Lee's surrender

[timewalker]

Originally Posted by 5fish

General R. E. LEE:
GENERAL. Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for 10 a.m. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &c.,
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General


You can argue that Grant boohooed Lee's wordy peace proposal. It seems Grant's only desire was the surrender of the AoNV.

Per Bruce Catton in Grant Takes Command, Grant was under specific orders from Lincoln not to treat for peace generally, but only to accept the surrender of the AoNV.

[whitworth]

"To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army,"

R.E. Lee


Lee had no army to speak of by the time he got to the Appomattox area.
The losses at Sailor Creek had sealed Lee's army fate to less than a week. His army was running on "fumes" with no chance of resupply of ammunition and artillery shells.

Here was an army that spent some eight months in the trench, poorly supplied with food and many conveniences of life.
Unfit to fight; unfit to march after too many months in the trenches, Lee was down to virtually skeleton corps.

There were no more troops available; no more supplies from Alabama and Georgia; no more Richmond to resupply the army.

The death knells on the funeral bell had rung, as Lee lead his army out of Petersburg.

[5fish]

Would Lee have surrender to Grant if Grant had not been so magnamious in the surrenders of Ft. Donelson and Vicksburg?

[Dred]

Originally Posted by 5fish

Would Lee have surrender to Grant if Grant had not been so magnamious in the surrenders of Ft. Donelson and Vicksburg?

Did he really have a choice? He was closed in with a broken, battered, ill equipped army. There was no way out for his army.

[Baggage Handler #2]

I'm not certain you can look at Lee's surrender without taking Sherman into context.

I once had a history prof who fought under Patton, served under Eisenhower, and had failed his West Point exam. His considered opinion was that WWI led to WWII because the German people didn't know they were beaten: no foreign troops had crossed their frontier. Also, the terms of surrender were so onerous as to guarantee failure.

Contrast this, where there was genuine respect between the two, and everybody knew that the Union Army could go wherever it wanted when it wanted - and at that moment it wanted to envelop and annihilate Lee's army. Whether Johnston's was eliminated first changes this not at all. Lee knew they were beaten; his soldiers knew it. And just as importantly, their families knew it. The political oligarchy of the cavalier south (can't avoid the word. Sam Clemens and Sam Watkins both used it to describe the southern mindset of the time) was forever gone, thanks to Sherman.

Offering reasonable terms only makes sense then. "They" know they're beaten; "we" know it too. Harsh term only sets you up for a guerilla war. Let them go home with dignity, and they will go home. Make their pride be for how they have fought, not for the myth of a 16th century feudal society, and you have a hope of winning the peace.

At least that's my take.

Lee would have to convince his troops to take the surrender. I feel strongly he'd have died with them rather than dishonor them.
Grant's motivated by wanting to stop the bloodshed. Lee's problem is a bigger one, and considerably more complicated.

[5fish]

[quote]

Originally Posted by Baggage Handler #2

I'm not certain you can look at Lee's surrender without taking Sherman into context.

I once had a history prof who fought under Patton, served under Eisenhower, and had failed his West Point exam. His considered opinion was that WWI led to WWII because the German people didn't know they were beaten: no foreign troops had crossed their frontier. Also, the terms of surrender were so onerous as to guarantee failure.

Contrast this, where there was genuine respect between the two, and everybody knew that the Union Army could go wherever it wanted when it wanted - and at that moment it wanted to envelop and annihilate Lee's army. Whether Johnston's was eliminated first changes this not at all. Lee knew they were beaten; his soldiers knew it. And just as importantly, their families knew it. The political oligarchy of the cavalier south (can't avoid the word. Sam Clemens and Sam Watkins both used it to describe the southern mindset of the time) was forever gone, thanks to Sherman.

I agree Sherman brought the war to the people of the south. His army's march through the south dispelled any notion that the could win the win and enforced the notion the south was a beaten people..

Offering reasonable terms only makes sense then. "They" know they're beaten; "we" know it too. Harsh term only sets you up for a guerrilla war. Let them go home with dignity, and they will go home. Make their pride be for how they have fought, not for the myth of a 16th century feudal society, and you have a hope of winning the peace.

At least that's my take.

My question did Grant have the fore thought to know this or was Grant just being magnanimous and kind for that was the type of person he was.

He never contacted Lincoln and talk to Lincoln about what terms of surrender should be offered to Lee or to Davis. The terms Grant offer to Lee became the terms use thought out the south as Southern units surrender to the Union army.

The question becomes: Was is out of sheer brilliance of Grant or sheer graciousness of Grant or sheer dumb luck the terms of sureender he offered to Lee?

[Baggage Handler #2]

[quote=5fish;86369]

...
My question did Grant have the fore thought to know this or was Grant just being magnanimous and kind for that was the type of person he was.

He never contacted Lincoln and talk to Lincoln about what terms of surrender should be offered to Lee or to Davis. The terms Grant offer to Lee became the terms use thought out the south as Southern units surrender to the Union army.

