Grasping victory

[whitworth]

Many students of the Civil War and historians seem to be bent on grasping victory from the jaws of defeat.

The Confederacy lost because of some very good reasons. Valor was never enough.

I just read part of a book that maintained a treaty, near the end of the war was possible. That the Confederacy would become independent, with Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, the New Mexico territory, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina and eastern Virginia, late in the war.
Unfortunately, a good deal of this territory was lost in 1862, 1863 and 1864. I wonder how he could reconcile the U.S. giving up much territory lost by the Confederate army and never regained.
Some historians seem to never recognize that the Confederacy was defeated and the defeat didn't start in 1865. These "historians" never quite accept defeat. Why they can hatch a plan where victory is grasped from the jaws of defeat. Not partially mind you, in this case, but totally.

Why the Confederacy never made a mistake, and defeat was a figment of someone's imagination.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Whitworth,

Personally, I doubt if any governmental form enjoys 'defeat,' Even in today's politics, the 'spin' is the same as I am seeing in Civil War survivors who rather live in spot 'glory' then to take the entire Civil War into context and bring it to the total sum.

If removing the governmental aspects --then put it into a personality aspect -- then the insecurities and the martyr syndrome manifests. The denial continues when there is an inability to deal with reality. But, with the papers were feeding 'filling' and not being brutally honest--the sudden surrender of Lee at Appomattox, Johnson and Waite following was perhaps one of the causes.

But, to me--The Confederates lost when they had failed to exhaust all the remedies of the US Surpreme Court as well as to be patient with Congressional 'wheels of motion.'

The lack of preparations was already evident in 1861. General Robert E. Lee was writing to his wife about the lack of clothing and often depended on the captured Union equipment. What a good many battles by the Confederates were with the stolen/captured guns and ammunitions of the US Government, not counting belt buckles, overcoats, blankets, canteens, horses, horse shoes and nails, saddles bridles, bits, swords and so forth

The Confederacy made many mistakes in it's birth and death. But, so did the Union--but, due to being defeated, its always been 'nature' for the defeated to excuse themselves and or blame others.

My personal sadness is though -- the offenses against one another in the Civil War are not offenses against us... in the present/future. There are heros on both sides and, in general -- Americans hate to loose and we loose poorly. We saw this, after Viet Nam.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[timewalker]

Originally Posted by whitworth

Many students of the Civil War and historians seem to be bent on grasping victory from the jaws of defeat.

The Confederacy lost because of some very good reasons. Valor was never enough.

I just read part of a book that maintained a treaty, near the end of the war was possible. That the Confederacy would become independent, with Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, the New Mexico territory, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina and eastern Virginia, late in the war.
Unfortunately, a good deal of this territory was lost in 1862, 1863 and 1864. I wonder how he could reconcile the U.S. giving up much territory lost by the Confederate army and never regained.
Some historians seem to never recognize that the Confederacy was defeated and the defeat didn't start in 1865. These "historians" never quite accept defeat. Why they can hatch a plan where victory is grasped from the jaws of defeat. Not partially mind you, in this case, but totally.

Why the Confederacy never made a mistake, and defeat was a figment of someone's imagination.

Complete balderdash. Lincoln was never willing to agree to independence. His meeting at City Point late in the war with CSA VP Stephens late in the war is testimony to that. He would not even agree to meet with them unless they assured him that peace would NOT include independence.

And is list of territory is simply incredible. Kentucky? Never even part of the Confederacy. What makes the author think the US would agree to give up Kentucky? Or the length of the Mississippi allowing free trade?

The author is living in a fantasy world.

[mobile_96]

Who is the Author and book Title
Chuck in Ill.

[5fish]

I agree with Timewalker there never a time where Lincoln thought or desire to cut a treaty with the Confederacy.

Treaty implies that the Confederacy was a nation and Lincoln never referred to or ever implied the Confederacy was nothing more then rebels.

I do not understand the writer's logic on why Lincoln would be motivated to sign a treaty of the rebels...He was winning the war on every account that one judges a war by.

I have never understood why people today wish the south had won the Civil War. I can not understand thier logic on wishing the south won the civil War. I just figure its just home team pride.... I know it is more then that but I jest don't understand what the desire for is for Southern victory...

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by whitworth

I just read part of a book that maintained a treaty, near the end of the war was possible.

You'd better get another book.

