear road, began our march, and at 8 A. M. reported, ready for action, to General Longstreet on the field.”

An important word remained even yet unspoken. This came at last from the lips of General McLaws on April 27, 1896. He revised his former Gettysburg address and read it before the Confederate Veterans' Association of Savannah on the date named. From that address I quote: “My division arrived at Willoughby Run, about four miles from Gettysburg, at 12 o'clock at night and camped there. During the night I received orders to march on at 4 A. M., but this was countermanded, and I was directed to be ready to move early in the morning. The sun rises about half-past 4 in the first days of July. .... Not long after sunrise I moved forward, and before 8 A. M. the head of my division reached Seminary Ridge, where General Lee was in person. I was notified that General Lee wished to see me, and my command was halted and I reported to the General. .... General Longstreet was walking up and down a little way off, apparently in an impatient humor. .... General Longstreet joined us and said, pointing to the map and speaking to me, 'General, I want you to place your division there,' drawing his finger along a line parallel to the Emmitsburg road. 'No, General,' said General Lee, 'I want his division perpendicular to the Emmitsburg road.'” (Addresses Savannah Veterans' Association, 1896, pages 68, 69.)

Further light is thrown upon the matter by the reports of Wilcox, and Anderson, of Hill's corps. It was part of Lee's plan that this corps should occupy the Confederate centre on July 2d, and that Longstreet should bring his divisions upon the field immediately to the right of Hill. Anderson's division, however, was a mile and a half west of Gettysburg on the morning of July 2d (O. R., XXVII, Part II, page 613.) The brigade of Wilcox, Anderson's division, did not begin the advance movement until 7 A. M., and it was 9 A. M. when the brigade took its position in line of battle on Seminary Ridge. (Idem, page 617.)

These quotations furnish us a full explanation of Hood's indefinite letter, and show that Longstreet was delinquent in not hastening up his troops to Seminary Ridge as Lee had ordered; that those troops set forth from camp only after sunrise, were detained to some extent by Ewell's wagon train, and the head of the column reached Seminary Ridge when the sun was three or three and a half hours above the horizon. We learn, further, that the quasi-debate between Lee and Longstreet, as described in Hood's letter, took place before the troops stood in Lee's presence; that when the First corps arrived, about 8 A. M., Lee at once gave specific orders to the leading division commander, over Longstreet's head, as it were, and bade McLaws lead his men into battle along the Emmittsburg road, from the Peach Orchard towards Gettysburg.

There is further evidence from Long, Venable and others, to show that Lee then rode away through the town of Gettysburg to consult with Ewell about the co-operation of the left wing with the right wing, which he had just ordered forward to the attack. At Ewell's headquarters Lee waited to hear Longstreet's guns. At noon he rode from beyond Gettysburg to Seminary Ridge to seek Longstreet, only to find that the latter had assumed authority to await the arrival of Law's brigade. This brigade came up about half-past 12 or 1 o'clock. Three hours were then consumed in finding a covered route to the Peach Orchard, where Longstreet's guns opened the battle about 4 P. M.

The above are the actual facts. On the other hand, however, General Early's untenable theory, set forth twenty years ago, has become the basis of a modern myth. Early's narrative with reference to that which he heard and saw on the evening of July 1st is of course accurate beyond all question. But when Early took the fragments of Hood's letter and fastened an erroneous interpretation upon it, due to his own lack of information, he laid the foundation of the myth which many recent writers have asked us to accept. General Longstreet himself seems to have adopted the myth, for in his Memoir of the War, published in 1896, he asserts that the troops of McLaws and Hood reached Lee's headquarters at sunrise on the morning of July 2d (page 362). Newspaper and magazine articles have invited us to consider a supposed dramatic spectacle, alleged to have taken place on the morning of July 2d. The time contemplated by those who have developed this view is the hour between dawn and sunrise; the place, Seminary Ridge, with Cemetery Hill in full view. The mythical spectators, the troops of McLaws and Hood, stained with mud of an alleged night march. The chief actors, Lee and Longstreet. Lee's alleged opinion is that the troops ought to deliver battle at once; Longstreet remonstrates against the attack, and his argumentative opposition, we are told, leads to delay and consequently disaster. So runs this erroneous theory.

