The worst General- North and South

[milhistbuff1]

Originally Posted by nbforrest

How about the Seven Days? Had Lee just sat on his behind, would that have turned out well?


You are ignoring the situation of each battle. Large numbers of casualties does not necessarily equal a blunder. Lee did make mistakes. But most of the time he chose the better of unpleasant alternatives. And got a lot of success where most generals would have found none.

NBForrest,

My apologies, i did not intend to duck your question. To answer it, Hood and Lee, both were equally bad, just the time frame was different. Both destroyed their armies due to a lack of judgement or patience. Hood especially should have known better, since he had experience from Brigade level on up. Additionally Hood had extensive prewar experience in combat commands, something Lee lacked since Lee was an engineer until his posting with the 2nd Cav. Flip side of that coin is that Lee should have known what fortified positions would do to his men since he built plenty of them in his military career especially after Mexico.

As far as the above quote about Seven Days and ignoring battlefield situations, i am hardly doing that.

In the Battles of Mechanicsville, Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines Mills, Lee's direct assaults were needless or based on improper information. Jackson was coming south from Ashland to Hundley's corner per Lee's initial plan, beyond Porter's Beaver Dam Creek flank, making an attack unnecessary. AP Hill was unaware due to Lee's misuse of Stuart's cavalry(sending it to the eastern flank where no credible existed) that Jackson would be late reaching his Hundley's Corner jump off point to turn Porter's flank, and asked Lee if he could attack around 3pm on June 26th, two hours before Jackson arrived. Lee disregarded his own plan and let AP Hill and part of DH Hill's division attack.

Bevin Alexander quotes DH Hill on the Mechanicsville/Beaver Dam Creek attack. " The blood shed by southern troops there was wasted in vain, and worse than in vain; for the fight had a most disspiriting effect on our troops.They could have halted at Mechanicsville until Jackson had turned the works on the creek and all the waste of blood could have been avoided.

At Gaines Mill the next day Lee believed Porter retreated to Powhite creek facing west to protect former Union HQ White House, which Lee believed was still the hq. In reality, Porter was at Boatswain's Swamp facing north, protecting the Chickahominy River Crossings. Since Lee didnt use the cavalry to maintain accurate info how could i be ignoring it. Lee never gathered it properly.Finally, instead of attacking Malvern Hill, Evelynton Heights was open for occupation by the CSA artillery and infantry and could have shelled Harrision's landing forcing McClellan to attack Lee and, which most likely would have failed. For Malvern Hill there is no excuse for his direct assaults as he spent many hours at his mothers girlhood home, Shirely Plantation, five miles west of Malvern Hill and surely knew that critical information about Evelynton Heights.

NBForrest, it seems to me that the opposite of what you said was true, Lee seemed to pick the worst alternative of all, consistantly. Perhaps sitting on his rear on the right ground a time or two could have forced McClellan to surrender, especially the Malvern Hill example.

Source Bevin Alexander's R E LEE's Civil War pgs 12-27

respectfully,
Matt


NBForrest, it seems to me that the opposite of what you said was true, Lee seemed to pick the worst alternative of all, consistantly.

[nbforrest]

NBForrest,

My apologies, i did not intend to duck your question. To answer it, Hood and Lee, both were equally bad, just the time frame was different. Both destroyed their armies due to a lack of judgement or patience. Hood especially should have known better, since he had experience from Brigade level on up. Additionally Hood had extensive prewar experience in combat commands, something Lee lacked since Lee was an engineer until his posting with the 2nd Cav. Flip side of that coin is that Lee should have known what fortified positions would do to his men since he built plenty of them in his military career especially after Mexico.

I fail to see how Lee was as bad as Hood. Hood was an abysmal corps commander and a schemer who maneuvered his way into command of the AOT and then proceeded to wreck the AOT in front of Atlanta. Then he embarked on the disastrous TN campaign. Cassville, Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, Ezra Church, Jonesboro, Spring Hill, Franklin, Nashville...hmmmm, not sure Lee can compare to that. When did Lee assault fortified positions? At most, rude breastworks. Ft. Stedman would likely be the only time.

In the Battles of Mechanicsville, Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines Mills, Lee's direct assaults were needless or based on improper information. Jackson was coming south from Ashland to Hundley's corner per Lee's initial plan, beyond Porter's Beaver Dam Creek flank, making an attack unnecessary. AP Hill was unaware due to Lee's misuse of Stuart's cavalry(sending it to the eastern flank where no credible existed) that Jackson would be late reaching his Hundley's Corner jump off point to turn Porter's flank, and asked Lee if he could attack around 3pm on June 26th, two hours before Jackson arrived. Lee disregarded his own plan and let AP Hill and part of DH Hill's division attack.

