Why were Burnsides' bridges late at Fredericksburg?

[gary]

He ordered them, but they got there late, real late. Was it Halleck who didn't dispatch them? That's what I recall, but I don't have the source in front of me.

[trice]

Originally Posted by gary

He ordered them, but they got there late, real late. Was it Halleck who didn't dispatch them? That's what I recall, but I don't have the source in front of me.

General Halleck's version, from his report to Stanton:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D.C., November 15, 1863.
SIR: In compliance with your orders, I submit the following summary of military operations since my last annual report:

DEPARTMENT OF WEST VIRGINIA AND ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

When General Burnside relieved General McClellan from his command, on the 9th of November of last year, the Army of the Potomac was on the south side of the Potomac, under instructions to pursue Lee by a flank march on the interior line to Richmond, hugging closely to the Blue Ridge, so as to observe its passes and to give battle to the enemy whenever an opportunity occurred. On reaching Warrenton, however, General Burnside proposed to give up this pursuit of Lee's army toward Richmond, and to move down the north side of the Rappahannock <ar31_47> to Falmouth, and establish a new base of supplies at Aquia Creek or Belle Plain. This proposed change of base was not approved by me, and in a personal interview at Warrenton I strongly urged him to retain his present base, and continue his march toward Richmond in the manner pointed out in the President's letter of October 13 to General McClellan.
General Burnside did not fully concur in the President's views, but finally consented to so modify his plan as to cross his army by the fords of the Upper Rappahannock, and then move down and seize the heights south of Fredericksburg, while a small force was to be sent north of the river to enable General Haupt to reopen the railroad and to rebuild the bridges, the materials for which were nearly ready in Alexandria. I, however, refused to' give any official approval of this deviation from the President's instructions until his assent was obtained. On my return to Washington, on the 13th, I submitted to him this proposed change in the plan of campaign, and on its receiving his assent, rather than approval, I telegraphed, on the 14th, authority to General Burnside to adopt it. I here refer, not to General Burnside's written plan to go to Falmouth, but to that of crossing the Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan.

It has been inferred from the testimony of General Burnside before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, that his plan of marching his whole army on the north of the Rappahannock, from Warrenton to Falmouth, had been approved by the authorities in Washington, and that he expected, on his arrival there, to find supplies and pontoons, with gunboats to cover his crossing. In the first place, that plan was never approved, nor was he ever authorized to adopt it. In the second place, he could not possibly have expected supplies and pontoons to be landed at points then occupied in force by the enemy. Again, he was repeatedly informed that gunboats could not, at that time, ascend the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg.
General Burnside did not commence his movement from Warrenton till the 15th, and then, instead of crossing the Rappahannock by the fords, as he was expected to do, he marched his whole army down on the north bank of that river, his advance reaching Falmouth on the 20th. Lee's army, in the mean time, moved down the south side of the river, but had not occupied Fredericksburg on the 21st. The river was at this time fordable a few miles above the town, and General Sumner asked permission to cross and occupy the heights, but it was refused, and no attempt was made to effect the passage till the 11th of December, by which time Lee's army had been concentrated and strongly intrenched. This passage, however, was effected without serious opposition, by the right wing and center, under Sumner and Hooker, at Fredericksburg, and the left wing, under Franklin, on bridges established some miles below. It was intended that Franklin's grand division, consisting of the corps of Reynolds and Smith, should attack the enemy's right, and turn his position on the heights in rear of Fredericksburg, while Sumner and Hooker attacked him in front. But, by some alleged misunderstanding of orders, Franklin's operations were limited to a mere reconnaissance, and the direct attacks of Sumner and Hooker were unsupported. The contest on the right wing during the 13th was continued till 5.30 p.m., when our men were forced to fall back, after suffering terrible losses. Both armies remained in position till the night of the 15th, when General Burnside withdrew his forces to the north side of the Rappahannock.