Reference must here be made to one writer, who published his views before Hood's letter became a part of the discussion. The Comte de Paris, as long ago as 1875, gathered into his bulky volumes all obtainable facts bearing upon the most minute movements of the Federal and Confederate troops in this entire campaign and battle. Some of his statements are wide of the truth, but upon the point here under discussion he bore this testimony: “Longstreet virtually disobeyed General Lee's wishes in not bringing his corps to Seminary Ridge until 8 o'clock on the morning of July 2d.”

The whole myth vanishes in the light of the statements made by McLaws, Kershaw, and the rest. The alleged spectacle of Lee's vacillation did not take place. The supposed spectators, the troops, were not present. In fact, they were just breaking camp beyond Willoughby Run after the hour of sunrise. The discussion between Lee and Longstreet was only a brief exchange of views, and it took place while those riflemen were still at a distance. Lee did not vacillate. He did not yield his judgment to Longstreet. The latter's fault was not argumentative opposition, but practical disobedience of orders. There were two separate acts in this disobedience. Neither of these was committed in Lee's presence. Both were perpetrated when Lee and Longstreet were far apart. Longstreet countermanded the Order for the early march before he reached Lee's headquarters; later in the day he bade his divisions pause and wait for Laws' brigade, after Lee's departure to another post upon the field. In both cases Longstreet could advance the nominal excuse that he was only exercising the discretion usually accorded to a corps commander in the absence of the general-in-chief. His use of that alleged discretion, together with the improvident use of the same prerogative on the part of Stuart, A. P. Hill and Ewell, combined together to inscribe Gettysburg in the annals of the Southern Confederacy as a lost field.

[hoosier]

Wow! There's certainly a lot of information here. I wouldn't know where to begin to make a comment.

Mental Nomad, you might want to offer this to Mike as an entry for the Contributed Articles section of the website.

Good Lord Mental Nomad! That was quite a thread.Read part of it will try to finish it later tonight.Good posts though.

I am glad ya'll liked this thread...I feel I probally should have posted what Lee himself had to say Officially on the subject, so here it is.

June 3-August 1, 1863. - The Gettysburg Campaign.
Report of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army,
commanding Army of Northern Virginia.
O.R. - SERIES I - VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 44] - Gettysburg Campaign


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Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,
January 20, 1864

General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:

General:

I forward to-day my report of the late campaign of this army in Maryland and Pennsylvania, together with those of the corps and other commanders, as far as they have been received. General Longstreet's list of casualties, and the reports of his subordinate officers, shall be sent as soon as they can be obtained from him.

I also forward the report of the medical director, and some other documents mentioned in the accompanying schedule. With reference to the former, I would remark that it is necessarily imperfect, for reasons stated in my report. The actual casualties and the number of missing can only be learned from the reports of the commanding officers, and it should be borne in mind that they usually embrace all the slightly wounded, even such as remain on duty, under the impression, commonly entertained, that the loss sustained is a measure of the service performed and the danger incurred.

I also inclose a map of the routes of the army, and one of the lines at Hagerstown and Williamsport. That of the battle-field of Gettysburg shall be forwarded as soon as completed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee
General.
[Inclosure.]
Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,
January --, 1864
General:
I have the honor to submit a detailed report of the operations of this army from the time it left the vicinity of Fredericksburg, early in June, to its occupation of the line of the Rapidan, in August.
Upon the retreat of the Federal Army, commanded by Major-General Hooker, from Chancellorsville, it reoccupied the ground north of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked excepting at a disadvantage. It was determined to draw it from this position, and, if practicable, to transfer the scene of hostilities beyond the Potomac. The execution of this purpose also embraced the expulsion of the force under General Milroy, which had infested the lower Shenandoah Valley during the preceding winter and spring. If unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was hoped that we should at least so far disturb his plan for the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season of active operations.

The commands of Longstreet and Ewell were put in motion, and encamped around Culpeper Court-House June 7. As soon as their march was discovered by the enemy, he threw a force across the Rappahannock, about 2 miles below Fredericksburg, apparently for the purpose of observation. Hill's corps was left to watch these troops, with instructions to follow the movements of the army as soon as they should retire.

