Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
Yes Lee was lucky- all commanders need a bit of luck to help things along their way. But Hooker losing his nerve was more a bit of Lee making his own luck than being 'lucky.' All was going swimmingly for Hooker until two things happened. The first was that after all his bluster and arrogance, Hooker was finally at that desperate moment when he meets his great adversary 'eye-to-eye' so to speak. In this 'meeting' the pretender blinked before the grim, hard faced, brilliant, and renowned Lee. And thus Hooker hesitated, hesitating meant thinking, thinking meant doubt. The other thing is that Lee reacted unexpectedly- not only did he not flee before Hooker's might and brilliant flank movement, he moved immediately to confront Hooker on terrain, the Wilderness, favorable to the Rebels. And so seizing the initiative, he never allowed it to pass from his hands and kept the Union reeling. But again I feel it is more a matter of creating one's luck and then using what fortune comes one's way to benefit.
Where luck does come into play for Lee is that Hooker against his generals' advice removed the army from an impregnable position before he could be assailed by Lee, an attack likely to cost Lee dearly and for no gain. But again, this incident can as well come under the heading of Lee's complete domination in moral courage over his adversary.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Well again, I think you would have to look hard and long to find an argument against it being anything short of an impressive tactical victory but was it GREAT in the strategic sense? Beyond it being yet another well executed punishing defense against another of a string of poorly executed Federal offensives preceeding it, what was gained strategically to achieve ultimate goals? It bought more time surely, but to what end. For all it's notoriety as a Confederate victory, it did not seriously damage the AOtP, it did not bring the Europeans into the CSA camp. Heck, I would argue that the repulse of BAnks and Steele associated with the failed Red River campaign in spring of 1864 did as much to blunt Federal initiatives in the Trans-Miss and the deep south which was more a key to the CSA's survival than the stalemated line of the Rapidan.
Spartan, I understand what you're saying that the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville, though 'impressive' to use your bit of understatement only served to fend off the inevitable. But can that really take away from the magnitude of what Lee and what he had available of his army acheived on the field? True, things stayed much as they were before the battle occurred, the odds and the political and strategic situation facing the Confederacy were relatively unchanged. But these are factors beyond the amazing victory acheived on the field. By your reckoning, Antietam was a greater victory for how it influenced the war and the political situation and how the war would be fought. And Antietam was a poorly fought battle by the victor, McClellan. What you bring up are elements beyond the control of the commanding general. Lee and the Confederacy were always going to be behind the 8-Ball, and he and President Davis were perspicacious enough to realize it. European recognition was a will o the wisp from the get-go. What really mattered throughout was the will of the North to prosecute the War. Every Confederate victory mattered in this regard. In what dire straits would the Confederacy have been if Hooker had succeeding in this masterful plan of his? Without question the Confederates are in a very bad way. regards, ed
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
Spartan, I understand what you're saying that the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville, though 'impressive' to use your bit of understatement only served to fend off the inevitable. But can that really take away from the magnitude of what Lee and what he had available of his army acheived on the field? True, things stayed much as they were before the battle occurred, the odds and the political and strategic situation facing the Confederacy were relatively unchanged. But these are factors beyond the amazing victory acheived on the field. By your reckoning, Antietam was a greater victory for how it influenced the war and the political situation and how the war would be fought. And Antietam was a poorly fought battle by the victor, McClellan. What you bring up are elements beyond the control of the commanding general. Lee and the Confederacy were always going to be behind the 8-Ball, and he and President Davis were perspicacious enough to realize it. European recognition was a will o the wisp from the get-go. What really mattered throughout was the will of the North to prosecute the War. Every Confederate victory mattered in this regard. In what dire straits would the Confederacy have been if Hooker had succeeding in this masterful plan of his? Without question the Confederates are in a very bad way. regards, ed
Perhaps we are guilty of excessive "deep thinking" in pondering this simple question posed earlier by Whitworth. I take nothing away from the what t Lee tacticallly achieved on the field and yes, it was one impressive piece of leadership in the heat of battle however understated that may sound. In attempting to answer the question of the degree of greatness of a victory I tend to look at victory also in the strategic sense, and in this view I maintain when all the above is considered it was strategically a minimal success sir. The knockout punch WAS in Lee's control and this was not achieved which in my mind marginalizes to various degrees the immediate tactical benefit gained. As you cited Antietam. I would offer that the situation was reversed in that Little Mac failed miserably in taking strategic advantage of tactical gain in blunting Lee's Maryland campaign on that field of honor. In this case however, a case for a tactical victory by the Federals was anything but cut and dried, so no I do not view Antietam in the capacity you reckon I do. Respectfully, Spartan
Has anyone read Stephen Sears' book on Chancellorsville? I haven't and wonder if anyone could recommend it.
