Stinking Bodies

[connyankee]

I read a lot about U.S. Grant. It seems to me that at least twice (assaults at Vicksburg, before the seige, and again at Cold Harbor) he waited for a number of days to retrieve the dead and wounded on the battleground of these two places. Was it a tactic to "stink" the Confederates out of their trenches? It also seems to me that the thing came to an end when his own men complained of it. The stench must have been enormous.

At Cold Harbor, there was a weird correspondence between Lee and Grant about the battlefield that lasted for days.

Not a topic to discuss before dinner, I suppose.

[blackirish]

June 3, 1864 found Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia firmly entrenched across from Ulysses S. Grant and the Army of the Potomac at Cold Harbor. The two armies had been in constant conflict since Grant had thrown his 150,000 man army across the Rapidan on May 4. After large and overwhelmingly one-sided losses in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Grant's forces were considerably lessened but he still had a much larger force than the one Lee commanded. Grant had been whipped convincingly losing men at a rate double to the Confederate losses but he was unperturbed. He was determined to carry out his single minded purpose of destroying Lee's army and he knew that no matter how many men he lost, he could replace them. Lee did not enjoy the same luxury. Even though his losses were smaller they were irreplaceable losses.
Grant was a different sort of problem for Lee. Lee had enjoyed tactical successes over each and every General that he faced. Grant was no exception. Lee and his army had outmaneuvered and outfought the Army of the Potomac in each engagement and yet Grant just kept coming. He was relentless and indifferent to everything except his avowed purpose of destroying Lee's army. His superiority in numbers of men and material would eventually decide the war and he knew it. Grant was not in Lee's league as a strategist but he had the advantage. Grant was the perfect man for the bloody job of defeating Lee. He was a bulldog with a death grip on Lee and he was determined not to let go. The same personality traits that had led to Grant's lack of success in other endeavors seemed custom designed to carry him through the conflict with Lee. The following is a quote from Grant's own memoirs:
"One of my superstitions had always been when I started to go anywhere, or do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. I have frequently started to go to places where I never had been and to which I did not know the way, depending on making enquiries on the road, and if I got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, I would go until a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and come in by the other side."
Grant's campaign into Virginia in 1864 was an excellent example of this philosophy in action. With equal forces Lee would have annihilated Grant but they were not equal.
On this particular morning, after two days of fighting the outcome of the impending battle was anything but certain. Lee was strongly entrenched and Grant was determined to break his lines. He was preparing to send some three corps of men 60,000 strong against the center and right of Lee's line. Lee's men, experts at entrenchment and defensive positions had done their job well. Hancock and Wright's men walked right into a concave line supported heavily by artillery and the slaughter was terrible. The closer to Lee's line the Union soldiers made it the worse the crossfire became. The brunt of the attack was spent in eight minutes. When the smoke cleared enough to see clearly an Alabama colonel, whose regiment had three men killed and five wounded, saw that "the dead covered more than five acres of ground about as thickly as they could be laid." The fighting continued sporadically until 1:30 that afternoon when an order came down from Grant "For the present all further offensive operations will be suspended." The confederate losses were estimated at around 1500 men while the Union losses exceeded 7000 men.
Grant told one of the members of his staff that Lee would come out of his trenches and try to take advantage of the situation at which point he would "turn the tables". Lee had no intention of doing anything so foolish. Later, with his staff sitting silent at dinner and the realization beginning to dawn on all of them of the magnitude of the defeat Grant said "I regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered".
The main part of the battle took place on June 3. It was June 7 before arrangements were concluded to allow for the rescue of wounded men who had lay dying in the heat for 3 days. Union troops watched in horror from behind their lines while wounded men cried out for aid day after day. The heat was withering while vultures circled overhead and the cries got weaker and weaker as time wore on. Any effort at rescuing the dying men was met with withering fire from Confederate sharpshooters and both sides wondered what was going on. Why was there no cease-fire? Why were men suffering horribly for no reason?
In much the same type of situation at Vicksburg the Confederate commander, Pemberton, had called for a cease-fire to administer aid for the wounded. The difference was that at Vicksburg the dead had been intermingled Union and Confederate. At Cold Harbor they were almost solely Union troops that lay in the hot sun suffering. A union officer explained Grant's reluctance by saying that it was commonly assumed that the commander who sent a flag of truce and requested permission to care for his wounded and bury his dead was tacitly admitting defeat. Plainly, Grant was reluctant to admit any such thing. Finally, on June 5, when it became abundantly clear that Lee was not going to ask for a truce to bury Union dead, General Meade talked Grant into doing so. The exchange that followed took another 2 days to conclude due to Grant's repeated determination to refuse to acknowledge any sense of having lost the battle. This drama could almost be seen as a comic display of obstinacy if not for the fact that wounded men lay suffering in agony the whole time it was playing itself out.