The cavalry, under General Stuart, which had been concentrated near Culpeper Court-House, was attacked on June 9 by a large force of Federal cavalry, supported by infantry, which crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly and Kelly's Fords. After a severe engagement, which continued from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, the enemy was compelled to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving about 500 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands.

General Imboden and General Jenkins had been ordered to cooperate in the projected expedition into the Valley, General Imboden by moving toward Romney with his command, to prevent the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from re-enforcing those at Winchester, while General Jenkins advanced directly toward the latter place with his cavalry brigade, supported by a battalion of infantry and a battery of the Maryland Line.

General Ewell left Culpeper Court-House on June 10. He crossed the branches of the Shenandoah near Front Royal, and reached Cedarville on the 12th, where he was joined by General Jenkins. Detaching General Rodes with his division, and the greater part of Jenkins' brigade, to dislodge a force of the enemy stationed at Berryville, General Ewell, with the rest of his command, moved upon Winchester. Johnson's division advancing by the Front Royal road, Early's by the Valley turnpike, which it entered at Newtown, where it was joined by the Maryland troops.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
The enemy was driven in on both roads, and our troops halted in line of battle near the town on the evening of the 13th. The same day the force which had occupied Berryville retreated to Winchester on the approach of General Rodes. The following morning, General Ewell ordered General Early to carry an intrenched position northwest of Winchester, near the Pughtown road, which the latter officer, upon examining the ground, discovered would command the principal fortifications.

To cover the movement of General Early, General Johnson took position between the road to Millwood and that to Berryville, and advanced his skirmishers toward the town. General Early, leaving a portion of his command to engage the enemy's attention, with the remainder gained a favorable position without being perceived, and, about 5 p.m., twenty pieces of artillery, under Lieut. Col. H. P. Jones, opened suddenly upon the intrenchments. The enemy's guns were soon silenced. Hays' brigade then advanced to the assault, and carried the works by storm, capturing six rifled pieces, two of which were turned upon and dispersed a column which was forming to retake the position. The enemy immediately abandoned the works on the left of those taken by Hays, and retired into his main fortifications, which General Early prepared to assail in the morning. The loss of the advanced works, however, rendered the others untenable, and the enemy retreated in the night, abandoning his sick and wounded, together with his artillery, wagons, and stores. Anticipating such a movement, as soon as he heard of Early's success, General Ewell directed General Johnson to occupy, with part of his command, a point on the Martinsburg road, about 2½ miles from Winchester, where he could either intercept the enemy's retreat, or aid in an attack should further resistance be offered in the morning'. General Johnson marched with Nicholls' and part of Steuart's brigades, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel [R. S.] Andrews with a detachment of his artillery, the Stonewall Brigade being ordered to follow. Finding the road to the place indicated by General Ewell difficult of passage in the darkness, General Johnson pursued that leading by Jordan Springs to Stephenson's Depot, where he took a favorable position on the Martinsburg road, about 5 miles from Winchester. Just as his line was formed, the retreating column, consisting of the main body of General Milroy's army, arrived, and immediately attacked him. The enemy, though in superior force, consisting of both infantry and cavalry, was gallantly repulsed, and, finding all efforts to cut his way unavailing, he sent strong flanking parties simultaneously to the right and left, still keeping up a heavy fire in front. The party on the right was driven back and pursued by the Stonewall Brigade, which opportunely arrived. That on the left was broken and dispersed by the Second and Tenth Louisiana Regiments, aided by the artillery, and in a short time nearly the whole infantry force, amounting to more than 2,300 men, with eleven stand of colors, surrendered, the cavalry alone escaping. General Milroy, with a small party of fugitives, fled to Harper's Ferry. The number of prisoners taken in this action exceeded the force engaged under General Johnson, who speaks in terms of well-deserved praise of the conduct of the officers and men of his command.

In the meantime, General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, reaching the latter place in the afternoon of the 14th. The enemy made a show of resistance, but soon gave way, the cavalry and artillery retreating toward Williamsport, the infantry toward Shepherdstown, under cover of night. The route taken by the latter was not known until it was too late to follow; but the former were pursued so rapidly, Jenkins' troops leading, that they were forced to abandon five of their six pieces of artillery. About 200 prisoners were taken, but the enemy destroyed most of his stores.

