From Antietam to Fredericksburg

[Blockaderunner]

This is a question on troop numbers which has always puzzled me. At Antietam, the ANV was approx 40,000 strong. Yet at Fredericksburg, Lee had around 77,000 troops at his disposal. During the Maryland campaign both wings of the ANV plus Stuarts cavalry were present, which suggests these were the only troops available. Allowing for the casualties at South Mountain and Antietam, the ANV had doubled in strength in three months. I have never read any explaination of this. Any ideas?

[ole]

Excellent question. Someone will have an answer.

Meanwhile, would CSA conscription have anything to do with it? That is, there might have been the men in the army, but they would have been too raw (and probably unarmed) to join the Maryland Campaign? But they were available three months later?

Or did Lee draw troops from deep south garrisons?

Good question. I'm anxious to see an answer.

ole

[samgrant]

Without the benefit of research into this good question, I'd guess that perhaps not all of the ANV went North into that campaign, and that maybe several thousand were left behind as a contingency for defense. (?)

Ole's suggestion about conscription may have some validity also.

But more convincing is this from Freeman's Robert E. Lee (Vol II Chap. 29):

"This transformation of his army between Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg was essentially the work of Lee."

It takes several pargraphs to cover the issue as Freeman decribes it, so read this:

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/...REL/2/29*.html


--

[ole]

This comes from Frank O'Reilly's book, 'The Fredericksburg Campaign:' (Page 10):

"Lee and his commanders immersed themselves in rebuilding the army. Confederates herded stragglers from across Virginia to the Valley. Wounded men from earlier campaigns returned, and Lee further enhanced his strength with heavy recruitment and a general reorganization of the army. Lincoln's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation sparked an influx of new volunteers. Others enlisted to avoid conscription. An early Confederate writer averred that 'in the course of a fortnight the army was increased by the arrival of about 30,000 fresh troops.' Soon that number burgeoned to 78,000. A division staff officer rejoiced: 'The Army is is filling up rapidly.' A South Carolina private wrote: 'Our brigade is becoming stronger every day...it is very cheering to see our ranks beginning to fill up."

Wish I could take credit fror this find, but it was a kindly lurker who passed it to me via PM on another board.

ole

[OpnDownfall]

The ANV just after Second Manassass and Antietam, was not the same army. It was still new and all the pieces did not quite fit. It was still an army of civilians, who tended to take their politics seriously.
Many of the soldiers thought of their duty as defending the confederacy, not as a army of invasion. When Lee went North, many of the troops went south, they would die to defend the confederacy but not to invade sister states.
Confederate provosts reported the Valley swarming with stragglers and others who felt their duty done in saving the confederacy and were heading home, whatever the new enlistment laws may have said.
When Lee retreated back into Va. Lee sent cavalry to sweep these men back into the ranks and many rejoined their units voluntarily as soon as the Army was back in what they considered confederate territory.
Later as the Army became more professional and developed its particular elan and mystique, the above would not be a problem for the invasion of Pa.

[J_Man0507]

Stragglers. That is the big reason why Lee's army was so small at the battle of Antietam. The AoNV had been marching and fighting for the better part of three months, and now they were heading north. Men had little to eat, little to wear, and were tired. The results of this is a mass of stragglers. But, there were other reasons as well.

The following comes from James Murfin's The Gleam of Bayonets, which is one of the best treatments of the Antietam campaign that I have read.

"Many stragglers were truly sick, but deliberate absenteeism was not uncommon at this point in the war. Soldiers were tired of fighting; some, too, were tired of what they were fighting for. The Army of Northern Virginia, known throughout history for its devotion and bravery, was not so unique as to preclude a significant wave of political mutiny. Some counties in North Carolina, for example, had been pro-Union before the war began. A regimental historian wrote that their men 'had volunteered to resist invasion and not to invade; some did not believe it right to invade Northern Territory' The same feeling was also quite evident among South Carolina troops. At the battle of South Mountain, a mortally wounded Lt. Col. James from the 15th South Carolina told Capt. Charles Wolcott of the 21st Massachusetts...that the colonel of his regiment refused to cross the river, 'saying that the regiment had enlisted to defend the South and not to invade the North.' James had taken his command and led the volunteers on, all to their death, he feared. 'There are two opinions in the army as to the propriety of the move,' wrote a soldier to his daughter. 'A minority believed it a matter of prudence at least we should not leave our own soil; that it looked a little like invasion. The consequence was a large number hung back and would not cross the river---while others were willing to retire from the fight sooner than they would have done on our own soil.'"

Lee saw this problem and issued General Order No. 2 to try and curb straggling, but still, a great number did not cross or left when they saw their chance, to rejoin the army later on. So straggling was a very big problem, as we can see, that led to a deficit in Lee's numbers. Also remember that he split his army, and it wasn't fully together at the opening of the battle.

As Lee prepared his army to meet Burnside, he brought in troops from wherever he could get them. New recruits, convalescents and other units that weren't being used elsewhere. That is what swelled his numbers there. He also consolidated his forces, making Longstreet commander of the 1st Corps and Jackson commander of the 2nd Corps. Prior to this, Jackson had technically been in command of a separate force, the Army of the Valley. Now Lee consolidated and the AoNV at Fredericksburg was the largest that it would ever be.

[Blockaderunner]

Well, it certainly seems that the problem was stragglers. This gives rise to another question. What could the ANV have achieved at full strength in Maryland? On the same subject, I read once (I'm afraid I can never remember the source) that the theoretical strength of the ANV before the Wilderness was 100,000+. The actual number of men present for duty was approx 60,000. Units were detached on garrison duties, but again straggling was a problem.

[Dred]

Alot of the soldiers didn't believe that the ANV should invade the north. There were literally thousands of soldiers waving goodbye to the army as they crossed the Potomac, feeling that they could not, or would not, leave old Virginy! In some readings I have come across, estimates of up to half the army disbursed until Lee came back into Southern territory. Where did they go? Home, vacation, or maybe they stayed and camped and waited... That part I'm not sure of but I would bet its a little of all of it.

[Blockaderunner]

The problem sounds very similar to that faced by the armies in the English Civil War of the 1640's. Troops were often reluctant to move outside of their own county. Geographically, when compared to the American Civil War, this meant troops being unwilling to move even much shorter distances. The problem was later addressed by the formation of the proffesional 'New Model Army'.

[cw1865]

...and it had been seen previously during the War of 1812 when Governors, at times, specifically refused to permit the militia to operate out of the state, or when militia units failed to cross the Canadian border....