Was Chancellorsville a Great Victory?

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by ewc

Wars being fought means victories are gained. Both sides, all lose something to some extent. But victories are indeed gained. Why should we lament or be at fault for examining those victories, what they are and what they mean?

I have no problem with that personally. The loss of Gen. Thomas Jackson at Chancellorsville was a far greater blow to the ANV than was obvious at the time. That took much of the value off a Confederate victory claim. Yes, applying some flag of victory or loss is part of our national mentality for some probably good reason. It's just that in the civil war they tended to average out and far too many participants had far too many different reasons for their presence in the conflict. Not a clean contest to say the least.

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by SpartanGSG

Hey Larry, this may be a tired subject for you but heading down from St Louis area soon on biz in the great state of TN. Approx 2.5 days, hopefully 10% biz 90% pleasure. Never been down there, starting from Nashville give this first timer a hint of what he can accomplish in a couple days CW touring. Not afraid to do a little extra driving at $3 a gallon. Respectfully, Spartan

This is the kind of question I love. Maybe I ought to retire and drive a Grayline tour bus? The problem here in Tennessee is that while many armies and events passed through, because of the Union "occupation", preservation of sites and development of interpretative sites has been very slow. Recently opened Ft. Negley near downtown Nashville is a must. This is a large star fort built of stone (rebuilt partly by WPA) by US Army 1862-64 with interpretative signage and walks through the well preserved ruin. Funds have been appropriated for a building but that will take a couple of years. The battle of Nashville is marked in mostly residential neighborhoods only by historic markers. Go to the website of the Battle of Nashville Preservation Society and you can see mapping and photos. BONPS Shy's Hill is being preserved and was the focal point of the actual 2-day battle Dec 16-17 1864. The National Park at Stones River Battlefield is worth a visit in Murfreesboro. They have a website as well. About a 30 minute drive down I-24 from Nashville. That route roughly follows the path of the Nashville-Chattanooga Railroad, a central player in US Army supply 1862-64, the only route for freight from Nashville to Chattanooga. Considerable fighting around this railroad all through the war. Next stop and the most information with live people is the museum at the Carter House in Franklin, about 20 minutes from Nashville. Centroid of the battle of Franklin. Our Winstead Hill is 2 miles south where Hood watched his men get slaughtered. If the budget and butt can stand it, take off for Chattanooga and nearby Chickamauga and Lookout Mountain battlefields. About 2 hours down I-24. Those are the highlights. Bring your tourist dollars. We will make you welcome!

[larry_cockerham]

Pardon, please from our friends in West Tennessee. Ole was on beam with Shiloh. I ommitted because of the location and direction from Nashville being west on I-40 and then south on highway 22. About 2 hr drive one way. A loop through Shiloh can get you to north Mississippi, the Tennessee river and Florence, Alabama scene of much 1864 and earlier action. Probably a separate trip. I tend to jump to the 1863-65 era because of the service times of my ancestors who were here. (2 yanks and a reb).

[richard]

Larry you forgot to tell him that if he heads to Chattanooga, he drives almost through the Hoovers Gap battle field. That is on I 24 at Beach Grove.

[larry_cockerham]

Richard, I don't know Hoover's Gap. Another one to look up. Must have been prior to 1864?

[JohnTaylor]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

Richard, I don't know Hoover's Gap. Another one to look up. Must have been prior to 1864?

1863 Tullahoma Campaign.

[JohnTaylor]

Originally Posted by ewc

Essentially we are arguing a point of semantics as to what constitutes a 'great victory.' I contend it is a matter of how the fight on the field was handled; its' relative merit to the end it served important but secondarily considered. Spartan is running with a 'great victory' as being one which primarily furthers a purpose beyond the fighting on the field. This point can be argued endlessly, with noone being wrong. However one must not focus too narrowly on his definition. I am afraid I cannot accept Matthew's very narrow defintion.

When a young man, I used to define a victory in term of which side incurred greater casualties, or which side held the field. Of course, these are arbitrary. Now, I define victory as a tactical engagement that furthers the strategic goal. On this score, Chancellorsville was not a great victory: Lee merely avoided the defeat that Hooker's maneuvers should have inflicted. This is not to say that Lee's command decisions and tactical handling of his limited assets wasn't brilliant. I believe they were brilliant. But this was not enough. Lee was very justifiably disappointed in Chancellorsville. Lee and Jackson wanted not just to defeat the AoP, but to destroy it as a fighting force. That was why Jackson was taking the risks he was on the evening of May 2nd. He genuinely was trying to organize an attack that would have destroyed Union II, V, XI, and XII Corps. With a river to their backs, this could have been very damaging indeed. It was certainly worth a throw of the dice.