These operations resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the Valley; the capture of 4,000 prisoners, with a corresponding number of small-arms; 28 pieces of superior artillery, including those taken by Generals Rodes and Hays; about 300 wagons and as many horses, together with a considerable quantity of ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster's stores.

Our entire loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing.

MARCH INTO PENNSYLVANIA.
On the night of Ewell's appearance at Winchester, the enemy in front of A. P. Hill, at Fredericksburg, recrossed the Rappahannock, and the whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the north side of the river. In order to mislead him as to our intentions, and at the same time protect Hill's corps in its march up the Rappahannock, Longstreet left Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and, advancing along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. He had been joined, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. General Stuart, with three brigades of cavalry, moved on Longstreet's right, and took position in front of the Gaps. Hampton's and [W. E.]Jones' brigades remained along the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, in front of Culpeper Court-House, with instructions to follow the main body as soon as Hill's corps had passed that point.

On the 17th, Fitz. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Munford, which was on the road to Snicker's Gap, was attacked near Aldie by the Federal cavalry. The attack was repulsed with loss, and the brigade held its ground until ordered to fall back, its right being threatened by another body, coming from Hopewell toward Middleburg. The latter force was driven from Middleburg, and pursued toward Hopewell by Robertson's brigade, which arrived about dark. Its retreat was intercepted by W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Chambliss, jr., and the greater part of a regiment captured.

During the three succeeding days there was much skirmishing, General Stuart taking a position west of Middleburg, where he awaited the rest of his command.

General Jones arrived on the 19th, and General Hampton in the afternoon of the following day, having repulsed, on his march, a cavalry force sent to reconnoiter in the direction of Warrenton.

On the 21st, the enemy attacked with infantry and cavalry, and obliged General Stuart, after a brave resistance, to fall back to the gaps of the mountains. The enemy retired the next day, having advanced only a short distance beyond Upperville.

In these engagements, the cavalry sustained a loss of 510 killed, wounded, and missing. Among them were several valuable officers, whose names are mentioned in General Stuart's report. One piece of artillery was disabled and left on the field. The enemy's loss was heavy. About 400 prisoners were taken and several stand of colors.

The Federal Army was apparently guarding the approaches to Washington, and manifested no disposition to assume the offensive.

In the meantime, the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland, with Jenkins' cavalry advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near Berryville.

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and, with the remainder, to cross into Maryland, and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.

On the 22d, General Ewell marched into Pennsylvania with Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, taking the road from Hagerstown, through Chambersburg, to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. Early's division, which had occupied Boonsborough, moved by a parallel road to Greenwood, and, in pursuance of instructions previously given to General Ewell, marched toward York.

On the 24th, Longstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and, on the 27th, encamped near Chambersburg.

General Imboden, under the orders before referred to, had been operating on Ewell's left while the latter was advancing into Maryland. He drove off the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and destroyed all the important bridges on that route from Martinsburg to Cumberland, besides inflicting serious damage upon the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He was at Hancock when Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and was directed to proceed to the latter place by way of McConnellsburg, collecting supplies for the army on his route.

The cavalry force at this time with the army, consisting of Jenkins' brigade and [E. V.]White's battalion, was not greater than was required to accompany the advance of General Ewell and General Early, with whom it performed valuable service, as appears from their reports. It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were, therefore, issued to move upon Harrisburg. The expedition of General Early to York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. General Early succeeded in the first object, destroying a number of bridges above and below York, but on the approach of the troops sent by him to Wrightsville, a body of militia stationed at that place fled across the river and burned the bridge in their retreat. General Early then marched to rejoin his corps.

The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing ****her west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
Hill's corps was accordingly ordered to move toward Cashtown on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and directed to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The advance of the enemy to the latter place was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops. Heth's division reached Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's brigade, sent by General Heth to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being ignorant of the extent of his force, General Pettigrew was unwilling to hazard an attack with his single brigade, and returned to Cashtown.