-

[ole]

No. No. Guys. When Lincoln took office, there was no more pretend. He might have some leeway to negotiate but, so far as he was concerned, it was Constitutiounally limited. He could do this. He could not do that. Mostly; what he could not do was what the Confederacy demanded. So it played into his hand. Let's remember that the north outnumbered the south at least about 3 to 2. Not a good idea.

ole

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

From the Official Records of the Rebellion:
The Outbreak Of Rebellion.
Chapter IV.--Lincoln.


Mr. Lincoln's inaugural address made a frank declaration of his policy on the leading points of controversy. He repeated that he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it existed. But he also asserted that the Union is perpetual; that secession resolves or ordinances are legally void; that acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary; and that to the extent of his ability he should cause the laws to be faithfully executed in all the States. The Union would defend itself, hold its property and places, and collect the duties and imposts; "but, beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." There should be no bloodshed or violence, unless forced upon the national authority. Temporary discontent he would tolerate; the exercise of offices in disaffected districts he would forego; he would continue to furnish the mails unless repelled; he would endeavor to preserve that sense of perfect security most favorable to calm thought and renewed allegiance. An unanswerable argument against disunion and an earnest appeal to reason and lawful remedy, he followed by a most impressive declaration of peace and good <out_50>will: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government; while I shall have the most solemn one to preserve, protect, and defend it."

Unhappily the burden and difficulty of administration was already heavier than he or the public were aware. He had come into office sharing the general belief that Major Anderson was secure in his stronghold of Sumter until the rebel batteries should become powerful enough to drive him out. On the contrary, a subtler and more unfailing enemy than the rebels—starvation—was rapidly forcing the brave little garrison to surrender. On the morning after inauguration letters from Sumter were put into the President's hands, showing that the fort contained provisions for only a little more than a month longer, and adding the professional opinion of Anderson and his officers that a well-appointed fleet and an army of twenty thousand men would be needed to raise the siege, so formidable had the encircling rebel batteries already become.

Such a fleet and such an army were not in existence, nor could they be organized for many months. After mature consideration General Scott advised the President that it was practically impossible to relieve or reinforce Sumter, and that, as a mere military question, it was necessary to order its evacuation.

To Mr. Lincoln, who had only a few days before publicly promised the nation that he would "hold, occupy, and possess, the property and places belonging to the Government," this was indeed a trying alternative. He ordered a re-examination of the whole subject, and Cabinet, military, and <out_51>naval officers joined in its discussion. Among the plans of relief was one urged by Captain G. V. Fox, who, even under General Scott's adverse criticism, convinced the President and a majority of the Cabinet that he could, by means of open boats and small tugs, in a dark night throw a small quantity of provisions and a few men into the fort. The political aspects of the case, however, remained still to be considered. The President, therefore, on March 15th propounded to his Cabinet the written question, "Assuming it to be possible to provision Fort Sumter, is it wise under all the circumstances of the case to attempt to do so?" To this the Cabinet made written replies, five members arguing against the policy of attempting relief, and only two in its favor. The majority, led by Mr. Seward, argued that any possible relief would only be temporary, and that a disastrous failure, and the eventual loss of the fort would produce more damaging political results, than to give it up at once under the imperative military necessity already existing, and for which the new administration was in no wise responsible.

Two or three collateral questions connected themselves with the main one. The exposed situation of Fort Pickens had become known to Lincoln, and one of his earliest official acts was to order its reinforcement from the fleet; but of the conditions of the January truce he was not informed. He was therefore waiting in painful anxiety to receive news that his order had been executed and Pickens reinforced, for the successful strengthening of that point would have an important influence in deciding the question of Sumter.

Another secondary consideration was the attitude of Virginia. Rebel influences in her Legislature had ordered a State convention, to which convention her people had elected a large majority of professedly loyal members. Their loyalty, however, was of a qualified sort, deeply tinctured with <out_52>factional prejudice, and irritated with the imaginary wrongs of the South. Upon this element, rebel intrigue and conspiracy were working with telling effect; and instead of declaring and practising frank and direct adherence to the Government, the union members were fulminating baseless complaints, demanding impossible guarantees, and pleading indulgent excuses for the course of South Carolina and the Cotton Republics. And this condition of misdirected and unstable loyalty was also widespread among the leaders and people of the Border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.

How to deal with such a morbid and disturbed public sentiment—how to treat this unnatural, contradictory, and halfhearted allegiance, was a problem of direct bearing on the Sumter question, Mr. Seward, optimist by nature, believed and argued that the revolution throughout the South had spent its force and was on the wane; and that the evacuation of Sumter, and the manifestation of kindness and confidence to the Rebel and Border States, would undermine the conspiracy, strengthen the union sentiment and union majorities, and restore allegiance and healthy political action without resort to civil war.