General Burnside has been frequently requested to make an official report of these operations, but has furnished no information beyond that contained in his brief telegrams sent from the field, in one of which he uses the following language:

The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton to this line, rather against the opinion of the President, the Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible.
...
It was alleged at the time that the loss of this battle resulted from the neglect to order forward the pontoon train from Washington. This order was telegraphed by me from Warrenton to Brigadier-General Woodbury, then in Washington, on the 12th of November, and was promptly acted on by him. General Burnside had supposed that the pontoon train was then in Washington or Alexandria, while it was still on the Potomac, at Berlin and Harper's Ferry, General Burnsides order to send it to Washington not having been received by the officer left in charge there. General Burnside had only allowed time for transporting his pontoons from Alexandria, whereas they had first to be transported to that place from Berlin. The delay was, therefore, entirely unavoidable, and, on investigation of the matter by General Burnside, General Woodbury was exonerated from all blame.

General Hooker relieved General Burnside from his command on the 25th of January.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
=====
Regards,
Tim

[trice]

Originally Posted by gary

He ordered them, but they got there late, real late. Was it Halleck who didn't dispatch them? That's what I recall, but I don't have the source in front of me.

The Burnside version:
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXI [S# 31]
DECEMBER 11-15, 1862.--Battle of Fredericksburg, Va.
No. 3.--Reports of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac, of operations November 9, 1862--January 25, 1863, and congratulatory message from the President.

NEW YORK, November 13, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Army of the Potomac during the time it was under my command:
...
On the 9th day of November General McClellan issued an order relinquishing the command of the army, after which an order was issued from my headquarters assuming command.
The positions of the different corps of the army were as follows: The First, Second and Fifth Corps near Warrenton; Sixth Corps at New Baltimore; Ninth Corps, with Stoneman's and Whipple's divisions, on both sides of the river, in the neighborhood of Waterloo; Eleventh Corps at Gainesville, New Baltimore, and the gaps; Pleasonton at Jefferson and Amissville, with advance on Hazel River; Bayard at Rappahannock Station and neighborhood; Slocum was still at Harper's Ferry and Fayetteville. There were no pontoons with the moving army at this time, and our supplies had run very low. It will be observed that directions were given in the order from General Halleck to me, dated November 5, to report at once a plan for the future operations of the army, which was done, and is marked B in the appendix. This plan had been fully matured, and was at the time understood to be in accordance with the views of most of the prominent general officers in the command. It had been written out and was sent to Washington by Maj. E. M. Neill on November 10, and delivered to General G. W. Cullum, chief of staff, the following day; after which General Halleck telegraphed me that he would meet me at Warrenton on the next day (the 12th), which he did, accompanied by Generals Meigs and Haupt. During that night and the next morning we had long consultations. General Halleck was strongly in favor of continuing the movement of the army in the direction of Culpeper and Gordonsville, and my own plan was as strongly adhered to by me. He declined to take the responsibility of issuing an order, but said that the whole matter would be left to the decision of the President, and, if the President approved my plan, I was to move the main army to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, and there cross the Rappahannock on pontoon bridges, which were to be sent from Washington.

In my interview with General Halleck I represented to him that soon after commencing the movement in the direction of Fredericksburg my telegraphic communication with Washington would be broken, and that I relied upon him to see that such parts of my plan as required action in Washington would be carried out. He told me that everything required by me would receive his attention, and that he would at once order, by telegraph, the pontoon trains spoken of in my plan, and would upon his return to Washington, see that they were promptly forwarded. After his return he sent me the following telegram:
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 14, 1862.
Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac :
The President has just assented to, your plan. He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not. * * *
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
This dispatch was received at my headquarters, at Warrenton, at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, and I at once issued orders for the different commands to move in accordance with the above-mentioned plan. The remark in this dispatch, indicating the great necessity for the speedy movement of the troops, was entirely in accordance with my own views, as the season was so far advanced that I looked for but little time in which to move the army effectively.

General Sumner’s grand division started at daylight on the morning of the 15th, and the grand divisions of Generals Franklin and Hooker, together with the cavalry, started on the 16th.

General Sumner's advance reached Falmouth on the 17th. General Franklin concentrated his command at Stafford Court-House, and General Hooker his in the vicinity of Hartwood. The cavalry was in the rear, and covering the fords of the Rappahannock. The plan submitted by me on November 9 (see Appendix B) will explain fully the reasons for these movements. It contemplated, however, the prompt starting of pontoons from Washington. I supposed this would be attended to; but, feeling anxious to know something definite in regard to them before telegraphic communication with Washington should be interrupted, I directed Lieutenant Comstock, my chief engineer, on the morning of the 14th, to ask General Woodbury, by telegraph, if the pontoons were ready to move. Not receiving an immediate reply, I directed him to telegraph to General Woodbury a second time, urging him to forward the trains promptly.