General Hill arrived with Pender's division in the evening, and the following morning (July 1) advanced with these two divisions, accompanied by Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions of artillery, to ascertain the strength of the enemy, whose force was supposed to consist chiefly of cavalry. The leading division, under General Heth, found the enemy's vedettes about 3 miles west of Gettysburg, and continued to advance until within a mile of the town, when two brigades were sent forward to reconnoiter. They drove in the advance of the enemy very gallantly, but subsequently encountered largely superior numbers, and were compelled to retire with loss, Brigadier-General Archer, commanding one of the brigades, being taken prisoner. General Heth then prepared for action, and as soon as Pender arrived to support him, was ordered by General Hill to advance. The artillery was placed in position, and the engagement opened with vigor. General Heth pressed the enemy steadily back, breaking his first and second lines, and attacking his third with great resolution. About 2.30 p.m. the advance of Ewell's corps, consisting of Rodes' division, with Carter's battalion of artillery, arrived by the Middletown road, and, forming on Heth's left, nearly at right angles with his line, became warmly engaged with fresh numbers of the enemy. Heth's troops, having suffered heavily in their protracted contest with a superior force, were relieved by Pender's, and Early, coming up by the Heidlersburg road soon afterward, took position on the left of Rodes, when a general advance was made.

The enemy gave way on all sides, and was driven through Gettysburg with great loss. Major-General Reynolds, who was in command, was killed. More than 5,000 prisoners, exclusive of a large number of wounded, three pieces of artillery, and several colors were captured. Among the prisoners were two brigadier-generals, one of whom was badly wounded. Our own loss was heavy, including a number of officers, among whom were Major-General Heth, slightly, and Brigadier-General Scales, of Pender's division, severely, wounded. The enemy retired to a range of hills south of Gettysburg, where he displayed a strong force of infantry and artillery.

It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour.

In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch showed that another corps had halted that afternoon 4 miles from Gettysburg. Under these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about 4 miles in the rear during the night. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement.

It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal Army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.

The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming its northern extremity, and a third at the other end, on which the enemy's left rested. Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to his troops and impede our advance. In his front, the ground was undulating and generally open for about three-quarters of a mile.

General Ewell's corps constituted our left, Johnson's division being opposite the height adjoining Cemetery Hill, Early's in the center, in front of the north face of the latter, and Rodes upon his right. Hill's corps faced the west side of Cemetery Hill, and extended nearly parallel to the Emmitsburg road, making an angle with Ewell's, Pender's division formed his left, Anderson's his right, Heth's, under Brigadier-General Pettigrew, being in reserve. His artillery, under Colonel [R. L.] Walker, was posted in eligible positions along his line.

It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in.

General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's center, to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right division in Longstreet's attack.

General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer.

About 4 p.m. Longstreet's batteries opened, and soon afterward Hood's division, on the extreme right, moved to the attack. McLaws followed somewhat later, four of Anderson's brigades, those of Wilcox, Perry, [A. R.] Wright, and Posey supporting him on the left, in the order named. The enemy was soon driven from his position on the Emmitsburg road to the cover of a ravine and a line of stone fences at the foot of the ridge in his rear. He was dislodged from these after a severe struggle, and retired up the ridge, leaving a number of his batteries in our possession. Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry, and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side; but having become separated from McLaws and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division, they were attacked in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery. McLaws' left also fell back, and, it being now nearly dark, General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of General Pickett. He disposed his command to hold the ground gained on the right, withdrawing his left to the first position from which the enemy had been driven.

Four pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and two regimental flags were taken. As soon as the engagement began on our right, General Johnson opened with his artillery, and about two hours later advanced up the hill next to Cemetery Hill with three brigades, the fourth being detained by a demonstration on his left. Soon afterward, General Early attacked Cemetery Hill with two brigades, supported by a third, the fourth having been previously detached. The enemy had greatly increased by earthworks the strength of the positions assailed by Johnson and Early.

