Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
and the slower they march too. I'll stick to conventional wisdom here and believe that Grant wanted to fight the ANV in the open. He was aware of what happened at Mine Run the previous year and wanted Lee out of his entrenchments and in the open. The Wilderness was not "open" and so there was no intent to fight there and Grant wanted a battle further west. Lee was hoping to intercept (which he did) and sever the corps of the AOP. Neither achieved what they started out to achieve (no plan lasts beyond the first contact).
Having recently visited the field, I have been avidly reading all the material I can find on this battle. The theory is that Grant/Meade intended to pass through the Wilderness without fighting there. I do not believe this is the case. The two Union leaders must have known they were going to fight in this region.
... Did the Union leaders really believe that Lee would make no move? The two Corps with Lee were only just over ten miles away from the Wilderness. The way the battle developed was almost inevitable and was always going to be fought on this field.
Hmm, I think this is the wrong approach to understanding Grant and Meade.
Meade had been a Corps commander under Hooker at the Battle of Chancellorsville. He remembered clearly how close they had come to success, and how horrible the fighting in that terrain had been. His troops had been about to break out of the Wilderness into the clearer terrain towards Fredericksburg then when he had received the recall order from Hooker, and Meade had exploded in anger when he got it.
Grant and Meade had plenty of time to discuss various approaches here, and what Lee might or might not do. While Grant had come East with his own set of convictions, Meade had been fighting in Virginia against Lee's ANV a long time. The AoP generals had talked quite a bit to Grant about what "Bobby Lee" was going to do. By the time they got to the fighting in the Wilderness, Grant was tired of hearing it. (That does not mean he ignored it -- he was just tired of their attitude.)
Grant was a very aggressive general. He was aware of what the enemy might do -- he just preferred to concentrate on what he was going to do to them. He acted on the assumption he could deal with whatever they did as they did it, and that his own actions would force them to react to what he did. He often found his subordinates were not quite up to what he expected of them, but he had a long record of success, and of overcoming/surviving whatever the enemy tried. Sherman could have told the AoP generals about this.
Grant's first plan when he arrived in VA was incredibly audacious. He wanted to load ten days of supplies and ammo into the wagons, cut loose from his LOC, advance down the slope of the Blue Ridge, then turn and advance from the West, pinning Lee against Richmond and foricng him to a fight to the finish. I think this scared the beJesus out of most AoP generals, the War Department, and the government (Meade gives me the impression he would have gone along with it). Grant gave it up, but later said that if he had had six months experience with the AoP and realized what kind of fighting force he had, he would have gone with this.
Grant then considered other plans. These generally focused on trying to get around Lee to the East, usually by using a water movement, and might be considered somewhat similar to McClellan's Peninsula move. An understanding of the political-military realities ended up forcing him to abandon those as well, leaving only the overland route through either Fredericksburg or the Wilderness.
No general in his right mind could have looked at the possibility of another frontal assault across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg with satisfaction after Burnside's disaster. That left the Wilderness route.
Grant was aware that Lee might strike him there if he chose. Moving through that area thus had risks and rewards.
In an objective analysis, an attack on Grant's large force by Lee's small force is not a great danger if met stoutly. He greatly outnumbers Lee, and only 2/3rds of Lee's force is really in a position to move against him (Longstreet was known to be moving to VA, but his exact position in the state was not known as the planning went forward).
Most important, though, is that Grant did not ignore the possibility. He was perfectly willing to fight Lee. He saw only one purpose to maneuver: to close with and fight the enemy, hopefully at an advantage, but always to fight and beat him. In that sense, he was willing to accept a battle in the Wilderness, but he could see that it would be better if he got through the Wilderness without a major fight.
In fact, Grant understood what most people did not: Lee could not let Grant march through the Wilderness without reacting. That reaction might be an attempt to strike his flank, or to race to get ahead of Grant on the road, or even I suppose a move North into what would have been Grant's rear. But Grant's calculation is basically an example of pressuring Lee to choose: fight here, or fight there, but Lee has to come out of those entrenchments to the West and fight somewhere. If he does not, Grant will be closer to Richmond, on a better route, and that road leads to quick Southern disaster.