June 5, 1864
General Robert E. Lee
Commanding Confederate Army
It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me.
U. S. Grant
Lieut. General

Lee's response was not what Grant expected. Lee correctly wanted Grant to ask for a cease-fire. "I fear that such an arrangement will lead to misunderstanding and difficulty," Lee wrote back. "I propose, therefore, instead, that when either party desires to remove their dead or wounded a flag of truce be sent, as is customary. It will always afford me pleasure to comply with such a request as far as circumstances will permit."
Grant took several hours to respond to this letter from Lee. When he did respond he again carefully skirted the request by Lee that he observe protocol and ask for a truce.

June 6, 1864
General Robert E. Lee
Commanding Army of N. VA.
Your communication of yesterday is received. I will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 and 3 P.M. to-day. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.
U.S. Grant
Lieut.-General

Lee was somewhat perturbed that Grant had ignored his request for a formal truce. He answered "I regret to find that I did not make myself understood in my communication."
He had not proposed any such informal collection of dead and wounded and he told Grant that he would honor only a formal request of Grant's made "by flag of truce in the usual way."
Again Grant took several hours to reply to Lee's letter.

June 6, 1864
General R. E. Lee
Commanding Army, N. Va.
The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to say that the hours you my fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application.
U. S. Grant
Lieut. General

Lee agreed to these terms. However, delays in transmitting correspondence back to Grant brought it to the 7th of June before the truce was actually declared. During that time all but 2 of the Union wounded who had suffered so cruelly in the five-acre field of death between the lines had died.
While June 3, 1864 lives as a day of horrific loss on the field of battle the next 3 days of posturing by Grant and Lee over protocol at the expense of wounded men suffering where they had fallen between the lines is a ghastly reminder of just how horrible war really is.

blackirish

[connyankee]

I appreciate your reply, blackirish, Thanks.

CY

[william42]

I've not been able to understand this event, even though I've read about it several times. Grant's delay in contacting Lee to arrange a cease-fire or truce so that the wounded and dead could be attended to is inexcusable. As much as I admire Grant as a general I've always considered this incident to be very troubling. The fact that it took 2 days for him to send the first dispatch to Lee is incomprehensible. Maybe he was waiting for Lee to contact him. Why would Lee do that when the majority of the dead and wounded were yankees? I'm a die-hard yankee myself, and I would surely like to give General Grant the benefit of the doubt here, but I cannot.

[pvt gauss]

At Cold Habor anyway I believe ole Grant was just keepin Bobby Lee in place so as to get his next sidle on the road. After all the casualties he had "absorbed" up till now, whats another 8 thousand. All that stuff about the flag on truce taking so long, again hold your enemy in place and manuever.

[william42]

pvt gauss: Thanks for your post. I'm no military tactical expert by any stretch, but if I understand your post you're saying that by not asking for a truce for 2 days Grant would be holding Lee in place while Grant would be free to maneuver, to get his next sidle on the road, using your words. What would stop Lee from manuevering also? "...hold your enemy in place and manuever." I'm sorry, I can't seem to grasp how a truce arranged immediately after the battle to evacuate the wounded would have been beneficial to Lee and detrimental to Grant, thereby justifying Grants long wait before finally arranging a truce. During the time when there was no truce, according to your post, Grant would be free to maneuver, and Lee would be prevented from maneuvering, or as you put it he would be kept in place. I don't understand how that would happen.

"What's another 8 thousand." I can't tell if you're kidding or not. You seem to be saying that Grants decision to allow the wounded to lay dying there for two days was justified by the tactical advantage he supposedly gained in doing so. I don't remember any significant advantage that was gained by that decision, or if that was even the reason behind his delay in evacuating the wounded. Maybe the answer is in his memoirs. I don't know as I haven't read them yet, but whatever the reason for his inaction it had better be darned good to justify the enormous suffering that occurred there. Until I see evidence that would persuade me otherwise I will stick with my original opinion posted above in this thread that his inaction was inexcusable.