The troops of the former moved steadily up the steep and rugged ascent, under a heavy fire, driving the enemy into his intrenchments, part of which was carried by Steuart's brigade, and a number of prisoners taken. The contest was continued to a late hour, but without further advantage. On Cemetery Hill, the attack by Early's leading brigades--those of Hays and Hoke, under Colonel [I. E.] Avery--was made with vigor. Two lines of the enemy's infantry were dislodged from the cover of some stone and board fences on the side of the ascent, and driven back into the works on the crest, into which our troops forced their way, and seized several pieces of artillery.

A heavy force advanced against their right, which was without support, and they were compelled to retire, bringing with them about 100 prisoners and four stand of colors. General Ewell had directed General Rodes to attack in concert with Early, covering his right, and had requested Brigadier-General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to co-operate on the right of Rodes. When the time to attack arrived, General Rodes, not having his troops in position, was unprepared to co-operate with General Early, and before he could get in readiness the latter had been obliged to retire for want of the expected support on his right. General Lane was prepared to give the assistance required of him, and so informed General Rodes, but the latter deemed it useless to advance after the failure of Early's attack.

In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Major-Generals Hood and Pender, Brigadier-Generals [J. M.] Jones, Semmes, G. T. Anderson, and Barksdale, and Colonel Avery, commanding Hoke's brigade, were wounded, the last two mortally. Generals Pender and Semmes died after their removal to Virginia.

The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early's division.

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.

After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about l p.m.

General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.

A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions, which, it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely.

About 1 p.m., at a given signal, a heavy cannonade was opened, and continued for about two hours with marked effect upon the enemy. His batteries replied vigorously at first, but toward the close their fire slackened perceptibly, and General Longstreet ordered forward the column of attack, consisting of Pickett's and Heth's divisions, in two lines, Pickett on the right. Wilcox's brigade marched in rear of Pickett's right, to guard that flank, and Heth's was supported by Lane's and Scales' brigades, under General Trimble.

The troops moved steadily on, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack being directed against the enemy's left center.

His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance works, and capturing some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back with heavy loss.

The troops were rallied and reformed, but the enemy did not pursue.

A large number of brave officers and men fell or were captured on this occasion. Of Pickett's three brigade commanders, Generals Armistead and [R. B.] Garnett were killed, and General Kemper dangerously wounded.

Major-General Trimble and Brigadier-General Pettigrew were also wounded, the former severely.

The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B. H.] Robertson and [William E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the remainder of his command, would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal Army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that he would be able, by that route, to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on the night of June 24, intending to pass west of Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, he arrived at the Potomac, below the mouth of Seneca Creek, in the evening.

He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but, after great exertion, gained the Maryland shore before midnight with his whole command.

He now ascertained that the Federal Army, which he had discovered to be drawing toward the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving toward Frederick, thus interposing itself between him and our forces.

He accordingly marched northward, through Rockville and Westminster, to Hanover, Pa., where he arrived on the 30th; but the enemy advanced with equal rapidity on his left, and continued to obstruct communication with our main body.

Supposing, from such information as he could obtain, that part of the army was at Carlisle, he left Hanover that night, and proceeded thither by way of Dover.

He reached Carlisle on July 1, where he received orders to proceed to Gettysburg. He arrived in the afternoon of the following day, and took position on General Ewell's left. His leading brigade, under General Hampton, encountered and repulsed a body of the enemy's cavalry at Hunterstown, endeavoring to reach our rear.

General Stuart had several skirmishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe engagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which was finally compelled to withdraw from the town. The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about 800, and at Rockville a large train of wagons coming from Washington was intercepted and captured. Many of them were destroyed, but 125, with all the animals of the train, were secured.

The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at Gettysburg it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectually protected our left.

In this action, Brigadier-General Hampton was seriously wounded, while acting with his accustomed gallantry.

Robertson's and Jones' brigades arrived on July 3, and were stationed upon our right flank. The severe loss sustained by the army and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable, and it was, therefore, determined to withdraw.

The trains, with such of the wounded as could bear removal, were ordered to Williamsport on July 4, part moving through Cashtown and Greencastle, escorted by General Imboden, and the remainder by the Fairfield road.

The army retained its position until dark, when it was put in motion for the Potomac by the last-named route.

