Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
Wasn't Jomini's distillation of Napoleonic tactics a common text for officers on both sides. I seem to remember Halleck either translating or editing or teaching this.
Jomini, of course, wrote in French. His biggest competition in the post-Napoleonic-Wars military history/theory writing wars was von Clausewitz, who naturally wrote in German. Both had served as staff officers at a high level in the wars, von Clausewitz for the Prussians and Russians, Jomini for the French and Russians. They did not like one another much. Napoleon had commented favorably on Jomini's work while he was still serving the French.
Von Clausewitz' work was not available in English before the Civil War. I am not sure when Jomini's work became available in English, but it was not widely available in the US and was not used as a standard text at West Point. The only course West Point cadets took that would really be concerned with strategy and tactics was Mahan's short one -- but Mahan himself was familiar with Jomini's work in French, it seems, and passed a distilled version across in the few weeks he had the Cadets. A lot of it was distilled down into one-liners.
Now someone like Lee, who was an active member of the Napoleonic Society while at West Point for three years as Superintendant, probably knew a lot more about Jomini than most. It looks to me like Jackson also was a student of Napoleonic matters, and Meade almost had to be from the way that Army was moved as soon as he took over. Lee knew both before the war.
Added note: The first book the young Robert E. Lee checked out of the West Point Library was a study of Napoleon's campaigns.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Glad to see that the last link mentioned Grant's mathematical side as well. Now I don't have to create a post mentioning it.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Before the war, Halleck wrote a book on Infantry Tactics, which was essentially a verbatim translation from the writings of Joimini (Halleck was fluent in French, apparently) The book stamped Halleck as a officer of some intellect within the Army and I understand, the book was widely read within the officer corps, I do not know if it made the West Point cirriculum or not.
I wonder if that spacial sense helped him on the battlefield?
Probably did. Have seen a number of references to Grant's unique ability to keep the entire battlefield and all its players in his mind. Must have been a heckuva chess player, if he played chess.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Have seen a number of references to Grant's unique ability to keep the entire battlefield and all its players in his mind.
I believe I may have as well, but can't specify. Ole, any specific references come to mind?
This quality may also be apparent in a context larger than a single battlefield. I refer to Grant's temporal and spacial sense from the moment his army crossed the Mississippi, thru Jackson, and till the siege of Vicksburg. He was definitely able to keep his eyes on several moving 'balls' during this phase of that campaign.
__________________ -
"It was a very peculiar time." - Franklin D. Cossitt
Ancestors in USA Army: 6th IA Inf, 11th IL Cav, 1st AL Cav; 122nd NY Inf; 6th MI Cav; 35th MA Inf; 100th IL Inf; 1st CO Inf/Cav; 22nd IN Inf
It might be a case of an early observance which was repeated by subsequent historians, but it does ring quite true. He was a demonstrably better battlefield general than most, if not all, other generals in that fracas.
In studying his battles from that perspective, that quality does emerge clearly. A rider gallops in. "General! They'e doing thus and such in front of whomever!" Grant could see the situation and send the rider back with the fix. (Sometimes the fix didn't work, but the point is that he could see what was happening, how to fix it, and where to get the resources to do it.)
I think the first time I saw it mentioned was in Sword's, "Shiloh, Bloody April." Can't be sure of that, but the battle is a classic example of knowing what to prepare for and how to arrange it while walking backwards.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
It might be a case of an early observance which was repeated by subsequent historians, but it does ring quite true. He was a demonstrably better battlefield general than most, if not all, other generals in that fracas.
In studying his battles from that perspective, that quality does emerge clearly. A rider gallops in. "General! They'e doing thus and such in front of whomever!" Grant could see the situation and send the rider back with the fix. (Sometimes the fix didn't work, but the point is that he could see what was happening, how to fix it, and where to get the resources to do it.)
I think the first time I saw it mentioned was in Sword's, "Shiloh, Bloody April." Can't be sure of that, but the battle is a classic example of knowing what to prepare for and how to arrange it while walking backwards.
Perhaps the most-commented-upon characteristics of Grant were these:
1) his determination (generally, something like "looked like a man who was considering driving his head through a wall -- and was about to do it!", quote from memory, may not be exact)
2) his concentration upon what he was doing to the enemy, not what the enemy might do to him (such as the irritated comment at the Wilderness about AoP officers thinking Lee was going to do a double-back flip and land on both flanks, or Sherman's quote about how he was a darn sight better than Grant on most military matters, but that Grant didn't give a darn about what the enemy was doing outside of his sight)
3) his decision-making ability. When he came East, AoP staff officers were amazed at how ferociously and quickly he processed paperwork and sent out orders. One asked him what the secret was, how he could so quickly decide what the right thing to do. Said Grant, the key was to decide; if he had made the wrong decision, they'd quickly learn of it and could do something else next.
4) the clarity of his orders. We can find hundreds of examples in the Official Records. The action required might be the right or wrong one, but no one reading a Grant order could be in doubt about what Grant wanted done.
One other story/anecdote: one staff officer (Porter?) commented that Grant always more-or-less ignored cavalry raids when reports of them came in from afar in 1864, thinking they were usually more bark than bite and leaving them to others to attend to. But he also noted one exception: if the name Forrest was mentioned, Grant would stop what he was doing and listen attentively until he was sure he understood what was going on, then begin to issue instructions. Grant also understood what was truly essential and dangerous; Wheeler on a raid wasn't, Forrest on a raid was.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Grant's celebrated indifference to the enemy had its benefits: generally his opponents spent their time trying to counter his moves, while commanders like Hooker became paralyzed with anxiety about Lee was doing. Hooker's famous comment, "Hooker lost confidence in Hooker," was a bitter, but perceptive self analysis.
It had a downside too, the surprise at Shiloh, and the battle in the Wilderness, fought on the ANV's terms, not Grant's. Sometimes you SHOULD care about what the enemy is doing "out of your sight."
Lee had some of the same quality. He generally thought in terms of striking the enemy, not countering the enemy's moves. Although he often had some insight into the strategy thinking of his opponents. I'm thinking of the Overland Campaign.
Grant's celebrated indifference to the enemy had its benefits: generally his opponents spent their time trying to counter his moves, while commanders like Hooker became paralyzed with anxiety about Lee was doing. Hooker's famous comment, "Hooker lost confidence in Hooker," was a bitter, but perceptive self analysis.
It had a downside too, the surprise at Shiloh, and the battle in the Wilderness, fought on the ANV's terms, not Grant's. Sometimes you SHOULD care about what the enemy is doing "out of your sight."
I agree with the Shiloh point, although it applies as much or more to Sherman and others. The entire Army was sloppy and blind there, or the surprise could never have happened. The best you can say for those people is that they fought hard and persevered, and they were lucky to have survived that mess. Grant and Sherman seem to have learned a valuable lesson as a result.
At the Wilderness, I am not so sure. Grant was not unaware that he might be attacked there, and not unprepared for it. He probably underestimated Lee and the ANV, but I think you had to get hit by them before you believed what it was like. Mainly, Grant understood he had to move forward, that all routes had liabilities, and that this one meant Grant had to respond. He would rather have gotten through without being attacked; he understood Lee might attack; he was willing to take the risk.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