To this second dispatch he received the following answer on the morning of the 15th:
WASHINGTON, D.C., November 14, 1862.
Lieutenant COMSTOCK:
I have received your two telegrams to-day. Captain Spaulding has arrived, and thirty-six pontoons have arrived. Forty more are expected in the morning. Captain Spaulding received Captain Duane's order of the 6th on the afternoon of the 12th. The pontoon train can be got ready to start on Sunday or Monday morning, November 16 or 17, depending somewhat upon the Quartermaster's Department.. General Halleck is not inclined to send another train by land, but will allow it, probably, if General Burnside insists. A second train can be sent by water to Aquia Creek, and from thence transported by the teams which carry the first.
D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General.

This was my first information of delay; but the statement that thirty-six pontoons had arrived, and forty more were expected next morning, connected with the statement that the first train (which would have been ample for our purposes)would start on the 16th or 17th, was deemed sufficient to authorize me in continuing the movement of the troops, as the pontoons would have arrived in very good time had they started as promised, although not so soon as I had expected.

After telegraphic communication between my headquarters and Washington was broken, General Woodbury sent me the following dispatches, which reached me by orderlies, after my arrival at Falmouth:
HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE,
Washington, D.C., November 17, 1862--7 p.m.
Lieutenant COMSTOCK,
Engineer, General Burnside's Headquarters, Army of the Potomac:
Major Spaulding has not been able to get off to-day. He expects to start at 10 a.m. to-morrow. I will telegraph when he leaves.
H. W. BOWERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER BRIGADE,
Washington, D.C., November 18, 1862.
Lieutenant COMSTOCK, or, in his absence,
CHIEF OF GENERAL BURNSIDE'S STAFF:
Major Spaulding has been delayed in obtaining harness, teamsters, &c., for 270 new horses. He expects to start to-night.
D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

On the 19th, General Hooker's grand division was at Hartwood, and a portion of the cavalry occupied positions above him, opposite the fords, where they could cross, upon the receipt of the necessary orders. It was my intention, and I so informed General Halleck, to cross some of the cavalry, and possibly a small force of light infantry and artillery, over the fords of the Rappahannock and Rapidan, with a view to moving rapidly upon Fredericksburg, and holding the south bank of the river while bridges were being laid ; but the above telegrams, announcing still further delay in the arrival of means to cross the main army, decided me in the already half-formed determination not to risk sending a portion of the command on the opposite side of the river until I had the means for crossing the main body. Subsequent events proved the wisdom of this course, by showing that none of these fords are reliable for the passage of large bodies of troops without the use of temporary bridges, and the pontoons did not arrive until the 25th. It is possible that the cavalry, with some light infantry, could have crossed both rivers and moved down to Fredericksburg on the south side; but before the pontoons arrived, enabling the entire army to cross, this force would have been called upon to resist an attack from the greater portion of General Lee's army.
General Sumner, on arriving at Falmouth on the 17th, suggested crossing a portion of his force over the fords at that place, with a view to taking Fredericksburg; but, from information in my possession as to the condition of the ford, I decided that it was impracticable to cross large bodies of troops at that place. It was afterward ascertained that they could not have crossed.

On my arrival at Falmouth, on the 19th, I dispatched to General Halleck's chief of staff the report in appendix, marked C, which explains the movement of troops up to that date, and also states the fact of the non-arrival of the pontoon train. These pontoon trains and supplies, which were expected to meet us on our arrival at Falmouth, could have been readily moved overland in time for our purposes in perfect safety, as they would have all the time been between our army and the Potomac River; and, had they started from Washington at the promised time, they would have certainly reached Stafford Court. House as soon as the advance of General Franklin's grand division, and from that point they could have been forwarded by his teams to Falmouth, if the teams from Washington had needed rest.

