Historians: Forgetting Weaknesses of the Confederacy

[whitworth]

Historians: Forgetting Weaknesses of the Confederacy The following dispatch was written by Gen. R.E. Lee when he was in command of Virginia Defense Forces.

How did he ever think Virginia could defend Wheeling? Wheeling, Virginia, so close to the large population centers of Pennsylvania and Ohio, and on the Ohio River, a river soon dominated by Union steamboats, armed gunboats and unarmed supply vessels. Was there no appreciation of the use of steamboats in time of war by the Confederacy?

Of course, most historians practically ignore what became West Virginia. Was it only because there were not any large battles, or did some early historians want to ignore the facts that protection of Confederate "interests" was not achieveable, even at the start of the war?

Even Lee did not face, considering his long military experience, the consequences of secession by Virginia. As a young cadet at West Point, he had seen steamboats moving up and down the Hudson River, from New York City to Albany, the New York state capital.

Certainly the following dispatch does not show any military genius. Perhaps it shows that Lee was perhaps too subservient to state political judgments. Lee went through the motions, as if he had no other choice.

But then, how many historians who wrote of the Civil War, ever spent much time explaining the importance of steamboats to the United States in that war?


HEADQUARTERS VIRGINIA FORCES,
Richmond, Va., April 29, 1861.
Maj. A. LORING, Commanding Volunteers, Wheeling, Va.:
MAJOR: You will muster into the service of the State such volunteer companies as may offer themselves, in compliance with the call of the governor, take command of them, and direct the military operations for the protection of the terminus of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad on the Ohio River, and also that of the road. It is desirable that the busi-ness operations of the company and peaceful travel shall not be inter-rupted, but be afforded protection. Maj. F. M. Boykin, jr., has been directed to give protection to the road in the vicinity of Grafton. You will place yourself in communication with him, with the view to co-operate, if necessary. You are requested to report the number of com-panies you may muster into the service, the state of the arms, condition, and all the circumstances connected therewith.
Respectfully, &c., R. E. LEE,
Major- General, Commanding.

[JohnTaylor]

Originally Posted by whitworth

Historians: Forgetting Weaknesses of the Confederacy The following dispatch was written by Gen. R.E. Lee when he was in command of Virginia Defense Forces.

How did he ever think Virginia could defend Wheeling? Wheeling, Virginia, so close to the large population centers of Pennsylvania and Ohio, and on the Ohio River, a river soon dominated by Union steamboats, armed gunboats and unarmed supply vessels. Was there no appreciation of the use of steamboats in time of war by the Confederacy?

Of course, most historians practically ignore what became West Virginia. Was it only because there were not any large battles, or did some early historians want to ignore the facts that protection of Confederate "interests" was not achieveable, even at the start of the war?

Even Lee did not face, considering his long military experience, the consequences of secession by Virginia. As a young cadet at West Point, he had seen steamboats moving up and down the Hudson River, from New York City to Albany, the New York state capital.

Certainly the following dispatch does not show any military genius. Perhaps it shows that Lee was perhaps too subservient to state political judgments. Lee went through the motions, as if he had no other choice.

But then, how many historians who wrote of the Civil War, ever spent much time explaining the importance of steamboats to the United States in that war?


HEADQUARTERS VIRGINIA FORCES,
Richmond, Va., April 29, 1861.
Maj. A. LORING, Commanding Volunteers, Wheeling, Va.:
MAJOR: You will muster into the service of the State such volunteer companies as may offer themselves, in compliance with the call of the governor, take command of them, and direct the military operations for the protection of the terminus of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad on the Ohio River, and also that of the road. It is desirable that the busi-ness operations of the company and peaceful travel shall not be inter-rupted, but be afforded protection. Maj. F. M. Boykin, jr., has been directed to give protection to the road in the vicinity of Grafton. You will place yourself in communication with him, with the view to co-operate, if necessary. You are requested to report the number of com-panies you may muster into the service, the state of the arms, condition, and all the circumstances connected therewith.
Respectfully, &c., R. E. LEE,
Major- General, Commanding.

