Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
I saw a most interesting presentation on our local public tv station this weekend from John Siegenthaller's War on Words, in which the author of a new book Lost Triumph or something close to that, claims that Custer's charge at Gettysburg southeast of Culp's Hill was the reason for JEB Stuart not being able to complete his appointed mission, namely to close the pincher move opposite the ill-fated Pickett's charge. This was / is an obvious attempt to give Lee credit for some planning beyond the executed records of the battle. Has anyone read this book?
I haven't read the book. This argument has been around for 100 years or so, particularly from Custer supporters. No one has any definite knowledge of what Lee and Stuart were trying to do here, because neither one ever gave much detail about it.
Some things are clear, though. Stuart does not have the strength to do anything on his own, unless he wants to go on a raid into the Union rear like Wheeler before Murfreesboro six months earlier. If successful, he might have burned a lot of wagons and caused an uproar, but not much more (that's what Wheeler's raid did as well). Given the condition of his horses and men as well as the opposition he would face, success would not be likely.
It is also clear that there was far too much Union firepower on and behind Culps Hill for any Stuart move directly on the rear of Cemetery Hill to be successful. Even if you postulate a rout of the Union cavalry on the East Cavalry Field, Stuart would be blown away by the artillery and infantry if he tried this.
What that leaves is a blow against a retreating AoP trying to evacuate via the Baltimore Pike. That assumes Pickett's Charge is a huge success, breaking the Union center. It probably assumes Lee has then thrown in every last man (waving them forward a la Wellington at Waterloo at the crucial moment) in a do-or-die effort to destroy the AoP and that the AoP is in full retreat. If this happened, Stuart would be in absolutely perfect position for the classical cavalry task of pursuing/breaking up a routing/fleeing AoP amidst the chaos.
That fits with the little we know about what Stuart intended, and the accounts of his passive/aggressive actions. It is also assigning Stuart to a task that is completely secondary to the main effort. If Pickett fails, Stuart might as well break off the action and pull back, because nothing he accomplishes will be worth the losses incurred.
Seems to me the essential factor in this scenario was timing. It just didn't work out.
In many ways, that is true. Stuart's actions will all be dependent upon the actions of others, and his sense of timing on when to commit his effort would be very important.
But I don't think it is true in the sense that Stuart had to synchronize his effort with Pickett's Charge. He needed to be out to the East, close enough to act, if and when Pickett's Charge succeeded. Until and unless that happens, there just isn't much Stuart can do. Acting before that would be foolish unless Stuart discovered the Union flank to be wide open.
In preparation for that event, it would be great if he could kick some Union cavalry tail to clear the field and put himself in a better position to act after the Union broke. I think this is what he was hoping for when he brought the engagement on. If he can do this (drive them off in substantial disarray), he will no longer have to fight the Union cavalry to get at the fleeing Union troops he will hopefully see coming down the Baltimore Pike.
That is what I think was going on out on the East Cavalry Field. Stuart was hoping to lure a segment of the Union cavalry in, pounce on it, smash it, and make his later task easier. That would be very good tactics if he could make it work.
But of course, that didn't happen. Stuart's move caused Custer to be retained on the East flank, and Gregg was able to use that to fight Stuart to a standstill while still keeping a force available to counter any further moves. Stuart, looking for a nice little engagement that would be over quickly, saw his troops sucked into a fierce fight that seemed to have no conclusion -- exactly what Stuart, like any cavalryman acting offensively, would have wanted to avoid. At the end, even if Pickett had smashed the Union center Stuart still would have faced Gregg in a bitter covering action to protect the Union retreat.
The key for Stuart would be to never let that squable with Custer drag on so long. Either it never should have started in the first place or the Confederates needed to smash him quickly. In that sense, Gregg/Custer definitely came out better here, since a standoff for them as a flank guard was effectively a "mission accomplished".
Seems to me the essential factor in this scenario was timing. It just didn't work out.
Another way of looking at this is that Stuart was in perfect position to prove Lee a genius *IF* Pickett's Charge had somehow worked.
Assuming that had happened and Lee had managed to follow up with a second wave, the AoP is in a trap. Retreat will be horrible as the Confederates surge over the high ground. The only roads available: Baltimore Pike and the Tarrytown Road.