On the 22d, not hearing from these trains, I sent to General Halleck the report in appendix marked D. It appeared afterward that no supplies had been started overland, as suggested in my plan of operations, and the pontoon train did not leave Washington until the afternoon of the 19th, two days after the arrival of the advance of the army at Falmouth, and five days after the arrival of the pontoons in Washington from the Upper Potomac.
From the report of Colonel Spaulding, who had charge of the pontoons, and from other sources of information, I learned that the order of November 6, from Captain Duane, of the staff of General McClellan, to move from Berlin to Washington with his train, was not received by Colonel Spaulding until the 12th instant; that he then at once gave the necessary directions for carrying out this order; after which he proceeded to Washington, arriving there at 10.30 p.m. on the 13th, and reported to General Woodbury, at his residence in the city, the same night, and was requested to call at the general's office the next morning, the 14th.

Colonel Spaulding called upon General Woodbury at the hour appointed on the morning of the 14th, and was requested by the general to wait until he called upon General Halleck. In about one hour General Woodbury returned, and directed Colonel Spaulding to put his pontoon material in depot at the brigade shops, on the Anacostia River, near Washington, as fast as it arrived from Berlin, and go into camp there with his men. The colonel considered this as countermanding his order to make up the overland pontoon train, and, knowing that General McClellan had been relieved after the order had been issued, inferred that the plan for the campaign had been changed with the change of commanders, and that the land train was not required.

He visited General Woodbury's office again on the morning of the 15th, and did not find him in, but was informed that he had gone to see General Halleck; but, while waiting for his return, was told that a dispatch had been received from Lieutenant Comstock, my chief engineer, wishing to know if he (Colonel Spaulding), with his pontoon train, had been heard from. After some time, General Woodbury came in, and, in the course of conversation, repeated the order to put the pontoon trains in depot as fast as they arrived. It should be remembered that this was on the 15th, one pontoon train, which would have been sufficient for our purposes, having arrived in Washington on the evening of the 14th. The second train arrived the day after this interview. Later on this day (the 15th), or the day after, General Woodbury directed Colonel Spaulding to make up two trains in rafts to go by water, and to organize the necessary transportation for forty pontoons by land.

Due diligence was no doubt used by Colonel Spaulding in prosecuting his work, but he was not impressed with the importance of speed, neither was he empowered with any special authority that would hasten the issuing of the necessary transportation.

The pontoons which started for Belle Plain on raft arrived there on the 18th, but no wagons for their transportation from that place were sent with them, nor was any intimation given to Colonel Spaulding that any would be needed; neither to his knowledge had any information of that kind been given to General Woodbury. Had this information been given to Colonel Spaulding, the necessary wagons could have been placed on the rafts and floated to Belle Plain, from which point the pontoons could have been hauled to Falmouth by teams from the army before the enemy had accumulated sufficient force to resist the crossing. This was not, however, the method by which it was expected the pontoons would arrive, in time to cross the river before the enemy could concentrate to prevent it.
After arranging for these trains to go by water, Colonel Spaulding proceeded at once to make up the overland train, but was not enabled to start with it until the afternoon of the 19th. On this day it commenced raining, in consequence of which the rolls became very bad. Great exertions were made by Colonel Spaulding to push his train forward, but before his arrival at the Occoquan he decided to raft his boats when he reached that river, and have them towed to Belle Plain, for which purpose he sent an officer back for a steamer to meet him at the mouth of the river. The animals were sent overland. He arrived at Belle Plain with his pontoons on the 24th, and by the night of the 25th he was encamped near general headquarters.

By this time the enemy had concentrated a large force on the opposite side of the river, so that it became necessary to make arrangements to cross in the face of a vigilant and formidable foe. These arrangements were not completed until about December 10. In the mean time the troops were stationed with a view to accumulating supplies and getting in readiness for the movement.
...
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. E. BURNSIDE,
Late Major-General.
=====
Regards, Tim

[trice]

Originally Posted by gary

He ordered them, but they got there late, real late. Was it Halleck who didn't dispatch them? That's what I recall, but I don't have the source in front of me.

My version: sloppy work by Halleck and Burnside.

Halleck is saying that Burnside didn't allow enough time for the trains to arrive because he didn't know the trains were up the Potomac instead of at Washington, and so had to move to Washington before proceeding.

Burnside is saying the bridge train should have started earlier/moved faster.

Woodbury and his engineers appear to have busted a gut trying to get the trains forward, but never had a chance to make the unrealistic schedule.