The question becomes: Was is out of sheer brilliance of Grant or sheer graciousness of Grant or sheer dumb luck the terms of surrender he offered to Lee?

Parts of all, I think. I'm betting Grant had discussed this with Lincoln too, and the two were shrewd enough not to write it down. I don't know what portion of the terms would have come from those conversations and what portion were from his own mind.

But if Lincoln had told him to hunt them all down and run them to Mexico, he'd have done it.

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

I find, that in the official records of correspondences between Grant and Lincoln, it was very frequent but very bland. It is a fact that Lincoln made many trips to City Point and speak with General Grant. Two birds with one stone really; as Lincoln's son was given a Captain's rank and was on Grant's staff. I am sure Captain Lincoln would have been able to give cryptic messages via personal correspondences, just as General Lee had cryptic messages to his family.

When Grant was conducting the Vicksburg Campaign; I believe the surfacing of that victory and how it came about; popped up and flagged Lincoln. In summary of this, my opinion -- is how Grant was able to gain cooperation with other generals in which 'united' and struck a huge fist like blow--something Lincoln wanted in a commander of all the armies. The second 'flag' of noteworthy qualities; was the surrendering terms and how 'fair' and dignified his enemy were treated. To which his orders were--they are prisoners but, they are our guests. This behavior, I am sure caused Lincoln to really focus on Grant as well as his leadership in previous campaigns which were not as focused upon prior, do to Grant's assignments.

That said, Grant again demonstrated that 'non-humiliating' manner in offering terms of surrender with General Lee, as well as the orders from Grant that there will be no parties, rubbing defeating behaviors to the newly surrendering forces. The dignity, respect and perhaps the personal beliefs shared with Lincoln's 'malice towards none, charity for all;' Grant could see through Lincoln's eyes per se; the desire to be again--a "United States."

Lincoln's assassination did not help fulfill in detail and in total his personal prayer to unite fractured factions and be committed to the Union; the then Vice-President Johnson was not 'as' able to carry on the policies that Lincoln had set forth but, when Grant did gain his presidency; I don't think it was for Grant's personal gain but, more to finish what Lincoln started. I say this, as Grant was not a politician--he was a professional soldier. But, from reading accounts from former Confederate officers, such as Col. John S. Mosby, General Gordon and others --, excluding Longstreet from the accounts as it is known Longstreet was Grant's best man at his wedding, as he would also favor Grant and vice versa but; when one has Lee's staff officer Colonel Marshall speak at Grant's eulogy at length--the Southern Army felt that Grant's treatment throughout the war was fair and generous. Respect and dignity was a thread in Grant's war behavior and throughout the Grant administration. Unfortunately, those corrupt under Grant--destroyed any greatness that Grant, if supported in his administration without corruption may have gained. A series of former Union Officers then served as President and in time Confederates were in the US Government, serving with loyalty and with honorable intentions.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[ole]

But if Lincoln had told him to hunt them all down and run them to Mexico, he'd have done it.

With reluctance. Grant was, deep down, a gentle and caring man but you are correct: he would have followed orders.

He never contacted Lincoln and talk to Lincoln about what terms of surrender should be offered to Lee or to Davis.

Not quite absolutely correct. Lincoln had been down to City Point to visit with Grant and Sherman. Grant well new Lincoln's mind and the restrictions on him as a military commander. "Stack arms and go home." Sherman heard the same discussion and came away with a few ideas of his own on magnanimity. (He was beginning to think of himself in glowing terms.)

Offering reasonable terms only makes sense then. "They" know they're beaten; "we" know it too. Harsh term only sets you up for a guerilla war. Let them go home with dignity, and they will go home. Make their pride be for how they have fought, not for the myth of a 16th century feudal society, and you have a hope of winning the peace.

Seems that Lincoln, Grant and Sherman had a better feeling for human nature than others (with whom I'm not all that familiar). When you've won, and your opponent acknowledges that you've won, you don't go over and kick him. Take away his dignity and you'll be watching your back for the rest of your life. There were still plenty of hard feelings to go around, but most of the Confederates just went home and talked about having given it a good try.

