Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
A Confederate victory, but what kind of victory? It never laid the groundwork for later victories.
It was in many ways a victory over a poor fighting Corps, the XI Corps, that was poorly lead by Gen O.O. Howard. In the end, beating the XI Corps meant nothing. Take the first day at Gettysburg, where the XI Corps was again pummeled by Ewell's Corps. No great meaning on the following two days, when the Confederates had to fight other Army of the Potomac Corps.
In both battles, the Confederates took heavy casualties and lost important generals. Great victory; I think not.
By late 1863, the XI Corps was out of the Army of Potomac. One of its brigades got shipped to South Carolina, a few months after the Battle of Gettysburg. By early 1864, all its division commanders and most if not all its brigade commanders were in minor commands or the quiet sector of the war.
Beating the XI Corps did not translate into beating the Army of the Potomac. Howard revived his own status, once he was out of the XI Corps and in a new command.
Tactically, one of Lee's and the ANV's finest hours. Strategically - a minimal success in that it fended off Hooker, (and there are doubts in my mind as to the degree of longer term success Hooker would have enjoyed from this campaign even if he had won at Chancellorsville) but came at a heavy cost in squandering resources(men) Lee was already recognizing as rapidly diminishing.
Spartan:
It would seem that Lee saw a possibility of destroying the AotP, thus effectively closing the war in the east on a positive note for the CSA. With that prospect, he invested heavily in its accomplishment. However, happenstance and circumstance have a way of interfering with the best laid plans.
I believe the same might be said of the foray into Pennsylvania. Although that included an element of desperation. He could see that the CSA was flagging and must ultimately concede if only through years of attrition. He had failed to destroy Lincoln's army at Chacellorsville; maybe he could get it on ground of his choosing in Pennsylvania.
When that didn't work out, the attrition he expected commenced.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I think the importance of Chancellorsville is not the Confederate victory, but the inability of the Confederate army on an offense, to attack in depth. The importance being what didn't happen after the battle; much more than what happened at the battle.
It's like the boxer who hits the opponent with a tremendous punch, sends him reeling backward, but is unable to move forward and counterpunch him into submission.
Yes, there is the old claim of the importance of Stonewall Jackson. Well, many a general was killed in battle. If Stonewall Jackson was so important to victory, maybe the Confederacy should never have seceded. Soldiers and generals died in battle. The Union army seemed to sustain those losses much better than the Confederate army.
I think the importance of Chancellorsville is not the Confederate victory, but the inability of the Confederate army on an offense, to attack in depth. The importance being what didn't happen after the battle; much more than what happened at the battle.
It's like the boxer who hits the opponent with a tremendous punch, sends him reeling backward, but is unable to move forward and counterpunch him into submission.
Yes, there is the old claim of the importance of Stonewall Jackson. Well, many a general was killed in battle. If Stonewall Jackson was so important to victory, maybe the Confederacy should never have seceded. Soldiers and generals died in battle. The Union army seemed to sustain those losses much better than the Confederate army.
That is how I view it- strategically a minimal success as the devastating punch thrown by Lee/Jackson was not followed up with successive follow up punches to the head and body of the AOP. Though I understand that CW history teaches us that it was consistently just as hard to reorganize and reform the routers and it was the routed, a golden opportunity to carve up the AOP between the rivers was clearly missed. Thus, the situation remained stalemated on the Rapidan and thousands of quality ANV veterans were lost forever in the process. Chancellorsville also clearly demonstrated to Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck that Fightin Joe was not up to the task of tactical command of the army and ultimate victory.
Hooker did reorganize the chain of command with artillery, because of Chancellorsville. Artillery was too dispersed and had little central control at Chancellorsville.
Gen. Hunt assumed direct command of the Reserve Artillery, while the Corps Commanders had their artillery batteries.
At Gettysburg, Hunt had the abilitity to fill in the holes, resupply artillery batteries, and depend on his own judgment with a cashe of some 70 ammunition wagons, even Meade was unaware. Hunt never quite trusted all the Corps commanders to handle artillery effectively.
Gettysburg almost only lasted a day, as both Sickles and Hancock mishandled their artillery ammunition supply wagons. Sickles left all his artillery ammunition far in the rear and Hancock had lost half his artillery supply in the rear. Hunt kept tabs on artillery ammunition supply for the Army of the Potomac, a task the Confederates failed to do at Gettysburg.
Chancellorsville was a great victory for General Lee and the Confederacy in and of itself. This was a battle Robert E Lee had no business winning- General Hooker's strategic plan should have been a huge winner, but Lee would have none of it. What Lee did and accomplished at Chancellorsville is absolutely amazing. He had but Jackson's Corps, Stuart's horsemen, and two divisions of Longstreet's to work with, while having to hold off 3 Union Corps at Fredericksburg on his flank. And he then ignores the raiding Union cavalry and splits his command for a flank attack in front of Hooker's hordes- incredible!! That Lee stood Hooker up, stole the initiative and utterly cowed Hooker is a tribute to him; that Hooker crumpled in the face of Lee's audacity is a factor in Lee's favor as having created the situation.
That Lee produced a victory here is as I say amazing. That he then had visions of polishing off the Union Army and attempted to do it is amazing as well. That he could not do it does not reflect poorly on him. I don't see how he could have given the disproportion of numbers and the masses of unused Union troops in the area. Actually, good for him that Hooker pulled out of his entrenchments Confederate-side of the Rapidan, against his generals' advise. These lines were well nigh impregnable and manned by grim and undemoralized generals and men. The only thing they could not defeat at that point of time was their commanding general's cowardly orders. Still, none of this takes anything away from General Lee and this masterful victory.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
Lee was lucky Hooker lost his nerve - twice. First was when he stopped and dug in. Second was after Jackson rolled up the XI Corps and was killed during a night reconnaisance (and Stuart assumed command). Hancock later found himself in a position to roll up Stuart's flank but Hooker wouldn't let him and ordered a retreat. All in all, an amazing victory snatched from the proverbial jaws of defeat by Lee. However, as Robert K. Krick put it, it was the "smoothbore volley that doomed the Confederacy."