What we have here is a failure of Halleck, Burnside, and/or their staffs to handle the details of the movement properly. Halleck and his people seem to have failed Burnisde by not communicating the real situation to him. Burnside and his people seem to have been making plans without nailing down the details. As the saying goes, "what we have here is a failure to communicate".

Regards,
Tim

[cw1865]

Burnside and minor bodies of water seem to present a problem for the man. I've been to Fredericksburg and I have seen the Rappahannock, the fall line is right there.

The very first time I looked at it, the river below the fall line it looked more like a creek. My tour guide explained that apparently this section of the river is influenced by the tides in the Chesepeake Bay. At low tide it is clearly crossable by foot, at high tide, you would probably get wet.

ABOVE the fall line is a different matter though, there is more or less consistent flow and from what I could see it would appear an army should be able to get across without pontoons.

Bottom line, Burnside should've been on the Marye Heights with or without the pontoons.

[Dred]

So my question is why not change the plan? Burnside obviuosly knew the enemy was in strength in the town, why coudln't he make arrangements to cross somewhere else? Another great plan that disintegrates at the first obstacle. Ability to adapt to the changing situations (and nothing changes as much as war) is key to being a competent general, and the reason the north didn't have very many.

[trice]

Originally Posted by cw1865

Burnside and minor bodies of water seem to present a problem for the man. I've been to Fredericksburg and I have seen the Rappahannock, the fall line is right there.

The very first time I looked at it, the river below the fall line it looked more like a creek. My tour guide explained that apparently this section of the river is influenced by the tides in the Chesepeake Bay. At low tide it is clearly crossable by foot, at high tide, you would probably get wet.

ABOVE the fall line is a different matter though, there is more or less consistent flow and from what I could see it would appear an army should be able to get across without pontoons.

Bottom line, Burnside should've been on the Marye Heights with or without the pontoons.

Depends on the weather, and the river was a little different then. Small, but ocean-going ships could reach Fredericksburg in the old days. Union troops have to use pontoon boats to cross when they assault the town in December.

But perhaps more importantly, they need to have the bridges to cross artillery even if they can manage to wade across, to ensure supplies and ammo to the troops on the West/south side in case the Confederates attack, and to establish a viable retreat route for them.

Regards,
Tim

[trice]

Originally Posted by Dred

So my question is why not change the plan? Burnside obviuosly knew the enemy was in strength in the town, why coudln't he make arrangements to cross somewhere else? Another great plan that disintegrates at the first obstacle. Ability to adapt to the changing situations (and nothing changes as much as war) is key to being a competent general, and the reason the north didn't have very many.

Well, Burnside had doubts he was the man for the job; Lincoln should have listened to him.

The river widens as you go south, and gets deeper. They could have crossed with naval support, but it doesn't accomplish a lot. Lee probably would have removed to the North Anna and waited there. That might have been even worse. Imagine Burnside fighting Lee and Jackson in a mobile battle where the Union has a major river to cross to retreat.

Regards,
Tim

[cw1865]

While I still think Burnside should've been on Marye's Heights even without the pontoons; after the fact, Lee obviously has the Heights fortified. Burnside does realize he can go upstream to cross (he will attempt the flank maneuver after Fredericksburg with the Mud March), downstream and cross or of course he can go straight at Lee. Somehow Burnside gets the idea that going straight at Lee is for lack of a better term 'so obvious that it is the least expected' - I know its pretty boneheaded!

Hooker's initial plan is obviously a lot better, he goes above and below which he has the luxury of doing because he realizes his advantage of numbers.

[Dred]

Originally Posted by trice

Well, Burnside had doubts he was the man for the job; Lincoln should have listened to him.

The river widens as you go south, and gets deeper. They could have crossed with naval support, but it doesn't accomplish a lot. Lee probably would have removed to the North Anna and waited there. That might have been even worse. Imagine Burnside fighting Lee and Jackson in a mobile battle where the Union has a major river to cross to retreat.

Regards,
Tim

Once the first indication that the pontoons would not arrive on time came on, he should have adapted his plan right then. Attack somewehre that does not need the bridges. US Ford and the other one.. Rickets I think... so you just make a march for it and see if Lee follows or not. And you fight Chancelorsville a few months early. But like you said, Burnside didn't even have faith in himself, so you really can't fault him for not having the imagination Hooker had.