A heavy rain continued throughout the night, and so much impeded its progress that Ewell's corps, which brought up the rear, did not leave Gettysburg until late in the forenoon of the following day. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and, after an arduous march, we arrived at Hagerstown in the afternoon of the 6th and morning of July 7.

The great length of our trains made it difficult to guard them effectually in passing through the mountains, and a number of wagons and ambulances were captured. They succeeded in reaching Williamsport on the 6th, but were unable to cross the Potomac on account of the high stage of water. Here they were attacked by a strong force of cavalry and artillery, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden, whose command had been strengthened by several batteries and by two regiments of infantry, which had been detached at Winchester to guard prisoners, and were returning to the army.

While the enemy was being held in check, General Stuart arrived with the cavalry, which had performed valuable service in guarding the flanks of the army during the retrograde movement, and, after a short engagement, drove him from the field. The rains that had prevailed almost without intermission since our entrance into Maryland, and greatly interfered with our movements, had made the Potomac unfordable, and the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed by the enemy. The wounded and prisoners were sent over the river as rapidly as possible in a few ferry-boats, while the trains awaited the subsiding of the waters and the construction of a new pontoon bridge.

On July 8, the enemy's cavalry advanced toward Hagerstown, but was repulsed by General Stuart, and pursued as far as Boonsborough.

With this exception, nothing but occasional skirmishing occurred until the 12th, when the main body of the enemy arrived. The army then took a position previously selected, covering the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained for two days, with the enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to attack, but throwing up intrenchments along his whole line.

By the 13th, the river at Williamsport, though still deep, was ford-able, and a good bridge was completed at Falling Waters, new boats having being constructed and some of the old recovered. As further delay would enable the enemy to obtain re-enforcements, and as it was found difficult to procure a sufficient supply of flour for the troops, the working of the mills being interrupted by high water, it was determined to await an attack no longer.

Orders were accordingly given to cross the Potomac that night, Ewell's corps by the ford at Williamsport, and those of Longstreet and Hill on the bridge.

The cavalry was directed to relieve the infantry skirmishers, and bring up the rear.

The movement was much retarded by a severe rain storm and the darkness of the night. Ewell's corps, having the advantage of a turnpike road, marched with less difficulty, and crossed the river by 8 o'clock the following morning. The condition of the road to the bridge and the time consumed in the passage of the artillery, ammunition wagons, and ambulances, which could not ford the river, so much delayed the progress of Longstreet and Hill, that it was daylight before their troops began to cross. Heth's division was halted about a mile and a half from the bridge, to protect the passage of the column. No interruption was offered by the enemy until about 11 a.m., when his cavalry, supported by artillery, appeared in front of General Heth.

A small number in advance of the main body was mistaken for our own cavalry retiring, no notice having been given of the withdrawal of the latter, and was suffered to approach our lines. They were immediately destroyed or captured, with the exception of two or three, but Brigadier-General Pettigrew, an officer of great merit and promise, was mortally wounded in the encounter. He survived his removal to Virginia only a few days.

The bridge being clear, General Heth began to withdraw. The enemy advanced, but his efforts to break our lines were repulsed, and the passage of the river was completed by 1 p.m. Owing to the extent of General Heth's line, some of his men most remote from the bridge were cut off before they could reach it, but the greater part of those taken by the enemy during the movement (supposed to amount in all to about 500) consisted of men from various commands who lingered behind, overcome by previous labors and hardships, and the fatigue of a most trying night march. There was no loss of materiel excepting a few broken wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to draw through the deep mud. Other horses were sent back for them, but the rear of the column had passed before their arrival.

The army proceeded to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Darkesville, where it halted to afford the troops repose. The enemy made no effort to follow excepting with his cavalry, which crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and advanced toward Martinsburg on July 16.

They were attacked by General Fitz. Lee, with his own and Chambliss' brigades, and driven back with loss. When the army returned to Virginia, it was intended to move into Loudoun, but the Shenandoah was found to be impassable. While waiting for it to subside, the enemy crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and seized the passes we designed to use. As he continued to advance along the eastern slope, apparently with the purpose of cutting us off from the railroad to Richmond, General Longstreet was ordered, on July 19, to proceed to Culpeper Court-House, by way of Front Royal. He succeeded in passing part of his command over the Shenandoah in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas and Chester Gaps by the enemy, whose cavalry had already made its appearance.

