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Originally Posted by ole Custer never did prove that he was anything more than a loose cannon to be released when the division or corps commander felt the need of a smashing blow. But in that slashing, smashing, hell-for-leather operation, he was rarely equalled. He was very useful at brigade command -- a classic example of avoiding the Peter principle.
Ole |
Cant say I see where being categorized as a loose cannon argues for or against Custers competency under the scenarios discussed. When one views the war time contributions of Ashby, Forrest, Mosby, Buford, Custer, Pleasanton, etc, can't one within the context of traditional army
theory and practice view them all to various extents as "loose cannons"? Heck in many ways thats what made them audacious and thus very effective at times. It is also at times what made them impediments to the greater success of the armies they were attached to, such as the more publicized Stuart foray around the Union army at Gettysburg. Nbforrest makes very fcompetent arguments for Custer's rapid development in the Federal cavalry arm, I was merely responding to the what if posed earlier about Custer's defense of Gettysburg at that stage of his development in July of 1863.
I would pose the question when it came time to discussing Custer's overall fitness for high command later in his career, if my fellow posters believe he had a handle on both the strategic and tactical situation at Little Big Horn?