Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
Gary Gallagher made an interesting observation in a bit I caught on the History Channel over the weekend: "The Army of the Potomac was the equivalent of the 2nd largest city in the Confederacy (New Orleans being the first)."
So you have a large population larger than Richmond, most of which is encamped in Virginia. In the early days this population was largely supplied by RR and wagon trains -- itself a logistical nightmare of overwhelming proportions. Now consider that the riff-raff of this "city" is also scrounging in the fields, orchards, farmyards, and smokehouses. With the Confederates having at least an equal proportion of riff-raff, you can well imagine that Virginia farm production suffered.
Just an observation from a different perspective.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
An astute observation indeed, Ole. I always think of Georgia when I think of depredations on the countryside... though Virginians probably suffered more than any others, because the Eastern theater was their front yard.
On a personal note, there's a family story about my Virginia gggrandmother, Amanda Perkins, who was small but so feisty that no Yankee dared stand in her way when she was taking supplies to "her boys!"
To put Gallagher's statement in perspective a bit, it should be noted that the Confederacy's Armies of Northern Virginia and Tennessee were also larger than any Confederate city besides New Orleans. The South's next largest city, Richmond's 1860 nonslave population in 1860 was 40,500. And to put that statement into perspective, all the long standing Union Armies would easily outsize all Confederate cities but New Orleans. Prewar, New Orleans was 4 times larger than any Southern city, and was quickly lost to the Confederacy. Also during the war there was a general movement of Southerners into the cities; I remember reading somewhere that Richmond's population tripled during the war. That meant, as Ole points out, alot of scavenging by normal citizens and riffraff, and a severe taxing of the means of feeding the urban dwellers. Starvation was certainly a reality to the South throughout at least the last 3 years of the War.
What I find truly amazing is that throughout the War Northern troops in Southern territory did not suffer serious want as to rations and supplies except in certain situatuions when hard pressed by the Confederates (i.e.- at Chattanooga.) Those massive armies in northern Virginia and Tennessee always had plenty to eat and shiny guns and equipment and the horses had feed. This all mostly had to be shipped in by rail, water transport, and wagon train, sometimes by combination of all three. What this means is that the Federal industrial infrastructure, manpower, and ultimately superb technical management in keeping the troops in the pink is a primary factor in the North winning the War. At no time did Northern Armies have to disperse as Lee was compelled to do on several occasions so as to keep his men and animals in feed. A truly great, and unbeatable, feat- the Northern logistical machine.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
Sir, I believe you have accurately outlined the Confederate problem. Have you considered how the South was able to sustain this doomed effort for about three and a half years?
With the very real limitations you stated, the only thing left was the human spirit of the Confederate soldier. N.B. Forrest, as an example, didn't call the quartermaster or the Confederate White House for supplies in the later part of the war. He 'borrowed' much from the U.S. Army who were very stubborn, but usually oblidging. Forrest had a way about making a request for supplies. Fighting on familiar ground with civilians who were for the most part sympathetic to the Confederate effort made the brutality last much longer than desired and probably necessary.
That element, though difficult to describe, is the key that needs to be communicated by those who champion the CSA and it's various armies and symbols, still under attack after 140 plus years.
Near the end of the war, the Army of the Potomac was making 100,000 loaves of bread a day for its troops laying up with the siege of Richmond and Petersburg. Names like Armour and Borden got their start in obtaining fortunes by supplying the Union's logistics system.
Richmond was in a bad place, as it was at the end of the Confederate supply line, served by an overworked railroad system, that remained in private control through the war.
Of course the war, with a large Confederate army getting supplied by Richmond, meant that the Union army had to be supplied by rail or water. It could never mount a serious assault from the west. That was one of Lee's great advantages. As long as the Army of Northern Virginia had 50,000 soldiers in the field, the Union could not supply any army from the west.
If the capital had been at Philadelphia, the war might have ended a year or two earlier. The Union army had to attack and defend Washington at the same time. Without a need for defending a nearby capital, a large army could have been placed at Winchester and supplied by rail out of Harrisburg, Chambersburg and Hagerstown. It could then have pushed out like Sherman did between Chattanooga and Atlanta, squeezing Lee between two large armies. Because Washington was located,where it was, the Union could only supply one Army of the Potomac, as large as it was, where it was.
Whitworth, good points. One has only to visit City Point to envision the magnitude of the logistics effort. The AoP built a railroad directly from City Point, all along the rear of the Union lines around Petersburg, growing longer as the union lines stretched further and further to the southwest. A truly monumental undertaking. I remember reading about a Confederate soldier who took part in the looting of the US Army logistics base at Manassas Junction in August 1862. Among other things, he found ice cream. In August. Now to us that doesn't sound too remarkable, but in an era before refrigeration, having ice cream at an Army depot in August was a huge effort.
On the Confederate side, feeding the ANV was a constant problem for Lee. After the war, Lee wrote a letter to Wm. M. McDonald April 15, 1868, about the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863: “I did not propose to invade the North, for I did not believe that the Army of Northern Virginia was strong enough for the purpose, not was I in any degree influenced by popular expectation. My movement was simply intended to threaten Washington, call the Federal Army north of that river, relieve our territory, and enable me to subsist the army.” Reminiscences of General Robert E. Lee, by edited by J. William Jones, page 245.
__________________ "In this Constitution, the citizens of the United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with." James Wilson of Pennsylvania, October 28th, 1787
When discussing these large unpermanent housing sites such as army camps and prisons, with a better review of latrines, outhouses and sinks(the more prevalent term for latrine), one would not wonder why disease killed more soldiers in the Civil War, than battle.
When I've read of the high death rates in prisons, one rarely ever sees a realistic mention of the use of sinks in those prisons.
When I've read of the high death rates in prisons, one rarely ever sees a realistic mention of the use of sinks in those prisons.
Good point, whitworth. I suspect disease killed far more than starvation, although the inadquate diets might well have aided in the onset of disease.
I can understand ingnorance of sanitation; it boggles, 'though, that they thought nothing of drinking water downstream from the corral and sinks. That's not sanitation awareness, that just don't make sense.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
When you see the photographs reproduced from Alexanders or brady's books you see giant camps and buildings, masses of wagons, streams of railroad cars, mountains of supplies. It's the American way of war, a precursor of the massive logistic effort of World War II, and so 2nd nature to us now, we ignore the achievement of supporting powerful forces in places like Iraq and are surprised and angered if our troops lack for anything.
On the Confederate side, consider Gorgias's success in arming and supplying CS forces with ammuntion. No CS army ever lost a battle for want of ammuntion. Contrast it with the spasmodic and less efficient effort to supply the army with food and fodder: in a territory that was mostly agricultural(if not always food crops).
When you see the photographs reproduced from Alexanders or brady's books you see giant camps and buildings, masses of wagons, streams of railroad cars, mountains of supplies. It's the American way of war, a precursor of the massive logistic effort of World War II, and so 2nd nature to us now, we ignore the achievement of supporting powerful forces in places like Iraq and are surprised and angered if our troops lack for anything.
On the Confederate side, consider Gorgias's success in arming and supplying CS forces with ammuntion. No CS army ever lost a battle for want of ammuntion. Contrast it with the spasmodic and less efficient effort to supply the army with food and fodder: in a territory that was mostly agricultural(if not always food crops).