Whitworth, I believe that Lee and others were well aware of the advantage that steamboats (and railroads) would give the Union in the fight to come. As for defendinf Wheeling, I do not believe that any Virginia had a serious hope of establishing the Virginia border as an impenetrable line of defense. The best way to defend Wheeling strategically, was not to try to hold onto it tactically, when it was surrounded on thrww sides by Pennsylvania and Ohio, but to try and win the war and ensure that the Virginia frontier became the eventual US-CS boundary, which would include Wheeling in Virginia and thus the South.
As evidence, I would point to Lee's defensive plan in South Carolina and Georgia in the fall of 1861. He gave to trying to defend the outlying barrier islands, and concentrated on establishing defensible positions inland, away from the effects of Federal gunboats, and nearer to the railroads, which would give the defending Confederate a better chance of defeating Federal incursions from the sea. To try to defend the barrier islands would be to fight the Union forces at a place on which all the Federal advantages (sea mobility, naval firepower, etc.) could be brought to bear and where Confederate advantages (strategic depth, and lateral rail mobility) would be negated.
Note how successful Wise was with this strategy in Roanoke Island in the spring of 1862.

[gary]

While mililtary history was not studied at West Point when Lee attended, Lee believed as did Frederick the Great said, "He who defends everything, defends nothing."

[whitworth]

"As for defending Wheeling, I do not believe that any Virginia[n] had a serious hope of establishing the Virginia border as an impenetrable line of defense. The best way to defend Wheeling strategically, was not to try to hold onto it tactically, when it was surrounded on three sides by Pennsylvania and Ohio, but to try and win the war and ensure that the Virginia frontier became the eventual US-CS boundary, which would include Wheeling in Virginia and thus the South."

Did the Confederate founding fathers really believe that was the result of secession at the beginning? I think few had a clue, what war would mean? Could the Confederacy win outright, or did they think the North would tire of war. But then, did the Confederacy consider that the U.S. would not give away "southern" territory occupied by Union forces? I wonder?

The British Foreign Secretary asked the Confederate representative about Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and western Virginia, very early in the war? What happens if you cannot defend part of your territory, more or less?

The British knew what Confederates could produce in iron, steam engines, and steamboats. If the British knew one thing, it was logistics, as they had just finished a few years earlier, the Crimean War.

Very early in the war, a Virginian loyal to the Confederacy, and just west of the Allegheny Mountains, asked how the Confederacy would protect his county and counties west to the Ohio River?
He came the closest to foretelling the eventual fate of the western counties in Virginia.
During the meeting of delegates in Virginia to secede, no such question was asked.

Secede Virginia, and your state might lose a third of its territory. Even Lee couldn't defend and hold it.

[JohnTaylor]

Originally Posted by whitworth

Did the Confederate founding fathers really believe that was the result of secession at the beginning?

Some did, but secessionists were not a monolith.

Originally Posted by whitworth

I think few had a clue, what war would mean? Could the Confederacy win outright, or did they think the North would tire of war. But then, did the Confederacy consider that the U.S. would not give away "southern" territory occupied by Union forces? I wonder?

There are a lot of contingencies there. In the 1780’s, the British held onto portions of the Old Northwest after granting American independence, but only as a bargaining chip to ensure that the US complied with its obligations. Likewise, the US held onto bits of Mexico (other than the portions the US were granted by the peace treaty) to ensure Mexican compliance. Once that compliance was obtained, the US left the non-ceded portions of Mexico.
Assuming the US grew tired of continuing the struggle, would the US attempt to hang onto portions of western Virginia, and would the Confederacy, (again, assuming the US grew tired of fighting the war) be willing to continue the fight (even after a hypothetical peace offer), if that is what it took to keep Virginia intact? Or would the Confederate government tell Virginia to let the western counties go in exchange for US recognition of independence? Hard to say. My guess is that it would depend on what the trends lines were at the time.

Originally Posted by whitworth

The British Foreign Secretary asked the Confederate representative about Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and western Virginia, very early in the war? What happens if you cannot defend part of your territory, more or less?

The British knew what Confederates could produce in iron, steam engines, and steamboats. If the British knew one thing, it was logistics, as they had just finished a few years earlier, the Crimean War.

I am not familiar with this episode, so you’ll have to fill me in.

Originally Posted by whitworth

Very early in the war, a Virginian loyal to the Confederacy, and just west of the Allegheny Mountains, asked how the Confederacy would protect his county and counties west to the Ohio River?
He came the closest to foretelling the eventual fate of the western counties in Virginia.
During the meeting of delegates in Virginia to secede, no such question was asked.

