Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
Whether he was a "lovable lover" aside, he would have made a good manager for the Chicago Cubs.
Actually, he might have made a better manager for the Cubs than anything they've had for quite some time. When a decision has to be made, you have a week to think about it, and no one dies if you are wrong, he may have been very good.
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Perhaps, to a point, but how can anyone excuse McClellan for that month long "siege" of Yorktown?
He believed it necessary. That we know better doesn't change what he thought he was facing. Of course, we've come to appreciate generals who said, "what the hell" and went for it. Sometimes that didn't work out well either.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Actually, He believed it necessary. That we know better doesn't change what he thought he was facing.
ole
He believed it was necessary because he constantly listened to army intelligence that had no idea what they were talking about. He believed the Union Army was outnumberd 2-1, and he had somewhere in the neighborhood of 120,000 or so. To beleive the Confederates could ever put a single army of that size in the field is preposterous, even at the time. Any reasonable scout would have been able to tell him otherwise, and they did on several occasions but he dismissed it and still listened to his personaly intelligence unit, even AFTER they had been proven to be wrong time and again. McLellan was good at organizing the army, but as soon sa it took the field he should have been replaced before a fight ever happened. And Burnside was just slow... He never recognized the importance of swift movement, and it practically lead the Union Army to destruction at The Wilderness and it squandered the opportunity to defeat the Rebs decisivley at Antiteam, not to mention the snail like pace of crossing the rivers at Fredricksburg. Altho not all of the delays at Fred. can be laid at his feat, he didn't help things much.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
One thing about McClellan, if he honestly believes that he is heavily outnumbered, and the common wisdom at the time is that a ratio of 3:1 guarantees an attacker victory, is he also guilty of hubris inasmuch as he is attacking based, in his mind on a 1:2 ratio? ie. does he believe that each Yankee soldier is worth two Southerners? (kind've the reverse of the Southern sentiment that each Southern soldier is worth 10 Yankees)
my point being, that as slow as McClellan was, he wasn't the greatest fool in the war, and frankly I don't think he would've thrown his army at a superior force. To a certain extent, I think he knows he has an advantage in numbers and plays lip service to the fact that he feels that he is outnumbered because that provides an automatic excuse for failure....I could be wrong of course, this is just my gut talking....I've read many times where McClellan believes he is outnumbered and when you read it, the reader does get convinced that McClellan believes it....any thoughts?
my point being, that as slow as McClellan was, he wasn't the greatest fool in the war, and frankly I don't think he would've thrown his army at a superior force. To a certain extent, I think he knows he has an advantage in numbers and plays lip service to the fact that he feels that he is outnumbered because that provides an automatic excuse for failure....I could be wrong of course, this is just my gut talking....I've read many times where McClellan believes he is outnumbered and when you read it, the reader does get convinced that McClellan believes it....any thoughts?
I always got the feeling that he attacked not because he wanted to or thought he had an advantage, but rather because he felt he had to. If Lincoln never got on his case he would probably STILL be waiting to launch his Peninsula campaign. Most of what he does in any battle, is not attacks aimed at achieving victory, but the desperate flailing of a general who believes he has already lost. He prepared believing he would fail.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
A most interesting set of speculations, gentlemen. I go along with the psychic observation that he was a victim of the Austerlitz chimera (the one decisive battle that ends the war). He was looking for that one battle. At the time, it might have been possible. He had built a genuine, first-class, M1-A1 army but, in his desire to commit it only to that last battle, he leaned a bit too heavily on his studies and a little too lightly on reality. Then, one might well wonder if he would have committed his magnificent army to that battle if the opportunity were presented.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Do you think he would've made an effective corps commander? (Assuming of course he's never given the Army of the Potomac?)
I think he did some good in the army, don't get me wrong.. His organizational skills were beyond compare and he is responsible for building the AoP into a finely honed machine. I think if he had been put in charge of something like... The Department of Washington DC, or some such thing, he might have shined even more. Give him the AoP ONLY when it is around DC needing to be reorganized or what have you, and leave him in charge of the defenses. I think no other general in the war could have prepared better defenses than McLellan. It's perfect for what he did.
Give him a corps? I doubt it... he doesn't strike me as the type of guy that would like taking orders from somebody else. Especially not any other general in AoP... if memory serves me right he was pretty contemptous of every other general the AoP ever had.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Especially not any other general in AoP... if memory serves me right he was pretty contemptous of every other general the AoP ever had.
It is abundantly clear that he was a legend in his own mind. I can't see him, having tasted General-in-Chief, settling for a role as the Organizer-in-Chief. All of Lincoln's subsequent appointments have earned other ludicrous nicknames: Patsy-in-Chief, Default-in-Chief, Best-Guess-in-Chief. Each of them had their own strengths and weaknesses. And then Lincoln got the guy he wanted: U.S. Grant. This guy had as many weaknesses as he had strengths, but the strengths he had were what Lincoln wanted and needed at the time. How wrong is that?
Burnside was a very nice guy. Everybody loved him and was devoted to him. Unfortunately, that seems to have been the extent of his abilities. In peacetime, he was well within pretty doggone good; in the military, that dog don't hunt.
Actually, I'm quite weary with the busting of Burnsides' muttonchops. He doesn't really deserve the villification that we tend to heap upon him.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Actually, I don't go along with the story that McClellan produced a first class fighting organization that he then did a bad job commanding.
The AoP was NOT the best force it could have been. Compare it with Lee's ANV in terms of speed and responsiveness and the quality of corps and division commanders, at least earlier in the war. I don't just mean when McClellan was being deliberately careful when advancing up the Pennisula, I mean it usually took the AoP longer to do stuff, when they WANTED to move fast.
Example: At the beginning of the Overland Campaign, the two diversions, with Butler and in the Valley accomplished little. Indeed the AoP fought hard, but often moved sluggishly several places.
There are many examples of poor coordination.
Too many of the officers in the AoP had the same problem as McClellan, trying to avoid mistakes, and conserve their forces, rather than seeking out and striking at the enemy. Part of the issue may have been the organization of the AoP into several smaller corps, instead of the ANV two or three powerful corps.
The point is, aggressiveness and initiative was the "culture" of the ANV, while caution was the culture of the AoP.
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