As soon as a pontoon bridge could be laid down, the rest of his corps crossed the river, and marched through Chester Gap to Culpeper Court-House, where it arrived on the 24th. He was followed without serious opposition by General A. P. Hill.

General Ewell having been detained in the Valley by an effort to capture a force of the enemy guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Martinsburg, Wright's brigade was left to hold Manassas Gap until his arrival. He reached Front Royal on the 23d, with Johnson's and Rodes' divisions, Early's being near Winchester, and found General Wright skirmishing with the enemy's infantry, which had already appeared in Manassas Gap. General Ewell supported Wright with Rodes' division and some artillery, and the enemy was held in check.

Finding that the Federal force Greatly exceeded his own, General Ewell marched through Thornton's Gap, and ordered Early to move up the Valley by Strasburg and New Market. He encamped near Madison Court-House on July 29.

The enemy massed his army in the vicinity of Warrenton, and, on the night of July 31, his cavalry, with a large supporting force of infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford.

The next day they advanced toward Brandy Station, their progress being gallantly resisted by General Stuart with Hampton's brigade, commanded by Colonel [L. S.] Baker, who fell back gradually to our lines, about 2 miles south of Brandy. Our infantry skirmishers advanced, and drove the enemy beyond Brandy Station. It was now determined to place the army in a position to enable it more readily to oppose the enemy should he attempt to move southward, that near Culpeper Court-House being one that he could easily avoid. Longstreet and Hill were put in motion August 3, leaving the cavalry at Culpeper. Ewell had been previously ordered from Madison, and, by the 4th, the army occupied the line of the Rapidan.

The highest praise is due to both officers and men for their conduct during the campaign. The privations and hardships of the march and camp were cheerfully encountered, and borne with a fortitude unsurpassed by our ancestors in their struggle for independence, while their courage in battle entitles them to rank with the soldiers of any army and of any time. Their forbearance and discipline, under strong provocation to retaliate for the cruelty of the enemy to our own citizens, is not their least claim to the respect and admiration of their countrymen and of the world.

I forward returns of our loss in killed, wounded, and missing. Many of the latter were killed or wounded in the several assaults at Gettysburg, and necessarily left in the hands of the enemy. I cannot speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits deserve. Some of them are appropriately mentioned in the accompanying reports, and the memory of all will be gratefully and affectionately cherished by the people in whose defense they fell.

The loss of Major-General-Pender is severely felt by the army and the country. He served with this army from the beginning of the war, and took a distinguished part in all its engagements. Wounded on several occasions, he never left his command in action until he received the injury that resulted in his death. His promise and usefulness as an officer were only equaled by the purity and excellence of his private life.

Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, and Semmes died as they had lived, discharging the highest duty of patriots with devotion that never faltered and courage that shrank from no danger.

I earnestly commend to the attention of the Government those gallant officers and men whose conduct merited the special commendation of their superiors, but whose names I am unable to mention in this report.

The officers of the general staff of the army were unremittingly engaged in the duties of their respective departments. Much depended on their management and exertion. The labors of the quartermaster's, commissary, and medical departments were more than usually severe. The inspectors-general were also laboriously occupied in their attention to the troops, both on the march and in camp, and the officers of engineers showed skill and judgment in expediting the passage of rivers and streams, the swollen condition of which, by almost continuous rains, called for extraordinary exertion.

The chief of ordnance and his assistants are entitled to praise for the care and watchfulness given to the ordnance trains and ammunition of the army, which, in a long march and in many conflicts, were always at hand and accessible to the troops.

My thanks are due to my personal staff for their constant aid afforded me at all times, on the march and in the field, and their willing discharge of every duty.

There were captured at Gettysburg nearly 7,000 prisoners, of whom about 1,500 were paroled, and the remainder brought to Virginia. Seven pieces of artillery were also secured.

I forward herewith the reports of the corps, division, and other commanders mentioned in the accompanying schedule, together with maps of the scene of operations, and one showing the routes pursued by the army.

Respectfully submitted.
R. E. Lee
General.