Now I think Grant underestimated Lee, or had not yet really grasped what he faced. His previous experience had led him to a higher opinion of Joe Johnston than any other Confederate general. After the savage fighting at The Wilderness, Grant looks out across the burning ground and sees the ANV dug in, waiting for him to come on again. He says aloud "After two days of such fighting, Joe Johnston would have retreated." (quote from memory, may not be exact.)
Lee, at the same time, had not yet grasped what Grant was. He was trying to get a handle on him. He had spoken with Longstreet (who was in Grant's wedding party); he had studied Grant's campaigns; he had searched his memory of Mexico, trying in vain to recall something of the personality of the non-descript Lieutenant he remembered he had met exactly once. Now, I think, Lee recognized something he had, if not exactly dreaded or feared, hoped he would never face in a Union commander. Here was a man who would not retreat in the most dire of circumstances, who could not be intimidated, who could be beaten bloody and would still shake it off and come on again, a man who understood in his bones that the Union would win if it bore the pain, a soldier who would not quit or swerve from what he saw as his path. This was, I think, the nightmare Lee had always known might arise in a Federal commander; now he looked across the burning field at the reality. He was not afraid to face it; he simply saw Grant for what he was, and knew how hard it would be to vanquish such a foe.
I don't think that Grant or Meade wanted to fight Lee in the Wilderness. It just doesn't make sense in my mind. Meade had been in the Wilderness a year earlier and he knew how horrid a place it was to fight. And I am sure that he told Grant this. I think it was an unfortunate happenstance that the fight occured there. Grant had hoped to get through the Wilderness and into the clear, open ground south of the Wilderness, preferably that around Spotsylvania Court House. When he found that Lee had gotten in front of him, he and Meade got a little too tenacious and thought that they could fight and beat Lee, the AoP having superior numbers and Lee once more not having his full army up when he engaged. From all that I have gotten to read on the Wilderness: Gordon Rhea's book (excellent), excerpts from Porter's Campaigning with Grant and also from Grant's memoirs. And everything that I gathered is that it was not intended to fight there. It just doesn't seem logical that Meade would tell Grant to fight there, especially when Meade had overall command with Grant just giving guidance during the beginning phases of the campaign.
__________________ "The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize." George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796
Grants original plan included a drive for Richmond by Ben Butler's Army of the James as Grant move south through the Wilderness.
Due to Butler's invincible incompetence, he allowed himself to be bottled up at Bermuda Hundred, effectively out of the war until Grant readjusted his plans and linked up with the Army of the James, around Petersburg, later in the campaign.
As noted by trice, Grant was more concerned with Fighting Lee than he was about Where to fight him.
Grants original plan included a drive for Richmond by Ben Butler's Army of the James as Grant move south through the Wilderness.
Due to Butler's invincible incompetence, he allowed himself to be bottled up at Bermuda Hundred, effectively out of the war until Grant readjusted his plans and linked up with the Army of the James, around Petersburg, later in the campaign.
As noted by trice, Grant was more concerned with Fighting Lee than he was about Where to fight him.
I have always assumed that Grant and Meade had discussed how they wanted to act if Lee suddenly appeared. They were both highly competent officers, so it would be surprising if they did not. Meade is often described as cautious in his maneuvers, and Grant was thought more aggressive, but both can be aptly called combative.
That said, I thought it would be instructive to see what passed between them on the morning of May 5th, when Lee's advance appeared:
----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Old Wilderness Tavern, May 5, 1864.
(Received 7.30 a.m.)
Lieutenant-General GRANT:
The enemy have appeared in force on the Orange pike, and are now reported forming line of battle in front of Griffin's division, Fifth Corps. I have directed General Warren to attack them at once with his whole force. Until this movement of the enemy is developed, the march of the corps must be suspended. I have, therefore, sent word to Hancock not to advance beyond Todd's Tavern for the present. I think the enemy is trying to delay our movement, and will not give battle, but of this we shall soon see. For the present I will stop here, and have stopped our trains.
GEO. G. MEADE.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Germanna Ford, May 5, 1864--8.24 a.m.