One criticism one does not often read of Lee was the fact that he was fighting at such great odds at Chancellorsville. The great numerical advantage Hooker had was at least partially Lee's fault. Lee had sent Longstreet to southeast Virginia, and had failed to recall him in time to deal with Hooker. Lee was perfectly capable of noticing just how dry the roads were in Spotsylvania County. The fact that Hooker moved around May 1st should have been obvious to Lee, and he should have recalled Longstreet in time to have his forces on hand to meet Hooker. The fact that Lee failed to do so is a pretty sever indictment of Lee's legendary ability to read his opponents' minds.

Also, the location of the battle was poor in some ways. It was unlikely to result in a decisive win either way. Once Lee realized that Hooker had outmaneuvered him (i.e. May 1st), he could have withdrawn south, but he realized that he had a central position between 2 or 3 Union detachments, and decided to use that central position to defeat the Union detachments in detail. But even if he subjected them to a tactical defeat, it was not likely to be decisive. The Union could retreat across the Rappahannock (as in fact, they eventually did). Thus any potential Union defeat would be backstopped. On the other hand, if Lee withdrew to North Anna, he probably would not subsequently be able to maneuver Hooker into a position as bad as the one the AoP held on the evening of May 1st (i.e. Confederates in a central position and Union detachments subject to defeat in detail). North Anna might have been a better defensive position, but may not have offered opportunities for as decisive a victory as Chancellorsville did. That said, engaging in the tactical offense when outnumber 54,000 to 119,000 shows a level of desperation and a willingness to give up on seeking a decisive crushing defeat. The lack of adequate means on hand was Lee’s fault.
Bottom line: a brilliant tactical plan does not equal a brilliant victory if the conditions are right for such a victory.
Respectfully,
John Taylor

[SpartanGSG]

[quote=JohnTaylor]
When a young man, I used to define a victory in term of which side incurred greater casualties, or which side held the field. Of course, these are arbitrary. Now, I define victory as a tactical engagement that furthers the strategic goal. On this score, Chancellorsville was not a great victory: Lee merely avoided the defeat that Hooker's maneuvers should have inflicted. This is not to say that Lee's command decisions and tactical handling of his limited assets wasn't brilliant. I believe they were brilliant. But this was not enough. Lee was very justifiably disappointed in Chancellorsville.

Well presented John and articulately echoes my sentiments that this superbly fought tactical engagement fell short in the strategic sense and I think Lee would not argue with your assessment.
Respectfully,
Spartan

[ole]

Well presented John and articulately echoes my sentiments that this superbly fought tactical engagement fell short in the strategic sense and I think Lee would not argue with your assessment.
Respectfully, Spartan

Echoes, Spartan. Super dittoes, John. Eloquently said and compellingly rational. An amazing demonstration of military skill that was ultimately of little practical avail.
Ole

[JohnTaylor]

Spartan and Ole, thanks for the kind words.
One of Lee's salient characteristics was his ability to divine what his opponents were about to do before they did it, and take appropriate preventative measures.
In early May, this faculty failed Lee. (Others were Gettysburg and the transition from Cold Harbor to Petersburg in June 1864). Lee deserves censure for failing to understand that Hooker was moving and recalling Longstreet in time to participate in the Chancellorsville Campaign. What would have been the outcome of that battle if Longstreet and his two additional divisions had been on hand for the fighting in Spotsylvania County in May of 1863? If they had been there, a decisive Confederate victory might have been possible.
The upshot was that the much reduced (self-reduced?) ranks that did take part had much harder fighting, and with a much diminshed chance of achieving anything decisive.
That said, I have waded the Rappahannock at US Ford, and even if the Union Army had been crushed (a remote possibility), the Union infantry could probably have escaped. Union artillery and wagaons might have been stuck on the south bank, but probably not much of the infantry.
Lee was pretty darn good, but he was not perfect, as this occasion shows.
Respectfully,
John Taylor