Was Chancellorsville a Great Victory?

[Hanny]

Originally Posted by JohnTaylor

When a young man, I used to define a victory in term of which side incurred greater casualties, or which side held the field. Of course, these are arbitrary. Now, I define victory as a tactical engagement that furthers the strategic goal. On this score, Chancellorsville was not a great victory: Lee merely avoided the defeat that Hooker's maneuvers should have inflicted. This is not to say that Lee's command decisions and tactical handling of his limited assets wasn't brilliant. I believe they were brilliant. But this was not enough. Lee was very justifiably disappointed in Chancellorsville. Lee and Jackson wanted not just to defeat the AoP, but to destroy it as a fighting force. That was why Jackson was taking the risks he was on the evening of May 2nd. He genuinely was trying to organize an attack that would have destroyed Union II, V, XI, and XII Corps. With a river to their backs, this could have been very damaging indeed. It was certainly worth a throw of the dice.

One criticism one does not often read of Lee was the fact that he was fighting at such great odds at Chancellorsville. The great numerical advantage Hooker had was at least partially Lee's fault. Lee had sent Longstreet to southeast Virginia, and had failed to recall him in time to deal with Hooker. Lee was perfectly capable of noticing just how dry the roads were in Spotsylvania County. The fact that Hooker moved around May 1st should have been obvious to Lee, and he should have recalled Longstreet in time to have his forces on hand to meet Hooker. The fact that Lee failed to do so is a pretty sever indictment of Lee's legendary ability to read his opponents' minds.

Also, the location of the battle was poor in some ways. It was unlikely to result in a decisive win either way. Once Lee realized that Hooker had outmaneuvered him (i.e. May 1st), he could have withdrawn south, but he realized that he had a central position between 2 or 3 Union detachments, and decided to use that central position to defeat the Union detachments in detail. But even if he subjected them to a tactical defeat, it was not likely to be decisive. The Union could retreat across the Rappahannock (as in fact, they eventually did). Thus any potential Union defeat would be backstopped. On the other hand, if Lee withdrew to North Anna, he probably would not subsequently be able to maneuver Hooker into a position as bad as the one the AoP held on the evening of May 1st (i.e. Confederates in a central position and Union detachments subject to defeat in detail). North Anna might have been a better defensive position, but may not have offered opportunities for as decisive a victory as Chancellorsville did. That said, engaging in the tactical offense when outnumber 54,000 to 119,000 shows a level of desperation and a willingness to give up on seeking a decisive crushing defeat. The lack of adequate means on hand was Lee’s fault.
Bottom line: a brilliant tactical plan does not equal a brilliant victory if the conditions are right for such a victory.
Respectfully,
John Taylor

Victory, to Lee or Grant or any other general of the WBTS the states ment ocupation of the field, and the other side asking for a ceasation to collect the dead/wounded, thats what comes at the end of the engement and was the acepted means of showing who had won and who had not.

If you then go onto argue that winning is when you advance the strategic goal, youve missed the wood for the trees, the startegic goal is to hold the field and obtain the oposistions request for a ceasfire.

[SpartanGSG]

Hanny,
Belated welcome to the board. To some this is too narrow a view and after extensive discussion, I am pretty confident the last shots on this thread have been fired.
Respectfully,
Spartan

[Hanny]

Originally Posted by SpartanGSG

Hanny,
Belated welcome to the board. To some this is too narrow a view and after extensive discussion, I am pretty confident the last shots on this thread have been fired.
Respectfully,
Spartan

SpartanGSG

Thanks for the welcome.


Since i love a lost cause, lets see if i can breath some new life into it then.... .

It may be a narrow view, but that is because a) thats is the porpose and aim a general of that period fought a tactical engagement and b) the defintion "When a young man, I used to define a victory in term of which side incurred greater casualties, or which side held the field. Of course, these are arbitrary. Now, I define victory as a tactical engagement that furthers the strategic goal." used to argue on.

The startegic goal of the engegement is to hold and occupy the field and require the oponent to ask to collect his dead and wounded, thats how everyone knew who had won and who had not.

What J Taylor misses is that by his own definition he fails to understand the motivation of whatever actions are taken to achieve the aim of the engagment, if lee or anyone else knew he had to fullfill taylors or anyone elses understanding of what you need to do to an oponent to show the outcome of an engement then im sure he would act acordingly, but he and others were working under an understodd means of determination of who had won and who had not, hence those those that dont understand Antietam because lee stays and should/could have been swamped are victims of not comprehended the man in their time and how they fought and determined who had won and who had not, and simply say Lee was lucky/insane to stay and Mc a criminal/coward and so on because they fail to grasp a simple truth, to understahnd the events of the past requires you understand the man/men/event in proper context, and more importantly, J Taylor require ex post facto determination of if the strategic goal is achieved, when Germany invaded the SU in 41 with the strategic aim of destrying the SU forces before they could retire back into central Russia they acheived this in a series of engements, achiving the strategic goal set them, but from Taylors argument, luckly he confines himeself to a single tactical engagement rather than a campaign or war, the real victors of 41 in Russia were not thje Germans who arguable won all the tactical engements and achieved their strategic goal in doing so, but the Russians, because the ultimate aim is to win, and you can only juudge the outcome of events from that light in Taylors anayasis.

So the south lost, hence with hindsight we look at enegagemets to see who won, where the tipping point is and so on. What at the time look like stunning success, because they do not have the luxury of knowing what will occur therafter, become defeats instead. what they at the time understod to be a win or loss acording to the standars of the day, become something else, but only because we know the end result, unlike them.

Another way to look at it then is to the south lost then because it lost all the important tactical engements that really mattered, hence engements are not causes of defeat, but syptoms of defeatt already pre ordained due to imbalnces in human and material resources inherent between the two combatants.

[brigance]

I believe that Chancellorsville is a great victory not based on what actually followed it, but moreso, what COULD have happened if it was not as great a victory as it was. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia took the risks and maneuvers it did because they had to. The moves that Lee and Jackson made on the 1st and 2nd of May were never found in a textbook or were never taught to the generals. In fact, what Lee and Jackson did was ill-advised by the experts of the time. The results were greater than ever before in the war. Hooker executed a move that if performed against any other general would have certainly spelled doom for the South. Lee did lose a great deal of men, Jackson included. Yet without this, Chancellorsville would never have been the victory that it was.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by brigance

Hooker executed a move that if performed against any other general would have certainly spelled doom for the South.

You might also say that "Hooker executed a move that if performed by any other general would have certainly spelled doom for the South."

[brigance]

except by maybe McClellan who would have taken three weeks to execute it!

[samgrant]

Lincoln made a point of telling the general, when you go in, put ALL your troops in (at least he learned something form Antietam). Neverthelesss, Hooker kept almost a third of his troops in reserve at Chancellorsville.

[ole]

Whatever else Chancellorsville was, it was most certainly a classic example of Lee's audacity and generalship. Hooker's move was brilliant but, unfortunately, he winced at the third pitch -- something Lee or Grant wouldn't have done. It was a great victory for Lee.
Ole

[Texas2nd]

In the end this little battle would have made no difference to the war at all - but to loose Jackson - that made all the difference to REL who probably acted out his depression and loathing of war, at Getty'sburg (yep that's what I think REL was unconsciously doing - trying to end the ACW - one way or another).

Gettysburg would have made the difference!

Texas2nd

[ole]

Interesting theory Texas. One could imagine Lee thinking
"dammit! Won another one. Maybe if I invade Pennsylvania." Think I'll duck now. Incoming!
Ole