The definition for "great victory" seems to be, "one that wins the entire war." a Waterloo. By that criteria, the South won no "great victories" because they ultimately lost the war.
What interesting on the Union side is that the AoP did not consider itself whipped, as it had at Fredericksburg or Bull Run. The army was capable of continuing the fight, it was the high command that was "used up." If the errant shell had killed or wounded Hooker enough to put him out of the fight, a hard charging 2nd in command, like Meade or Couch could have pulled something out of the fire.
Has anyone read Stephen Sears' book on Chancellorsville? I haven't and wonder if anyone could recommend it.
The definition for "great victory" seems to be, "one that wins the entire war." a Waterloo. By that criteria, the South won no "great victories" because they ultimately lost the war.
What interesting on the Union side is that the AoP did not consider itself whipped, as it had at Fredericksburg or Bull Run. The army was capable of continuing the fight, it was the high command that was "used up." If the errant shell had killed or wounded Hooker enough to put him out of the fight, a hard charging 2nd in command, like Meade or Couch could have pulled something out of the fire.
Well MAtthew, that makes even my strategic view of what constitutes a great victory look narowly focused LOL. But you are correct, ask Meade, Couch, Hancock and the gang at corps level and those at division level of command if they felt whipped at Chancellorsville. Respectfully, Spartan
Yes... it would of been interesting if Meade was in command but I don't think he could have pulled off a victory for the North. Now here's a great "What if"........How about Grant @Chancellorsville? hmmmmmmmmm.
Good question. I don't think Meade would have pulled off an outright victory, but possibly the Union rout that occurred would not have been such a panic. Maybe it wouldn't have happened at all. If Grant was in command, the battle possibly would have turned into brutal, costly slug-fest with the end result being a draw, or possibly a narrow Union victory. The terrain was much different than at Gettysburg, and Lees tactics were, of course, much different. I don't know but I can't see an easy Union victory under either Meade or Grant.
Just me opining.
Terry
__________________ "In this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realized by every one." Abraham Lincoln - August 18, 1864 Speech to the 164th Ohio Regiment
Good question. I don't think Meade would have pulled off an outright victory, but possibly the Union rout that occurred would not have been such a panic. Maybe it wouldn't have happened at all. If Grant was in command, the battle possibly would have turned into brutal, costly slug-fest with the end result being a draw, or possibly a narrow Union victory. The terrain was much different than at Gettysburg, and Lees tactics were, of course, much different. I don't know but I can't see an easy Union victory under either Meade or Grant.
Just me opining.
Terry
Meade very likely could not have pulled a victory out of the jaws of defeat but seems to me a tactical draw could have been pulled out of the hat. This was not the George Gordon Meade who was so easily ready to retire to the Pipe Creek Line the the months ahead. He and Couch were among those very vocal and critical desenters against Hooker pulling back over the Rappahannock. The force under his command was by and large not engaged and fresh and like Couch was fully expecting to and ready to counterattack. The Federals had more than enough IMHO to reform and punch back, no doubt the end result being a costly slugfest ending with two angry boxers staring each other down as was the case in this same Wilderness a year later.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