Mr. Lincoln shared Seward's pacific inclinations, but not his optimism. He deferred his decision; gathered information from Anderson, from Charleston, from Richmond, waited in anxious suspense for news from Pickens. No substantial encouragement, however, reached him from any quarter. Anderson had no faith in a relief expedition. All union sentiment had disappeared from South Carolina. The Virginia Convention was evidently playing fast and loose with treason; and finally, General Scott was so far wrought upon by the insane cry for concession to gratify the morbid patriotism which yet found expression in the South, that he advised <out_53>the evacuation of Pickens as well as Sumter. To crown all, news came that the commander of the fleet at Pensacola had refused to allow the reinforcement of Fort Pickens from the ships, because of Buchanan's January truce, and of the technical objection that General Scott's order had not come through the regular channels of the Navy Department.

Amid these growing difficulties and dangers Mr. Lincoln felt that the time for decisive action had arrived. On March 29th a second and final cabinet discussion was held, in which there appeared a change of sentiment. Four of his seven counsellors now voted for an attempt to relieve Anderson, and at the close of the meeting the President ordered the preparation of the expedition proposed by Captain Fox. Three ships of war, with a transport and three swift steam-tugs, a supply of open boats, provisions for six months, and two hundred recruits, were fitted out in New York with all possible secrecy, and sailed from that port, after unforeseen delays, on April 9th and 10th, under sealed orders to rendezvous before Charleston Harbor at daylight on the morning of the 11th.

Coincident with this, the President, deeming the safety of Fort Pickens no less essential than that of Sumter, at once sent new and peremptory orders to the commander of the fleet, and also ordered the secret preparation of another and separate naval expedition to still further strengthen that post. The simultaneous preparation of the two produced a certain confusion and mutual embarrassment; but the latter was got off first, and, arriving safely, increased the garrison of Fort Pickens, including those already landed from the fleet, to 858 men, with provisions for six months, thus tendering it impregnable to rebel assault.


If we may credit abundant indications, the authorities at Montgomery did not believe they would need to resort to <out_54>their guns. As soon as the provisional government was organized, three rebel commissioners were appointed to proceed to Washington to negotiate for "recognition," for "adjustment of differences," and for possession of the federal forts. Two efforts to obtain Sumter by intrigue had failed; nevertheless, they still had faith a third attempt might succeed with the new administration.

Through a conspirator who still professed loyalty, they presented their application to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State. Mr. Seward answered courteously, but decidedly, that the new administration could have nothing to do either with the rebel government or its emissaries; and to a written paper sent to the State Department by the commissioners, he wrote an unofficial "memorandum" reply of the same purport. This properly finished the negotiation; but the commissioners, authorized to do so by the government they affected to represent, sought excuse to delay their departure, and Associate Justice Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the United States, volunteered to act as an unofficial intermediary in continuing to press their errand upon the Secretary of State. Campbell had at the beginning publicly opposed secession and still professed loyalty; and in that friendly and patriotic guise was admitted by the Secretary of State to an intimacy he could never have gained under his true colors. It seems that Seward, in this unofficial intimacy, did not hesitate to tell Campbell of his own willingness to give up Sumter, and of his belief that the President, upon the recommendation of General Scott, would order its evacuation. This was about the time of the first Cabinet discussion of the direct proposition, when five members voted for evacuation and only two against it, and the general situation of affairs strongly supported Mr. Seward's course of reasoning. Whatever may have been his language, a patriot could not <out_55>have misunderstood it. But Campbell had meanwhile become so far committed to the cause of the conspiracy, that he conveyed his information to the commissioners as a virtual pledge of the evacuation of Sumter, and they sent the news to Montgomery in high glee.

As a matter of fact, President Lincoln had not at that date decided the Sumter question; he was following his own sagacious logic in arriving at a conclusion, which was at least partially reached on the 29th of March, when, as we have seen, he made the order to prepare the relief expedition. By this time, Campbell, in extreme impatience to further rebellion, was importuning Seward for explanation; and Seward, finding his former prediction at fault, thought it best not to venture a new one. Upon consultation, therefore, the President authorized him to carry to Campbell the first and only assurance the Administration ever made with regard to Sumter—namely—that he would not change the military status at Charleston without giving notice.

This, be it observed, occurred on the 1st of April, about which time the policy of Seward favoring delay and conciliation finally and formally gave way before the President's stronger self-assertion and his carefully matured purpose to force rebellion to put itself flagrantly and fatally in the wrong by attacking Fort Sumter.

[End of excerpt].

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[Baggage Handler #2]

Good read, thanks!