Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
A have a Question: The night June 12, 1864 Grant pulls out of Cold Harbor and heads toward Wilcox's Point to began his Crossing of the James.
On the morning of June 13, 1864 Lee learns Grant has pulled out of his position in front of him. He is furious and is at a loss to where Grant has moved his army.
Lee does not know where Grant has moved to so his breaks camp and send Hill to river crossing south of Cold Harbor along the Chickahominy river.
On June 14th Grant begins crossing the James river.
From June 13 to June 16 1864, Lee has no know idea of where or what Grant is doing. He speculates Grant might try to cross the James river and speculates Grant may have turn north maybe even planing to double back on him.
My questions is:
How could Grant hide the movement of his large army for it would have congested all the roads toward Wilcox Point?
Would not have the locals told Lee which direction the AoP was moving?
I know Grant did not move the AoP in one day but over a few so how was Grant able to keep Lee in a fog for those three days before he figured out where Grant was?
An army on the move leaves a trail so why did it take Lee three days to figure out which way Grant's army moved off too?
It hard for me to believe Lee could not figure out where Grant had move his army since they where playing in Lee's own backyard.
It just mystifies me...
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
A have a Question: The night June 12, 1864 Grant pulls out of Cold Harbor and heads toward Wilcox's Point to began his Crossing of the James.
On the morning of June 13, 1864 Lee learns Grant has pulled out of his position in front of him. He is furious and is at a loss to where Grant has moved his army.
Lee does not know where Grant has moved to so his breaks camp and send Hill to river crossing south of Cold Harbor along the Chickahominy river.
On June 14th Grant begins crossing the James river.
From June 13 to June 16 1864, Lee has no know idea of where or what Grant is doing. He speculates Grant might try to cross the James river and speculates Grant may have turn north maybe even planing to double back on him.
My questions is:
How could Grant hide the movement of his large army for it would have congested all the roads toward Wilcox Point?
Would not have the locals told Lee which direction the AoP was moving?
I know Grant did not move the AoP in one day but over a few so how was Grant able to keep Lee in a fog for those three days before he figured out where Grant was?
An army on the move leaves a trail so why did it take Lee three days to figure out which way Grant's army moved off too?
It hard for me to believe Lee could not figure out where Grant had move his army since they where playing in Lee's own backyard.
It just mystifies me...
I have thought about this for a long time. There are various reasons for it (including an excellent job done by the AoP in disengaging from and screening their movement).
But if I had to blame someone for this, it would not be Lee. It would be P. G. T. Beauregard.
Beauregard did know Grant was moving his way -- and didn't tell Lee. He kept asking for troops, and he even pulled the force off the Bermuda Hundred line without telling Lee why, leaving Lee to cover it. If you ever have the time to go through the Lee-Beauregard messages for the period in the O.R., you'll get the distinct impression Beauregard wanted Lee's army sent south of the James to reinforce him -- but he didn't want Robert E. Lee showing up with it.
Beyond that, it is really hard for two armies facing one another in trench warfare to see more than a few hundred yards into the enemy position. What's being done away from the front is invisible most of the time.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Beauregard's vagueness in his telegrams was just one of the issues confronting Lee.
On the morning of June 13, lee had no clue where Grant's army had moved off to or in which direction. Lee was mystified by it.
How can this be? Lee new where Grant was going when
he moved his army towards the Wilderness and then to Spotsylvania, to North Anna and on to Cold harbor. So what happen at Cold Harbor that cause Lee to lose sight of Grant's army?
It looks like a break down in Lee ability to gather information even with the locals help. because Stuart was gone? or because Hamilton was off chasing Sheridan?
Why did it take three days to find Grant's army?
From what I know an army on the move leaves a big footprint as it moves across the landscape.
I am baffled by Lee's in ability to find Grant..
Still mystified...
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Grant's move across the James was at least as masterful a bit of legerdemain as his Vicksburg Campaign. I suspest that he didn't just sneak away, but did a few bits of razzle-dazzle to keep Lee guessing; i.e., small but obvious movements, feigned attacks, diversionary attacks, noise and shooting, countermarches, and whatever.
Wasn't the area heavily wooded? That alone restricts cavalry intelligence filtering back.
Will take Tim's advice and read those OR pages including the communications between Beau and Bobby Lee. Will also read the dispatches and communications in Grant's camp. Maybe a mutual exploration will lead to my better understanding of how he managed it. (And a couple of books.)
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Beauregard's vagueness in his telegrams was just one of the issues confronting Lee.
On the morning of June 13, lee had no clue where Grant's army had moved off to or in which direction. Lee was mystified by it.