Lee's attacks were hardly unnecessary. Do you think Lee would have won without attacking? The Seven Days were hardly Lee's best moments. But he had solid plans and he correctly interpreted the strategic system. His plan for Mechanicsville was sound, but Jackson's flank attack did not materialize. Glendale was an even better plan. But Jackson stalls at White Oak Swamp and the frontal attacks are to no purpose. Lee made mistakes in the Seven Days, but he had solid plans.

Bevin Alexander quotes DH Hill on the Mechanicsville/Beaver Dam Creek attack. " The blood shed by southern troops there was wasted in vain, and worse than in vain; for the fight had a most disspiriting effect on our troops.They could have halted at Mechanicsville until Jackson had turned the works on the creek and all the waste of blood could have been avoided.

And exactly when would Jackson have turned their flank? That's the point...he screwed up. Hill attacked per his orders and was cut up. Jackson failed in his part of the deal. Had Hill sat there, the yes, casualties would have been avoided and in hindsight Porter still would have been pulled back, but it was hardly a disastrous error.

At Gaines Mill the next day Lee believed Porter retreated to Powhite creek facing west to protect former Union HQ White House, which Lee believed was still the hq. In reality, Porter was at Boatswain's Swamp facing north, protecting the Chickahominy River Crossings. Since Lee didnt use the cavalry to maintain accurate info how could i be ignoring it. Lee never gathered it properly.Finally, instead of attacking Malvern Hill, Evelynton Heights was open for occupation by the CSA artillery and infantry and could have shelled Harrision's landing forcing McClellan to attack Lee and, which most likely would have failed. For Malvern Hill there is no excuse for his direct assaults as he spent many hours at his mothers girlhood home, Shirely Plantation, five miles west of Malvern Hill and surely knew that critical information about Evelynton Heights.

If Lee was so totally lost as you claim, then why were his men deployed to attack Porter in such short order? And you are missing a bit of the story...Lee's attack worked and scared McClellan so badly that he surrendered the initiative to Lee permanently. I hardly think indirect fire on the landing, where McClellan was not even deployed, would have goaded Mac, of all people, into a attack. He knew the area...and knew that throwing some shells at the landing would accomplish zero. And remember that Lee intended both the artillery and flank attacks to carry through...not just his frontal assaults.In the event, the plan broke apart, but Lee did not blindly send his men up the hill. Anyway, Malvern Hill was nowhere as near lopsided as it is portrayed as.

NBForrest, it seems to me that the opposite of what you said was true, Lee seemed to pick the worst alternative of all, consistantly. Perhaps sitting on his rear on the right ground a time or two could have forced McClellan to surrender, especially the Malvern Hill example.

Yes, sitting and letting McClellan to retreat to safety would really have led to a mass surrender of an entire time. Extremely plausible. Should Lee have sat in front of Richmond and let a siege settle? Should he have just let Pope break off at 2nd Manassas? Should he have let Grant clear the Wilderness? Should he have let Grant secure Spotsylvania Court House without a fight? Should he have pulled up stakes at the North Anna? Should he have just sat inside the Petersburg lines without retaliating? No, I think Lee chose some good alternatives.

Respectfully

[matthew mckeon]

Lee the south's worst general. What a very, very, very, very, very, very, unique opinion.

Personally I always feel bad for people like Burnside, guys who understand they've created a disaster. In his place I'd screw up even worst, lose my head, hide in my tent. I can never be one of these guys who go "he should have flanked General Smith at Jonesville and sent Whatshisnames corps to seize the high ground blah blah blah. " When you consider that half the time you couldn't even figure out where the high ground was, and had to communicate by waving flags, blowing bugles or writing little notes, I'm surprised the armies ever even found each other.

[milhistbuff1]

Longstreet would have been far better.
He understood how technology would affect tactics, Lee did not. Lee let his honor to get in the way, being called the King of Spades was too much so he refused to entrench when he had the operational capability of striking back at the enemy. Only after his army was bled white did he dig in with any consistancy as a strategy.
Longstreet on the other hand knew repeating rifles and long range artillery would doom the bayonet charges before they began.
Respectfully,
Matt

[nbforrest]

Longstreet would have been far better.
He understood how technology would affect tactics, Lee did not. Lee let his honor to get in the way, being called the King of Spades was too much so he refused to entrench when he had the operational capability of striking back at the enemy. Only after his army was bled white did he dig in with any consistancy as a strategy.
Longstreet on the other hand knew repeating rifles and long range artillery would doom the bayonet charges before they began.