The Tarrytown Road is horribly placed for the retreat. It runs directly South, way too close to Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops. As a result, the troops along those positions must hold out to allow forces north of them to withdraw -- and if Pickett has just broken through at the copse of trees, the forces north of him and around Culps Hill are being surrounded. If Lee can feed troops in to widen the penetration and attack south astride Cemetery Ridge, they will sweep it down to the Little Round Top area, leaving Tarrytown Road impossible for those men.
If Lee/Pickett can drive straight across, he will be isolating everyone on Cemetery Hill/Culp's Hill. The only chance for these troops would then be to retreat out the Baltimore Pike, with a "forlorn hope" of a rear guard dying in place to keep the way open.
If the Confederates can get their own guns forward -- or bring captured Union guns into play -- the milling mass of retreating Yankees will be an unmissable target. They'd be telling tales about it like the ones of French guns shelling the retreating Russians on the frozen lake at Austerlitz in 1805.
If any/all of that happens, Stuart is in the sort of position professional cavalrymen dream about their entire careers. He would be on the flank and rear of a confused, panic-stricken retreating column under severe pressure from the advancing Confederate infantry. Gregg/Custer would be forced to sacrifice themselves to keep Stuart away from the Baltimore Pike, jammed with wagons, ambulances, and broken men running for their lives.
If you can picture Chickamauga in more open country, with Stuart or Forrest and a few thousand cavalry in the Union right rear as Longstreet smashes through on the second day, you'd have something close to the mess this scenario is for Meade and the AoP at Gettysburg on the third day.
That is what I think Lee's vision was when he ordered all this. It is, of course, all based on smashing the Union center and driving them before the ANV infantry. We know that didn't happen and in hindsight Lee's decision seems inexplicable, his plan unworkable. But we also know Lee seemed to believe the AoP was not yet all up, thought they were hurt worse than they were, and thought his own force less savagely mauled on days 1 and 2 than it was.
If you think of Lee's ANV as a bit less hurt, of the VI Corps and maybe a cavalry division and some other troops as not yet up, Lee's attack looks less foolish. The payoff, as noted above, might be the absolute destruction of half the AoP. It would have more than offset the loss of Vicksburg, and maybe even brought an end to the war.
As history showed us, Pickett's Charge was a disaster, just as Longstreet feared. There really was no viable chance of success -- except the one that strong and valiant men always have in battle. I just think if you approach this believing what Lee seems to have believed, the odds don't look impossible, merely daunting -- and Lee believed his men could do just about anything.
I think the outline of what he intended for Stuart is clear enough. It would be thought of as brilliant military art if somehow the Union center cracked. Since it didn't crack, Stuart's whole mission appears useless.
None of that is particularly original to me. I might be able to see what might have happened if things had been gone differently in a fantasy scenario, but I sure can't see how to make Pickett's Charge work. It's a lot like one of those recipes for bear stew: first, kill the bear ...
It's a lot like one of those recipes for bear stew: first, kill the bear ...
Your observation makes a lot of sense, Tim, until you factor in the AoP. Splitting it roughly into halves with a successful 3rd-day charge would leave half on one side of your assaulting force and another half on the other side. Your scenario has the Yanks trapped on one side and running for their lives on the other -- and being cut to pieces by Stuart.
Expecting troops who had just quickly advanced for a mile under a hail of expertly directed fire to drive their opponents into panicked flight is a bit far fetched. Oh yes, there was Ewell up there and AP hill over there to help out if the PPT had worked but, realistically, they were incapable of pressing an advantage as fleeting as the one hoped for.
Not quarrelling; just quibbling to help a good thread keep going.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Your observation makes a lot of sense, Tim, until you factor in the AoP. Splitting it roughly into halves with a successful 3rd-day charge would leave half on one side of your assaulting force and another half on the other side. Your scenario has the Yanks trapped on one side and running for their lives on the other -- and being cut to pieces by Stuart.
Expecting troops who had just quickly advanced for a mile under a hail of expertly directed fire to drive their opponents into panicked flight is a bit far fetched. Oh yes, there was Ewell up there and AP hill over there to help out if the PPT had worked but, realistically, they were incapable of pressing an advantage as fleeting as the one hoped for.
Not quarrelling; just quibbling to help a good thread keep going.
