The worst General- North and South

[Admiral_Porter]

How on earth would Longstreet have defeated Rosecrans and rescued Vicksburg?

I'm not saying he would have rescued Vicksburg but driving back Rosecrans could have regained middle Tennessee.

When Longstreet did finally go west he won a bloody victory at Chickamauga but the prize of the campaign, Chattanooga, was still in Federal hands.

There's just not enough troops to go around.

That's exactly why I like Longstreet's idea of strategy.

[milhistbuff1]

I'm not saying do not attack, i'm saying let them attack you first, then once they are weak, you strike out and destroy the remnants. Although it cannot be seen, is the lee or western half of Seminary Ridge in cannon range, SB or Rifled ,of Cem. Hill.

Concerning Middle TN, Admiral Porter, wouldn't Nashville be key, since it contained 33% of the South's industry? Same for Chattanooga, for the RR connections to the deep south, as opposed to Chickamauga.
Respectfully,
Matt

[nbforrest]

I'm not saying he would have rescued Vicksburg but driving back Rosecrans could have regained middle Tennessee.
When Longstreet did finally go west he won a bloody victory at Chickamauga but the prize of the campaign, Chattanooga, was still in Federal hands.
How exactly did Longstreet win the victory. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't believe he commanded the Confederate forces there nor was it his battle plan. The results of the campaign prove that just dispatching a corps wasn't enough to even remotely turn the tide.


That's exactly why I like Longstreet's idea of strategy.

Longstreet's strategy could not, and did not, overcome the numerical limitations in the slightest.

Respectfully

[nbforrest]

I'm not saying do not attack, i'm saying let them attack you first, then once they are weak, you strike out and destroy the remnants. Although it cannot be seen, is the lee or western half of Seminary Ridge in cannon range, SB or Rifled ,of Cem. Hill.

The eastern side can be it by fire from Cemetery Hill. That is why a flank attack on Lee would be on the west side, shielded from fire.

Respectfully

[milhistbuff1]

What about Jenkins Cav brigade, it was on the field by day 2 and could have harassed any attempt forcing them into line of battle slowly giving ground until a reserve divison mobilized to the spot. Besides, Meade's 12th, 5th and 6th corp came in via the Baltimore Pike, so Hancock and Sickles would have had no support from the rest of the fresh troops in the AOP.
Respectfully,
matt

[nbforrest]

The Union cavalry could have swung around into Lee's rear in nothing flat. And a couple infantry corps would swat away Jenkin's small brigade like flies. Sitting atop Cemetery Hill, Lee was in a precarious position just asking to be toppled off.
Troops coming off the Baltimore Pike would come right up to any Union position of Cemetery Hill. They would have come in directly on the Union's theoretical right. That's why troops coming up the Pike could reinforce the Union line so quickly...very easy to move from the Pike to the rest of the field.

Respectfully

[milhistbuff1]

Thats what the reserve ID's are for, to provide support to counter a union flanking movement aimed at the rear. as for getting flung out of the way, if they cant reach you, how can they do it, with you having horses available to fall back on, they afoot. Once the infantry arrived, Jenkins could and should pull out. His purpose was a delaying tactic, force the yanks to deploy, give Hood and McLaw's division coming off the cashtown pike a chance to dig in south and west of the town.
Respectfully
Matt

[Admiral_Porter]

How exactly did Longstreet win the victory. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't believe he commanded the Confederate forces there nor was it his battle plan.

No he wasn't the army commander but his leadership won the day.

Polk was bludgeoning his head against Thomas' breastworks and Bragg was so far in the rear he didn't realize he had even won the battle.

When Longstreet asked Bragg to order Polk to assist him Bragg told him that the Bishop's men were used up. Pete was forced to fight the rest of the battle on his own.

Take Longstreet and his men out of the equation and the AOT probably would have lost like usual.

Longstreet's strategy could not, and did not, overcome the numerical limitations in the slightest.

I see it as a case of too little too late.

Longstreet and others wanted a western concentration but by the time it was ordered Lee was beaten and Vicksburg fell. The Federals were able to combine the idle men of the AOTP and the AOTT with the AOTC in an effort to drive back Bragg.

The same thing happened in 1862. Davis was unwilling to take men from other departments to reinforce AS Johnston and only once the floodgates burst open at Henry and Donelson was he willing to concentrate his scattered forces.

[nbforrest]

Thats what the reserve ID's are for, to provide support to counter a union flanking movement aimed at the rear. as for getting flung out of the way, if they cant reach you, how can they do it, with you having horses available to fall back on, they afoot. Once the infantry arrived, Jenkins could and should pull out. His purpose was a delaying tactic, force the yanks to deploy, give Hood and McLaw's division coming off the cashtown pike a chance to dig in south and west of the town.

Any line Lee deployed would have been in a terrible defensive position. Any flank movement would hardly be slowed by one small cavalry brigade. If Lee was dispatching divisions out to combat a flanking move, they would be in positions devoid of defensive value. Outnumbered and in awkward positions, the odds aren't so good.

Respectfully

[nbforrest]

he wasn't the army commander but his leadership won the day.

Polk was bludgeoning his head against Thomas' breastworks and Bragg was so far in the rear he didn't realize he had even won the battle.

When Longstreet asked Bragg to order Polk to assist him Bragg told him that the Bishop's men were used up. Pete was forced to fight the rest of the battle on his own.

Take Longstreet and his men out of the equation and the AOT probably would have lost like usual.


Longstreet leading the crucial assault is nothing new...it doesn't reflect him as a great general...he didn't come up with any of the plans that set up his good situation. He was able to deliver a crushing assault...much as he had done before and would do again with Lee. Here, Longstreet is far from the leading figure in the victory, but rather his usual self as a hard hitting subordinate. Anyway, Longstreet's numbers are more of a reason for Confederate success than Longstreet's leadership.



I see it as a case of too little too late.

Longstreet and others wanted a western concentration but by the time it was ordered Lee was beaten and Vicksburg fell. The Federals were able to combine the idle men of the AOTP and the AOTT with the AOTC in an effort to drive back Bragg.

The same thing happened in 1862. Davis was unwilling to take men from other departments to reinforce AS Johnston and only once the floodgates burst open at Henry and Donelson was he willing to concentrate his scattered forces.
I agree that Davis' Western policy was foolish and led to defeat. But Lee could not have changed that. As Chickamauga showed, Lee dispatching a corps could do nothing to stem the tide. Lee can't be blamed for not saving the already lost Western war.

Respectfully