How can this be? Lee new where Grant was going when
he moved his army towards the Wilderness and then to Spotsylvania, to North Anna and on to Cold harbor. So what happen at Cold Harbor that cause Lee to lose sight of Grant's army?
It looks like a break down in Lee ability to gather information even with the locals help. because Stuart was gone? or because Hamilton was off chasing Sheridan?
Why did it take three days to find Grant's army?
From what I know an army on the move leaves a big footprint as it moves across the landscape.
I am baffled by Lee's in ability to find Grant..
Still mystified...
To begin with, you need to picture what is going on as Grant and Lee are moving, and to realize that Grant was a very competent general who was deliberately confusing the situation and making multiple threats to disguise his purpose.
What people think of as Cold Harbor is the last assault on June 3, but that battle had begun on May 31. From then until June 12, the two armies faced one another across a solidly entrenched line. Lee and Grant can see the trenches and some areas around them; their is no way to penetrate the front and see what is going on a few hundred yards behind the lines, so sudden movement can take the other side unaware very easily.
As this was going on, David Hunter was moving up the Shenandoah Valley virtually unopposed. Grant sends Sheridan with 2 divisions of cavalry to join him on June 7. The Confederacy will face a grave threat if that happens: a united Hunter and Sheridan moving on Richmond from the West. Lee sends Early and Hampton out to neutralize this threat. Hampton meets and beats Sheridan at Trevillan Station on June 11-12, making it too difficult for Sheridan to complete his mission, and hits Sheridan again on June 24 at St. Mary's Church. This enables Early to win the Battle of Lynchburg (June 17-18), clear the Shenandoah and threaten Washington as Hunter retreats over the mountains into WV.
But all that means Lee is short a Corps and almost all of his cavalry on June 12 when Grant begins to move on Petersburg. Grant would have been even happier if Sheridan hadn't been stalled by Hampton and Hunter/Sheridan had joined to threaten Richmond -- but as a diversion even the bad result he got was great.
As he pulls out, Grant covers his rear; as he marches South, he feints toward Richmond with a Corps and marches the rest of the army South behind the shield of their lines. Grant has at least one cavalry division with him (I think 2, one a small one from Butler's command); Lee has very little. Union patrols blanket the roads to keep spies and civilians from passing information through quickly, and Lee does not have enough cavalry to effectively penetrate the screen to find the Union army.
Plus, Grant's men are marching away from Lee. Even in the best conditions, it would take a long time to get from the head of Grant's columns to Lee, even if there were no Union screen to stop you.
Lee, left in the dark, has to guess. He figures Grant is pulling another of his patented short-left-hook movements to get around the right flank of his ANV (as Grant almost managed to do at Cold Harbor May 31-June 2.) He moves to intercept. But Grant has actually planned a much longer movement, side-stepping all the way below the James before turning West.
The only people actually in a position to discover and report Grant's crossing of the James report to Beauregard. He discovers it. He begins to take action to defend against it. He does not tell Lee what he knows -- which is why Lee takes so long to discover what is going on.
Up to the point where Grant/Meade's troops start crossing the James, this is a brilliantly thought-out and executed mission, extending over the bredth of Virginia and involving troops from three different Union armies. Lee -- outnumbered and forced to divide his command -- actually did pretty well here. He would have done a bit better if Beauregard had informed Richmond and Lee of what he knew, and reinforcements probably would have arrived in Richmond slightly sooner.
As to Grant, the fatigue of the campaign had taken its' toll. Smith was too cautious, too worried about smashing headlong into entrenchments, at just the wrong time. Hancock (badly informed by Meade/Grant HQ) felt no sense of urgency as he came up, and took Smith's advice. The chance to win the war in an afternoon passed by.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
The Supply Train Grant’s supply train bypassed the Chickahominy crossings at Long and Jones bridges and continued to travel eastward to Cole’s Landing. The pontoon bridge there was the longest of the Chickahominy crossings, measuring 1,200 feet. The swampy terrain around the span required extensive use of corduroy approaches and piers. The terrain also required all the available pontoons in the engineer regiment plus those brought downstream after the disassembly of the Long and Jones bridges. The 1,200-foot span was completed after dark on June 14, and the supply train began moving across the pontoon bridge at Cole’s Landing during the night. The longer route to the Cole’s Landing crossing kept the supply train from encumbering the movement of the infantry, a constant concern of Grant and his quartermasters.