Terry

[pvt gauss]

William42,Compliments sir,
Sir, in my humble opinion Lee was now on the defensive, the choice of movement was no longer his. He had to react instaed of act. He had to WAIT until Grant made a movement or guess and loose the whole shooting match. The preponderance of numbers on the Union side precluded him from his "Gray Fox" movements from earlier in the war. He was now dictated too instead of dictating to. Grant dictated to him the amount of time to wait until he could move. So far during this campaign Lee had beat him[Grant] to his objective. He had to keep it up. Where would he[grant] move next? Would he keep up his sidles or would he strike due west-he[lee] had to wait and see. I have to believe this gauled him[lee] no end but little choice was his.
As far as the "another 8 thousand" is concerned, Grant had burnt up 65 thousand[total casulties] by that time in this campaign, it seems to me that another eight was just the price that had to be paid,to fight an army "on its last legs". Although he did state that Cold Harbor was the one charge he regretted makeing in his career,[and cried of it in his tent], tell that to the fallen boys. After all he was recieving re-enforcements[not as many as before], Halleck;[ the barrel is close to empty] but still getting them where Bobby Lee was not. Every Reb down was gone fore-ever not true on the union side. A siege the rebs couldn`t handle an thats where they were headed.

Paul

ps. some of Grants hospital trains were mistaken for a retreat- a lot of trains I guess

[ole]

I too have been unable to put a good face on Grant's inaction at Cold Harbor. Most accounts I have read have either hinted or boldly declared that Grant's pride kept him from asking for a truce.

Paul's explanation makes sense up to the point that a truce MAY have fixed Lee as firmly in place as did the threat of another maneuver.

I've chalked it up to a bad day, hoping that he had other reasons than pride for the delay.
Ole

[william42]

Hi Paul. I have no dispute with your first paragraph at all. I'm no expert on the battle of Cold Harbor, but what you've posted there pretty much jibes with what I've read in the past. The problem with Grant that I have does not really have to do with the WAIT, but rather with what he did, or did not do DURING the wait. The questions still go unanswered; Why did General Grant not immediately contact Lee for a truce arrangement so the wounded could be evacuated. and what was his reasoning in allowing his own wounded troops lie in the hot sun, wounded, bleeding, thirsty, and dying for two days before contacting Lee.

Grant writes in his memoirs about the events of June 5th, two days after the disastrous assault:

" The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us. During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. These we were able to care for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. So I wrote the following: "

The next paragraph in his memoirs contain the content of his first note to Lee about a truce. Sounds to me that there was quite a bit of maneuvering on both sides, during those two days, but there's still no satisfactory explanation for why Grant left his wounded to die during that time period.

Terry

[gary]

I would beg to differ with regards to Grant & Lee as a strategist. As a strategist, Grant was the best general of the war. He realized that the south was doomed after the fall of Donelson (it opened the heartland to Union invasion at any point of their chosing). He saw its potential but was stopped by Halleck. Halleck only agreed because of Lincoln's order for all armies to move. When Grant moved to capture Henry, he then took the initiative to attack Donelson. His campaign to capture Vicksburg met many setbacks, but when he finally decided to march on the west bank and land at Bruinsburg, he threw Pemberton for a loop and outmanuevered him entirely. The five battles he fought before arriving at Vicksburg was worthy of Napoleon's use of the central position.

While Lee was a good strategist, he was too Virginia oriented. Lee didn't have to invade the North to win the war. He need only win defensive battles to exhaust the North. It worked for Washington during the Revolution. At the Seven Days Battle, he led the largest army he would ever lead during the entire war but squandered it away. Look at his loses at Malvern Hill. His Sharpsburg campaign was ill conceived as was his Gettysburg Campaign. He suffered excessively. His strategy in detaching Early to raid Washington was also ill conceived. Grant had the advantage of interior lines and could rush troops to protect the capital (which he did). Grant's greatest fear would be that Early reinforce the Army of Tennessee, whup Sherman and then the Army of Tennessee arrives and helps Lee whup Grant. To Lee's credit though, he did predict the Overland Campaign and losing if it became a battle of attrition.

Now, as to Cold Harbor, that was a mistake and over 3,500 casualties were suffered in the morning attack and more in Burnside's afternoon attack. Grant admitted it was a mistake. Why Grant didn't ask for a truce immediately would be (I think) in his mind and the minds of everyone else of the period, be an admission of defeat according to the protocols of war.