The fate and attitude of the western counties was frequently the topic of discussion at the |Virginia Convention. Frequently, it was addressed in relation to the question of tax reform. Under then-existing Commonwealth law, slaves under the age of 12 were exempt from property taxes. Westerners wanted this changed to tax slaves immediately. Mr. Chapman Stuart said the western men will defend your slave property and repel John Brown invasions, but give the West justice in taxation. Proceedings of the Virginia Convention of 1861, vol. 3 pg. 115.
Mr. Cyrus Hall of Ritchie County said, “I am thinking we are going to have a fight with the North about this slave property of yours, and if we do, I expect to take part in it. If I do, I want that property for which I fight to contribute something to support us while we fight.” Vol. 3, pg. 528. There were others, but you get the point.
Other westerners spoke of the economic dislocation that would be caused by secession.
Summers of Kanawha pointed out that the economic interests of the western counties are with the Border States, they sell cattle in Baltimore, salt in St. Louis and Indiana. Cutting off the Border States will hurt the west very much. Summers says “I am irrevocably committed as a co-operation man” in favour of cooperatyion amongst the Border States. (Vol. 3, pg. 568.) Summers said “We have always acted in concert,” and cited Annapolis and Philadelphia as examples. He said that if we separate from Ohio and impose a tariff in Ohio goods, it will effectively prohibit trade with Ohio. The Southwest sells an immense amount of salt to Tennessee and Tennessee sells cattle and corn to Virginia. Virginia cattle are sold in Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York. One cannot cut off ties with these “without destruction. For this reason I have been for co-operation throughout, and shall be for co-operation.” Men should be governed by their interest, and just because nature ordains that the interest of western Virginia lie with the Border States does not mean they lack patriotism. Again, there were others who said similar things.

Several western delegates commented on the relatively defenseless condition of the west in the event of secession. On April 17th, Mr. Brown of Preston said, “The Pan Handle is in a worse condition than even my own county. It is bounded on the north by Pennsylvania and on the west by Ohio. It is a country over which a cannon ball can be thrown. Can they maintain their existence there? Can you send a soldier there to defend them? Do you really think that we will not need any? We will need them, but we do not expect aid from you, and I am sure you will not be able to get aid from us to any extent. The Pan Handle will be overrun, and will be in the possession of the enemy, as well as all the border counties of the North-west. That will be our condition.” (vol. 4, pg. 81). There were other who expressed these sentiments as well.

Originally Posted by whitworth

Secede Virginia, and your state might lose a third of its territory. Even Lee couldn't defend and hold it.

Some of the western delegates implied (and may have been writing a political check that their voters wouldn’t wish to cash) that, if tax relief were enacted, the people of the western counties would fight with the rest of the State against a Federal incursion. In the end, the Convention did make some movement toward modifying the tax laws (which exempted slaves under the age of 12 years from property taxes), but that wasn’t far enough or fast enough to keep the bolters in the Convention, and they left, and succeeded in reforming a rump convention in Wheeling and influencing public opinion in the western counties against secession. But this was still in the future when Lee issued the April 29 orders to Loring to go to Wheeling.

[whitworth]

"I am not familiar with this episode, so you’ll have to fill me in."

Most historians, who write history books, are unfamilar with the source.
Of course, I wonder how many historians really wanted to find solid reasons why the Confederacy should never have seceded. Margaret Mitchell got as close as I recall in the novel, Gone With the Wind. She gave voice to Rhett Butler, telling of the lack of industry to fight the war. Something on the lines that the South had their cotton, slaves and arrogance.
******

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 20, 1862.
No. 4.] CONFEDERATE STATES COMMISSION,
London, February 22, 1862.



"He [Earl Russell, British Foreign Secretary] took very little part in the conversation, asking only but one or two questions—
one was as to the internal condition of Kentucky, Missouri, and Ten-nessee, and he referred also to the alienation of northwestern Vir-ginia. I told him that as far as the three States named were con-cerned they were now members of the Confederate States; that we knew a very large majority of their people were with the South, and none who knew the actual condition of things doubted that they would remain so, and that as to northwestern Virginia the pretense of a separate government there was an empty pageant, credited only by the Government at Washington, and by it alone, for purposes of delusion.
On the whole it was manifest enough that his personal sympathies
were not with us, and his policy inaction. "


J.M. MASON.