I fail to see how Longstreet understood this at all. You are basing this on Pickett's attack right? Think of how many bloody frontal attacks Longstreet made. No, he didn't know anything Lee didn't. Anyway, those sort of attacks often were simply necessary. People tend to overstate Napoleonic tactics hitting modern technology. That isn't really true. The ACW was in an awkward stage of development of warfare. Bloody attacks were still in order. What else could they do? Lee didn't entrench? Fredericksburg? Wilderness? Spotsylvania? North Anna? Cold Harbor? Petersburg?

Respectfully

[FSPowers]

Sorry I've been off line so long. My in-laws were in from the UK and I was showing them around San Antonio.

The following is strictly my opinion:

Confederate:
1. Floyd- abandoned his troops in a time of need.
2. Pillow- same
3. Bragg- did not keep order among his officers.
4. Hood- excellent as a corps commander but lost it when he commanded an army.
5. Pickett- his search for glory led his troops into a deadly charge, while a fish fry finished them off.

Union:

1. McClellan- too timid to push an attack, could have ended the CW in 1862, or at least shortned it by destroying Lee.
2. McClearnand- to political to be of any use to Grant in the West.
3. Burnside- should have been left at brigade level.
4. Butler- another political general, let himself get bottled up by a smaller force.
5. Siegl- great at enlisting Germans, but not at leading them.
6. Hooker- him getting knocked out at Chancellorsville probably saved the AofP.

Just a few of many.

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by FSPowers

Sorry I've been off line so long. My in-laws were in from the UK and I was showing them around San Antonio.

The following is strictly my opinion:

Confederate:
1. Floyd- abandoned his troops in a time of need.
2. Pillow- same
3. Bragg- did not keep order among his officers.
4. Hood- excellent as a corps commander but lost it when he commanded an army.
5. Pickett- his search for glory led his troops into a deadly charge, while a fish fry finished them off.

Union:

1. McClellan- too timid to push an attack, could have ended the CW in 1862, or at least shortned it by destroying Lee.
2. McClearnand- to political to be of any use to Grant in the West.
3. Burnside- should have been left at brigade level.
4. Butler- another political general, let himself get bottled up by a smaller force.
5. Siegl- great at enlisting Germans, but not at leading them.
6. Hooker- him getting knocked out at Chancellorsville probably saved the AofP.

Just a few of many.

I think the only ones I might take issue with would be Hood in a limited sense: he was a terrible corps commander! So, actually I would agree with your choice more fervently.

Hooker-I don't think I would say he was one of the worst. He has rather risen in esteem in my mind. He was a solid corps commander. Certainly he screwed up at Chancellorsville, but he did a great job of reorganizing and raising the morale of the AOP beforehand, as well as planting the seed of an effective cavalry corps. He did solid work out West as well, which tends to be forgotten.
Seems like Banks, Fremont, or Milroy should be ahead of him in the list, although that is pretty much ****ing him with faint praise.

Respectfully

[FSPowers]

I agree with the statment concerning Hooker. most folks remember him just for Chancellorsville and the feud with Halleck which got him removed as Commander, AofP.

Forgot about the Corps command out west, where he did better.

I can replace Hooker with Pleasanton, who almost bagged Stuart at Brandy Station, another lost opportunity. I read an article that stated that he pumped his war record after the CW.

Some can command a regiment but not a division.
Some can command a division but not a brigade.
Some can command a brigade but not a corps.
Some can command a corps but not an army.

And some should have just stayed in the ranks.

[Calicoboy]

Alabaman

I find your views on Atlanta on the mark. Johnson may have not defeated Sherman at Atlanta; but he could have held out until after the 1864 election. That in itself would have had an impact on the fortunes of war. Hood probably did the North a massive favor by being so aggressive. Sherman's "bummers" were a tough lot and attacking them, as Hood did, was a strategic mistake. Hood was a brilliant brigade commander. Too bad he'll be remembered for Atlanta, Franklin and his disaster at the hands of Pap Thomas.

Calicoboy

[nbforrest]

Why Hood really deserves to be at the bottom of my list is that he agressively pursued higher command. If it had been a case of being promoted beyond his ability to command by happenstance...like say, Burnside...then that wouldn't be so bad. But he pursued corps command...and flopped. Then he lied about Johnston to gain army command...and that ended even worse.


Respectfully