ole

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

General Lee's letter to President Jefferson Davis holds many pieces to consider the circumstances of the surrender at Appomattox.
Mr. President: It is with pain that I announce to Your Excellency the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia. The operations which preceded this result will be reported in full. I will therefore only now state that, upon arriving at Amelia Court House on the morning of the 4th with the advance of the army, on the retreat from the line in front of Richmond and Petersburg, and not finding supplies ordered to be placed there, nearly twenty-four hours were lost in endeavoring to collect in the country subsistence for men and horses. This delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved. The troops, wearied by continual fighting and marching for several days and nights, obtained neither rest nor refreshment: and on moving, on the 5th, on the Richmond & Danville railroad, I found at Jotersville the enemy's cavalry, and learned of the approach of his infantry and the general advance of his army toward Burkeville. This deprived us of the use of the railroad, and rendered it impracticable to procure from Danville the supplies ordered to meet us at points of our march. Nothing could be obtained from the adjacent country. Our route to the Roanoke was therefore changed, and the march directed upon Farmville, where supplies were ordered from Lynchburg. The change of route threw the troops over the roads pursued by the artillery and wagon trains west of the railroad, which impeded our advance and embarrassed our movements.
On the morning of the 6th, General Longstreet's corps reached Rice's station, on the Lynchburg railroad. It was followed by the commands of Generals Anderson, Ewell, and Gordon, with orders to close it as fast as the progress of the trains would permit, or as they could be directed on roads ****her west. General Anderson, commanding Pickett's and B. R. Johnson's divisions, became disconnected with Mahone's division, forming the rear of Longstreet. The enemy's cavalry penetrated the line of march through the interval thus left and attacked the wagon train moving toward Farmville. This caused serious delay in the march of the center and rear of the column, and enabled the enemy to mass upon their flank. After successive attacks, Anderson's and Ewell's corps were captured or driven from their position. The latter general, with both of his division commanders, Kershaw and Custis Lee, and his brigadiers, were taken prisoners. Gordon, who all the morning, aided by Gen. W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, had checked the advance of the enemy on the road from Amelia Springs and protected the trains, became exposed to his combined assaults, which he bravely resisted and twice repulsed; but the cavalry having been withdrawn to another part of the line of march, and the enemy massing heavily on his front and both flanks, renewed the attack about 6 p.m., and drove him from the field in much confusion.
The army continued its march during the night, and every effort was made to reorganize the divisions which had been shattered by the day's operations; but the men being depressed by fatigue and hunger, many threw away their arms, while others followed the wagon trains and embarrassed their progress. On the morning of the 7th, rations were issued to the troops as they passed Farmville, but the safety of the trains requiring their removal upon the approach <cmh3_554>of the enemy, all could not be supplied. The army, reduced to two corps, under Longstreet and Gordon, moved steadily on the road to Appomattox Court House; thence its march was ordered by Campbell Court House, through Pittsylvania, toward Danville. The roads were wretched and the progress slow. By great efforts the head of the column reached Appomattox-Court House on the evening of the 8th, and the troops were halted for rest. The march was ordered to be resumed at 1 a.m. of the 9th. Fitz Lee, with the cavalry, supported by Gordon, was ordered to drive the enemy from his front, wheel to the left, and cover the passage of the trains; while Longstreet, who from Rice's station had formed the rear guard, should close up and hold the position. Two battalions o[ artillery and the ammunition wagons were directed to accompany the army, the rest of the artillery and wagons to move toward Lynchburg. In the early part of the night the enemy attacked Walker's artillery train near Appomattox station, on the Lynchburg railroad, and were repelled. Shortly afterward their cavalry dashed toward the Court House, till halted by our line. During the night there were indications of a large force massing on our left and front. Fitz Lee was directed to ascertain its strength, and to suspend his advance till daylight if necessary. About 5 a.m. on the 9th, with Gordon on his left, he moved forward and opened the way. A heavy force of the enemy was discovered opposite Gordon's right, which, moving in the direction of Appomattox Court House, drove back the left of the cavalry and threatened to cut off Gordon from Longstreet, his cavalry at the same time threatening to envelop his left flank. Gordon withdrew across the Appomattox river, and the cavalry advanced on the Lynchburg road and became separated from the army.
Learning the condition of affairs on the lines, where I had gone under the expectation of meeting General Grant to learn definitely the terms of the surrender of the army, I requested a suspension of hostilities until these terms could be arranged. In the interview which occurred with General Grant in compliance with my request, terms having been agreed on, I surrendered that portion of the army of Northern Virginia which was on the field, with its arms, artillery, and wagon trains, the officers and men to be paroled, retaining their side-arms and private effects. I deemed this course the best under all the circumstances by which we were surrounded.
On the morning of the 9th, according to the reports of the ordnance officers, there were 7,892 organized infantry with arms, with an average of seventy-five rounds of ammunition per man. The artillery, though reduced to sixty-three pieces, with ninety-three rounds of ammunition, was sufficient. These comprised all the supplies of ordnance that could be relied on in the State of Virginia. I have no accurate report of the cavalry, but believe it did not exceed 2,100 effective men. The enemy were more than five times our numbers. If we could have forced our way one day longer, it would have been at a great sacrifice of life, and at its end I did not see how a surrender could have been avoided. We had no subsistence for man or horse, and it could not be gathered in the country. The supplies ordered from Lynchburg could not reach us, and the men, deprived of food and sleep for many days, were worn out and exhausted.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
His Excellency Jefferson Davis.
R.E. LEE, General.

Reference: Confederate Military History, Vol. 3
CHAPTER XXXI.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf