Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
Did Lee make the right choice after Chancellorsville?
In relation to the Second Corps after Chancellorsville and the loss of Jackson, did Lee make the right decision in splitting the corps and placing Hill and Ewell in command? Or should he have kept the full 2nd Corps and/or place another man in charge?
__________________ Ancestors in the 28th, 38th, 46th, 59th and 22nd Btn. Virginia Infantry and 2nd Virginia Cavalry.
My personal belief supports Lee's decision to make the commands smaller. There's greater tactical flexibility and no subsequent commander could measure up to the standards set by Jackson. The possibility of errors by 1/2 as opposed to 1/3rd the Army is probably less than having 2/3rd doing wrong.
In relation to the Second Corps after Chancellorsville and the loss of Jackson, did Lee make the right decision in splitting the corps and placing Hill and Ewell in command? Or should he have kept the full 2nd Corps and/or place another man in charge?
IMHO:
1) Lee did not have another commander who could have handled the load of commanding a force of 30,000+ men. My opinion is based solidly on hindsight (Ewell and A. P. Hill never showed well enough once they made Corps command, neither did any of the others like Anderson, only Early showing any of the signs, and I don't think he could do it). Lee, however, said he already had his doubts with Jackson and Longstreet and had been looking for the right moment to do it.
2) Organizationally, an Army of three corps is much better and much more flexible. You might even say Lee should have considered four. The reasoning is that it becomes much easier to divide and recombine, to react to enemy maneuvers, and to detach parts for independent command. For example, if you have to send 2 divisions to the Shenandoah, it is much easier if they are already part of a unit used to working together. If you have to split them off from "Jackson's Corps", you create an entire issue of who commands them, with no specific higher staff/supply organization to care for them etc. Messy, and it tends to be inefficient without truly talented individuals to run it from the top.
For an invasion of the North, smaller corps would be much better, allowing the Confederates to make better use of the road net, react more quickly, and face unexpected situations better.
As long as the Army of Northern Virginia was fairly destitute of supplies, it could never make an invasion of Pennsylvania with only two corps.
Even with the smaller corps, Lee had doubts if Pennsylvania could supply more than Ewell's Corps on the march into Pennsylvania.
Too many historians assume that Lee did not realize how much in trouble the Confederacy was in by June, 1863.
Lee knew he could not send troops to Vicksburg, supply them adequately, and save Pentleton's army. Lee knew he couldn't sit in Virginia, without supplies and he certainly knew it would be bad for morale, if in a defensive mode in Virginia, the U.S. Army fired off artillery salutes in honor of the capture of Vicksburg.
Lee fought the war, long after it was lost. An officer of long experience could have seen why the Confederacy would lose by mid-1863.
Only a belief that Providence would save them, and not through a military assessment, could Lee see a favorable end.
By mid-1863, the Confederacy was hanging on, with no good view of adequately supplying their army. The Confederate economy, never good to start, was crumbling from within.
Meade bemoaned the dearth of qualified (competent) corps commanders for the AoP. Lee probably felt the same about the AoNV, but was more diplomatice, in voicing his concerns.
Even with 20/20 hindsight, it is difficult to easily discern, who would actually have been better than Lee's choices. Lee could have chosen differently, but would those 'different' choices have really been significantly better?
I'm not much of an eastern theatre man... my reading on the subject is only rather general. I don't see that Lee had many choices open to him. Trice's views pretty much mirror my own.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
I think assessing Lee is to look at the real truth in mid-1863. The Confederacy was poorly supplied. Lee could not send troops to Vicksburg, to make a meaningful change in that outcome.
The Confederacy was not winning the war; the Confederacy had lost and would never have a chance to save the border states and western Virginia.
The U.S. logistics network was in full swing. It had a larger and better equipped army. The U.S. was equipping its army with millions and millions in debt financing. There was no turning back and Great Britain would never assist the Confederacy, militarily.
Despite critical shortages of forage and horseshoes, Lee still moved into Pennsylvania. Lee was cutting too many corners, and it cost him. But few ever get beyond blaming Ewell, Stuart and Longstreet for Gettysburg.
In my humble opinion, Lee made a sound choice by splitting the 2nd Corps and creating two new ones out of it. There had already been evidence that the two corps were just to big for one person to handle and it would be easier to maneuver and to command if they were shrunken down to a more manageable size.
As for the commander of the two new corps, I am not sure Lee had much more of a choice than who he chose. Hill was a fighting general, and had had success during the war. The main reason for his poor showing at Gettysburg was his bout with a certain STD; he was sick the entire time. Not to make an excuse (Lee was sick the entire time too), but that may be why he wasn't as effective. Ewell was, well, Ewell. He probably would not have been my choice for command of a corps, but there weren't many other options at this point. You are halfway through the war, and there have been a great deal of general officers who have become casualties on both sides. Ewell was not a bad general, but he may have reached the top of his ability at the division level.
While its true that the Confederacy at the time of Chancellorsville is feeling the effects of the Anaconda Plan, its also true that the North is feeling the effects of the war. July 1863 sees Gettysburg, Vicksburg and of course the draft riots in NYC.
In retrospect, I think the best chance the South had to win the war MILITARILY was at the very beginning before the North can bring its superior resources to bear. However, once the war begins to drag on, the South's only chance is to win a political victory.
Prior to the Gettysburg/Vicksburg results, the South is pretty much holding its own, effectively parrying Northern attacks...but even after Gettysburg/Vicksburg, its not NECESSARILY a lost war. Hindsight tells us that it is, but in 1863, the South is still hoping to make victory so costly that the North simply won't want to pay the price in blood and money. Events at the time tell us that this could have been the case including the mid-term elections and events like the draft riots.
20/20 hindsight, says invading Pa. was a mistake. The alternative contemplated by Davis, Longstreet and the War Dept. was sending part of the ANV (longstreet) West to reinforce Bragg in Tn and/ or relieveVicksburgh. Which is what was done After the Gettysberg Fiasco (IMO, seen from the 21st Century, it probably should have been done before Chancellosville) In any case, there was a direct rail link between Petersburgh and Chattanooga that was the planned to carry the ANV troops to Chattanooga and during the Pa. Invasion, Burnside took Knoxville severing the direct link with the main armies of the West. Forcing Longstreet to go South to Ga. then West to Atlanta and then North to Chattanooga (Vicksberg, had already been lost during the Pa. affair, by this time) with the result that Longstreet barely reached the field of battle in time to participate in the battle and, even then did not get all his men into line in time, in the event.
After Chancellorsville, Longstreet could have been helping to crush Roscrans, who was not contemplating an offensive until After Vicksberg was taken.
Not invading Pa. would have probably saved Hookers job, Lincoln was still trying to rehabilitate the AoP Commander and his reluctance to encounter Lee, again, became glaring only after Lee moved North. Lee even missing Longstreet would have felt little fear of anything Hooker might attempt; If he attempted anything at all. Even if Meade succeeded in command later (A likely event) he was no more confident of beating Lee than Hooker was. Defensively, Meade had many saving qualities, but contemplation of fighting and defeating Lee offensively, was not one of his strengths.
This alternative, of course, did happened, but only during and After Gettysburg, not before.
If nothing else, a severe blow at Roscrans (or Vicksberg) would have kept Grant in the West sometime longer than Lee's defeat at Gettysburg did.
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Did Lee make the right choice after Chancellorsville? 
Ancestors in the 28th, 38th, 46th, 59th and 22nd Btn. Virginia Infantry and 2nd Virginia Cavalry. 
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