Quartermaster Improvements The chief quartermaster for the Army of the Potomac was Colonel Rufus Ingalls, a reformer and veteran of many campaigns. As early as 1862, Ingalls set to work reducing the number of wagons on the march with the army. He recognized that the large baggage trains that accompanied those early armies reduced mobility, were a financial burden and required excessive manpower to secure. His early reforms not only prescribed what should be carried on these wagons, but also tied the number of wagons authorized to the actual headcount within the regiment. Similar restrictions were eventually adopted throughout the Union Army, although abuses continued throughout the war. In addition to limiting the size of the trains, Ingalls also took steps to regulate their organization. Early in the war, wagon trains were organized at the regimental level with no centralized authority or marching orders. This led to mass confusion during major campaigns, with trains jockeying for position and becoming inextricably bogged down at every intersection and narrow point in the road. Ingalls ordered that trains be organized at brigade or division level with the senior quartermaster in overall command of the movement. Rufus Ingalls also created the concept of supply trains by separating bulk supplies into special trains for ammunition, subsistence, quartermaster and hospital stores. General supply wagons were to be marked to indicate their contents. Baggage wagons were to be marked with their corps badge, division color and the number of their respective brigade. These procedures allowed for streamlined traffic control and the efficient return of empty wagons to the advance depots for resupply. The supply train that moved from Cold Harbor to the James River contained several thousand wagons and was some 50 miles in length. A soldier assigned to the security detail for the train reported that it took 14 hours for the supply train to pass his position. When supply trains were grouped together on the march, they were organized with small arms ammunition to the front, followed by artillery ammunition, subsistence, forage and then sutlers. This arrangement allowed quick access to the most important supplies and assumed that the most critical resources were safest at the front of the column. During the movement to the James River, the supply train was organized at army level with brigade and regimental quartermasters placed among the trains where they were responsible for a given number of wagons. The nighttime movement, dusty roads and difficult terrain required strict adherence to the march order. The huge train was delayed several hours by the building of the pontoon bridge at Cole’s Landing. Nevertheless, Grant expressed satisfaction with its progress. The train was protected by troopers of General James Harrison Wilson’s cavalry division along with soldiers detailed from
I found this on the web:
The Crossing of the James is where the union army's engineers and quartermasters Corps shining moment of the war. Due to their herculean efforts they moved 115,000 men, wagons and a cattle herd across the James river before Lee could react to stop them.
There was more the web piece had that shows the engineering it took to move the AoP to Wilcox Point.
If you think about it Grant's greatest achievement was one of Logistics not one of combat.
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
I looked more into it and found and read Grant recount but does not try to explain how he managed to slip away in June 1864. He capture to bridge point on the Chickahominy river and chased off the pickets watching those points and then entrenched south of Chickahominy river. He fainted Warren Corps toward Richmond and that all he offers.
I have read a few accounts of the Overland campaign Lee was always one step ahead of Grant until he crossed the James. Lee usually had a plan if Grant depending on which river crossing he led the AoP to. At cold harbor it seems Lee did not have a plan when Grant vanished before him. I get the impression that Lee's army lost it's advantage to move faster then Grant's army it once enjoyed at the start of the Overland campaign
I need to find Lee's OR's during this period..
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
I would like to mention that General Beauregard in the beginning of the Civil War was the 'darling' of the CSA. By time General Lee came into command Beauregard wasn't so high up on everybody's admiration list.
If I was as in a position to make a 'splash' and get President Jeff Davis' attention; it would be with the Cold Harbor movement with Grant; as to just remind everybody that Beauregard is more than 'home guard' quality commander.
It has been mentioned in some of my personal chats with people about Beauregard; I was told to take Beauregard's official reports at a level of more filler and flash, which made them much more than they were. His need for attention, is an alleged cause for wanting the spotlight and leave Lee in the wings--thus the confusing and vague correspondences.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
It looks from this report that Lee knew that at least a part of Grant's army was heading towards. Lee sent this out on June 14th, 1864.
Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, Richmond, Va.
SIR: The force of the enemy mentioned in my last dispatch as being on the Long Bridge road disappeared during the night. It was probably advanced to cover the movement of the main body, most of which, as far as I can learn, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and below, and has reached James River at Westover and Wilcox's Landing. A portion of General Grant's army upon leaving our front at Cold Harbor is reported to have proceeded to the White House and embarked at that place. Everything is said to have been removed and the depot at the White House broken up. The cars, engine, railroad iron, and bridge timber that had been brought to that point have also been reshipped.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
It looks like Lee was unable to figure out where or how much of Grant's was moving towards the James.
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
June 4th, 1864. The Army of the Potomac sat in the trenches of Cold harbor, brought to a ... Grant's 115,000 troops had to crosstheJamesRiver. ... etext.lib.virginia.edu/flowerdew/vG4th.html - Cached
----------------------------------------------------- I found this site. It gives a great but short account of Grant crossing the James river in June of 1864.
__________________
"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
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Crossing of the James...Lee in a Fog. 
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