In retrospect, who had the greater grasp of reality, the British or the Confederacy in February, 1862. The British knew the U.S. advantage in building a freshwater navy. It also knew the Southern states logistical inferiority, because for many years the South was a good British customer.

Early in the war, it was evident that the Confederacy could not militarily hold Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee and north-western Virginia. The U.S. had the dominance in supply and the means to get troops and supplies into these areas.

Bravery was never enough to keep the Confederacy whole.

.

[Battalion]

Originally Posted by whitworth

"I am not familiar with this episode, so you’ll have to fill me in."

Most historians, who write history books, are unfamilar with the source.
Of course, I wonder how many historians really wanted to find solid reasons why the Confederacy should never have seceded. Margaret Mitchell got as close as I recall in the novel, Gone With the Wind. She gave voice to Rhett Butler, telling of the lack of industry to fight the war. Something on the lines that the South had their cotton, slaves and arrogance.
******

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 20, 1862.
No. 4.] CONFEDERATE STATES COMMISSION,
London, February 22, 1862.



"He [Earl Russell, British Foreign Secretary] took very little part in the conversation, asking only but one or two questions—
one was as to the internal condition of Kentucky, Missouri, and Ten-nessee, and he referred also to the alienation of northwestern Vir-ginia. I told him that as far as the three States named were con-cerned they were now members of the Confederate States; that we knew a very large majority of their people were with the South, and none who knew the actual condition of things doubted that they would remain so, and that as to northwestern Virginia the pretense of a separate government there was an empty pageant, credited only by the Government at Washington, and by it alone, for purposes of delusion.
On the whole it was manifest enough that his personal sympathies
were not with us, and his policy inaction. "


J.M. MASON.


In retrospect, who had the greater grasp of reality, the British or the Confederacy in February, 1862. The British knew the U.S. advantage in building a freshwater navy. It also knew the Southern states logistical inferiority, because for many years the South was a good British customer.

Early in the war, it was evident that the Confederacy could not militarily hold Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee and north-western Virginia. The U.S. had the dominance in supply and the means to get troops and supplies into these areas.

Bravery was never enough to keep the Confederacy whole.

.

So you believe the situation of the Confederates was much like that of the Rebels in the Revolutionary War?

[unionblue]

Battalion,

While you have addressed this to someone else, I would like to reply.

No, the situation of Confederacy was NOT much like the Rebels in the Revolutionary War.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[cw1865]

I think they're trying to assess British motives. From what I've read you have essentially two motives to intervene, the cotton (the lack of cotton does cause high unemployment in UK) and the fact that it strikes a future potential competitor in two (ironically a solid US boosts the UK in both World Wars)

England obviously must balance those interests against its need for Union food imports due to poor crops and of course, once the Emancipation Proclamation is issued, the UK is definitely pro-abolition.

From my readings, I'm not really quite sure why France won't intervene without England acting. Or are they just too busy in Mexico?

[matthew mckeon]

Was the situation of the CSA similar to the revolutionaries of 1776?

On one hand yes. Britain was a larger, and richer in resources than the colonists, as the North was to the South. The South was a geographically large area to conquer, as the colonies were, and this size was(usually) a defensive advantage. The British controlled the seas, while the patriots used privateers, as the North controlled the sea, with the CSA using commerce destroyers like the Alabama.

On the other hand, no. While Britain had jealous and vengeful European rivals, in France, Spain and Holland, willing to aid, and finally intervene in the Revolution, there was no rivalry to benefit the CSA.

British armies operated at the end of supplies lines stretching thousands of miles, while the North and South were geographic neighbors, and indeed, in the border states were literally next door to each other. The industrial revolution influenced war making in a variety of ways, and the North benefited the most from that influence.

A big difference was the will to make war. Unionists thought that secession was a betrayal of the ideals of the Revolution and the promise of "the last, best hope" of mankind. To them, losing the war was inconceivable, and if the Union had lost, meant a drastic and fundamental diminishment in what it meant to be American. The British could afford to lose the colonies without it making a significant or even visible difference to their national identity. They continued to expand their overseas empire, and continued to grow in wealth, power and influence.