General MEADE:
Your note giving movement of enemy and your dispositions received. Burnside's advance is now crossing the river. I will have Ricketts' division relieved and advanced at once, and urge Burnside's crossing. As soon as I can see Burnside I will go forward. If any opportunity presents itself for pitching into a part of Lee's army, do so without giving time for disposition.
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
----
Zip-zap-bang. No hesitation by Meade. Lee shows up, he stops his army and turns to the attack on his own authority. Grant gets the message and replies: I am pushing more men up and coming myself; if you get a chance to hit Lee before I get there, go after him quick and hard.
That is a command team sure of themselves and each other, in agreement about what they want to do.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Meade was combative, when in battle and someone else was in charge to take responsibility if anything went wrong.
IMO, Meade's main attribute as a commanding officer (especially as Army Commander, when his lack of confidence was most evident) that I like was that he 'rarely' let the state his nerves override his competence as a professional soldier. He usually did not get lost in his battles; A Very big step up from his predecessors.
Meade was combative, when in battle and someone else was in charge to take responsibility if anything went wrong.
IMO, Meade's main attribute as a commanding officer (especially as Army Commander, when his lack of confidence was most evident) that I like was that he 'rarely' let the state his nerves override his competence as a professional soldier. He usually did not get lost in his battles; A Very big step up from his predecessors.
That's very good. I doubt any example can be found in the entire Civil War of a large Army moving in such a classical Napoleonic-style battalion-carre formation as the Army of the Potomac from the day Meade took command to July 3. Brilliant staff and command work, strategically impressive; the movement itself forces Lee to pull back from Harrisburg and concentrate against Meade. The movement of the Corps looks exactly like the diagrams of how Napoleon moved La Grande Armee.
Other movements might be as impressive in some ways. Grant and Lee and Jackson certainly put on some good ones. Perhaps the Rosecrans/Thomas effort at Tullahoma is as good from a technical military viewpoint. But I don't think anything shrieks "competent, knowledgeable soldiers in charge" as the first few days of movement under Meade in 1863.
I've never checked to be sure, but Meade's movement looks like someone who'd clearly studied Napoleon's campaigns. Lee supposedly said "he will make no mistake on my front" or something similar when he heard Meade was in charge. I do know Lee was a member of the Napoleonic Society when he was Superintendant up at West Point. So I have always suspected that Meade and Lee had similar interests and were aware of each other's studies of Napoleon. Lee thus probably knew that Meade would always have his bases covered, always have his units in supporting distance, etc. -- in short, that all movements from him would be handled professionally.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
While Meade made some very good command decisions after he first took command of the AoP, it seems that he was just as bad as many of the other generals who had been put in charge of that army. He was, unfortunately, overly cautious. Now sometimes that is a good thing, I do admit. A prime example was during the Mine Run campaign, when Meade was urged to attack and he did not because Lee was entrenched in a formidable position, and to have attacked would have been foolhardy. But while Meade was competent, I would have to rate him as only a fair commander. He badly bungled in his first battle under Grant. I think part of this is because he is being watched by Grant, who is, as we know, a particularly aggressive general. I think Meade wanted to show that he could be aggressive too, and he messed up by pressing his forces into battle too soon and unsupported. And in the Wilderness, the terrain seems to negate the numbers in most cases.
Now Grant isn't entirely blameless, but he should be cut some slack in my opinion. He had made it a point that he was not taking over command of the AoP, and that it was still Meade's army to command; he was just giving a general order and Meade was to carry it out in his own way. The Wilderness showed Grant that Meade wasn't as competent as those who had served under Grant before, such as Sherman and Thomas, who could be given an order and be expected to carry it out almost to perfection. After the Wilderness, Grant began taking tighter hold on the reigns and gave more direct, clear cut orders, and to an extent began to command the AoP.
On the point of Meade being a student of Napoleon, I have to agree. He went to West Point, and Napoleonic tactics were the norm in that day, and were predominantly taught at the USMA. However, I think he, like most generals by 1863, were realizing that new technology in the form of rifling and better ammunition were making those tactic obsolete. Gettysburg was really the last stand up fight in the Eastern theatre, in my opinion, and the Wilderness was a mix of trench and stand up fighting. At Spotsylvania, its all trench warfare, with massed assaults launched to take the enemies works.
__________________ "The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize." George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