Ole
Oh, I haven't a clue about how to make it work. I believe it is just about the only reasoning that explains what Lee was thinking when he insisted on making the attack.
So if you put yourself in Lee's shoes and think: "They can't all be up yet" and "We've pounded them real good the last two days" and 'My men can do anything", what do you end up with? Maybe a belief that the guys on the other side of the valley just need a good punch to cave them in.
Figure no VI Corps present (Lee had to know he'd been fighting I and XI Corps on Day 1; II, III and V on Day 2. May or may not have known about XII Corps on Day 2. May have thought the slow-moving AoP had left a lot of stragglers behind moving this fast. May have thought they could not get their ammo train up and all their artillery if they moved that fast. Might have figured only 2 of their 3 cavalry divisions were up, with the other off guarding the LOC.
Over-estimate Union losses a bit, subtract VI Corps and lots of stragglers. Maybe Lee thinks that line over the other side is really a hollow shell. Puncture it and it will collapse, the AoP running like XI Corps had done twice in the last 2 months.
If by some chance all that is right, Lee's attack isn't so silly at all. Risky, yes -- darn risky. But he massed the greatest artillery barrage anyone in America had seen to support it, and the original plan had greater support from Ewell. I picture Lee thinking "Dagnabit, they are ready to collapse, we have to hit them!" while Longstreet and the rest are seeing the carnage and trying to say no without really telling him how bad they've been hurt and how strong the Union position is.
His vision was wrong, of course. The whole AoP was up, with plenty of ammo and all their artillery. His own force was bled a bit too much, and the artillery barrage was not good enough. But if somehow he'd been right, Stuart was in exactly the right position. (Of course, if Meade had been that badly off, I don't think he would have been still at Gettysburg.
All of this also seems to imply that Lee was going to commit the entire army if Pickett did succeed. Like Wellington at Waterloo when the Old Guard was repulsed, simply order them all in and ride forward waving them on. It would have been The Moment. Win and the AoP is shattered. Lose and the ANV is shattered. Very, very few commanders ever face that decision. Most will draw back from it when they do. Lee, I think, was willing to accept the gamble if he thought victory was there to be grasped.
BTW, the AoT almost accomplished this at Franklin. There is a moment near the Carter house in the first rush -- no more than 10 minutes, maybe less than 5 -- where the Union line might have splintered and shattered, the Rebels taking the bridges and rolling up the lines, destroying Schofield's army. But a Union brigade counterattacked instead of routing or falling back, apparently one of those the-men-did-it-themselves events, and the Rebels were thrown out in savage fighting. The AoT disaster followed.
All of this also seems to imply that Lee was going to commit the entire army if Pickett did succeed. Like Wellington at Waterloo when the Old Guard was repulsed, simply order them all in and ride forward waving them on. It would have been The Moment. Win and the AoP is shattered. Lose and the ANV is shattered. Very, very few commanders ever face that decision. Most will draw back from it when they do. Lee, I think, was willing to accept the gamble if he thought victory was there to be grasped.
I could accept this, IF Lee had actually done anything to prepare the remainder of his army to back up Pickett. There is 'some' evidence that Lee 'intended' a 2nd wave to follow Pickett if there was some sucess, but nothing was actually put together.
If Pickett had broken the line, its likely he would have needed help, and lots of it, in pushing the issue, as he would have been pretty well used up by the time he broke the line. The way it was, it would have taken time to set up and catch up to Pickett, and its possible that, by then, the Union Army could have reqrouped, and maybe even pushed back Pickett, even if a Corp short.
Just a tiny thought.
Chuck
I have never been understand what Lee was thinking, surely he must have remembered what happened to those masses of attacking troops at Fredricksburg. Longstreet was right...
Lee had no real reserve to exploit a succesful attack, no manuver force ready to support that assault.
The AoP had a history of breaking: Chancelorsville, Gettysburg 1st day collapse to name just two that had to be recent in the mind of Lee. Yet he also had to be quite aware that both of those examples came because of attacks from unexpected quarters that panicked large numbers of Union troops in a domino effect. Longstreets Grand Assault covered a distance of was over a mile before it came into contact w/ the Union lines. At the very best we are talking 15 minutes time... ampl time to position Infantry & Arty reserves for a 2nd line or a counter attack and as actaul events proved the attack was clobbered.
Could it have suceeded? I think so... a year earlier against a different AoP under a more easily rattled General than Meade.
There was a reason the men on that wall were chanting "Fredricksburg, Fredricksburg!" They knew what was happening. 13,000 odd men started on that assualt, how many breached that wall? IIRC less than 500.
If Meade had a Reserve he was willing utilize he might have followed across that same field... but there were how many CS guns sitting there waiting loaded w/ Canister backed up by some of the toughest Infantry in the world... they may have been bloodied but they were a far cry from broken. I believe Meade understood that; Lee failed to. But note a very important thing: Lee never made that mistake again. In fact I don't believe he ever even contemplated an attack on that scale again.
It's a pity Hood failed to learn from the mistakes of not only his enemies but his commander.
__________________
Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
On the note of Custer, I don't believe anyone ever questioned his courage... was he a little nuts & all prima dona? Absolutely. I wonder what he might have turned out like if he had been given command of western troops against a man like Forrest from the start... might it have humbled him a bit?
__________________
Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
I could accept this, IF Lee had actually done anything to prepare the remainder of his army to back up Pickett. There is 'some' evidence that Lee 'intended' a 2nd wave to follow Pickett if there was some sucess, but nothing was actually put together.
If Pickett had broken the line, its likely he would have needed help, and lots of it, in pushing the issue, as he would have been pretty well used up by the time he broke the line. The way it was, it would have taken time to set up and catch up to Pickett, and its possible that, by then, the Union Army could have reqrouped, and maybe even pushed back Pickett, even if a Corp short.
Just a tiny thought.
Chuck
I agree with that as well. If this is going to work, there would ideally be another division stepping off just about the time Picket was reaching the Union line, with a few batteries moving up to support the attack. The rest of the line, from Ewell's left to Longstreet's right, should have shown signs they had been alerted to attack if this succeeded. They don't.
Now Lee was not one to issue detailed orders for such, particularly in mid-1863 when he was used to the Jackson-Longstreet-Stuart command team functioning smoothly and taking care of all this for him. But Longstreet is in charge of this attack, and we see no sign of the traditional preparation from him -- certainly nothing like the assault he launched two months later at Chickamauga. That might be because Longstreet learned a lesson here, or because there really wasn't an uncommitted reserve to use, or because Longstreet didn't really believe in Pickett's Charge.
That's why I think Lee would simply have ordered everyone in if Pickett broke the Union center. Send couriers left and right, telling everyone to attack, ride the line himself to encourage the men. Not very detailed or pre-planned, more like a god of battle riding through the chaos of war, throwing his men at the enemy wherever he found them.
This is all fantasy, of course. We know Lee was wrong in his calculations. The AoP was all up, with their ammo trains and reserve artillery. His own troops were hurt worse than he knew (particularly Heth and Pender). The parts of I and XI and III Corps still on the field weren't about to run, they would fight hard.
I see this only as an attempt to figure out what Lee was thinking when he made the assault. If it somehow works, the AoP will be slaughtered and largely finished as an effective force. Overestimating his own side, underestimating the enemy, probably frustrated by the balky performance of Hill/Ewell/Early and even Stuart, maybe ill and fighting to stay active and in command of himself, knowing the Confederacy needed a big victory -- I think that is how Lee got into this place and made this bad decision.
To put this in perspective:
Robert E. Lee was clearly one of the great American battlefield commanders, a soldier to be admired. However, there are others he shares the stage with, from George washington to Winfield Scott to Grant/Sherman/Sheridan to Pershing and MacArthur and Patton.
If he had somehow pulled off what I have been describing here -- if he had been right about the AoP, or just incredibly lucky -- Lee would stand alone atop the American military pantheon.
He would be considered one of the greatest battlefield leaders of all time, a Great Captain on the list with Alexander the Great, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Virtually no one after the time of Waterloo in 1815 could be mentioned in the same breath with him until you come to World War II. In that period of more than a century, probably only Helmuth von Moltke could have stood in the circle with him. Hindenburg/Ludendorf and Allenby in WWI might have had a shot. Soldiers would have bowed down in awe at the combined brilliance of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.
That is the magnitude of the change I am pointing to here. I think it impossible -- but I also think the victories some great soldiers have pulled off should have been impossible as well. I just think this is the only way to understand what Lee was doing here within my limits.
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