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Civil War History - The Eastern Theater Discuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.

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  #1  
Old 11-10-2005, 05:56 PM
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Default AOP at Petersburg

What was wrong with the AOP at Petersburg?

There's some obvious answers I think...exhaustion, leadership corps temporarily gutted, large numbers of recruits to replace huge losses, etc.

Think of all the embarrasing defeats the AOP experienced at Petersburg...there was clearly some morale or cohesion problem here. Apparantly the problem got solved by the time of the 65 campaign though.

Respectfully
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  #2  
Old 11-15-2005, 08:25 AM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by nbforrest
What was wrong with the AOP at Petersburg?

There's some obvious answers I think...exhaustion, leadership corps temporarily gutted, large numbers of recruits to replace huge losses, etc.

Think of all the embarrasing defeats the AOP experienced at Petersburg...there was clearly some morale or cohesion problem here. Apparantly the problem got solved by the time of the 65 campaign though.

Respectfully
I think all of those come into play, but especially the large number of replacements had to be factor. Remember, the Union usually raised brand new regiments instead of adding to existing ones like the Confederates did. This led to a period of time where the new troops had to be trained and had to experience combat for the first time. The new Confederates simply learned from the men to their left and right. Another possibility is the existence of the Confederate Sharpshooter battalions. Each brigade took its best and brighest and created a sharpshooter battalion, which tended to lead the way in attacks. Also, the presence of Gen. William Mahone seemed to make a huge difference. He was very familiar with the area, and troops under his command did some of the worst damamge in terms of inflicting casualties on the Union forces.
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  #3  
Old 11-15-2005, 03:00 PM
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Those are all good points; to play off the Mahone comment a bit...Mahone really did come into his own, which is interesting since he was a rather mediocre brigade commander, but excelled as a division commander. Certainly his knowledge of the Petersburg area helped...Jerusalem Plank Road really comes to mind. (Wasn't he an engineer or something in Petersburg before the war?)

Further, I think the ANV had a steady officer corps that gets overlooked. A new cadre certainly emerged in 64, thanks largely to the bloody Overland campaign. Overall, the ANV officer corps was very steady and underrated.
The AOP, for whatever reasons, seemed to take a bit to "refurbish" their officer corps. By 65 I think the officer corps was very talented, but there was some lag time there.

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  #4  
Old 11-20-2005, 03:58 PM
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A lot of replacement troops for one thing. Poor leadership (Butler's failure to capture Petersburg, Burnsides' failure at the Crater, Warren's sluggishness) is another.
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  #5  
Old 11-20-2005, 05:17 PM
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Yeah, the Union replacement policy wasn't so good. The hard fighting units just weren't the same.



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  #6  
Old 11-20-2005, 11:41 PM
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NBForrest,

I agree, the Union replacement policy was deficient to say the least. The Confederates also drew the men from the same area as the original unit, no?
respectfully,
Matt
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  #7  
Old 11-21-2005, 11:33 AM
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Grant's whole Overland campaign was a business of driving on defensvie positions and his maneuverings were attempts to bypass and fight the Rebs outside of prepared defensive positions. It is a great credit to Lee and his army to manage to keep just enough ahead of the Army of the Potomac to get into or throw up earthworks, sometimes by the barest. That said, one must remember that weaponry had made this a war of the defensive, and troops on the offensive were at the disadvantage, almost ruinously when facing prepared works. By the time the Armies of the Potomac and the James had crossed to the south side of the James River and advanced on Petersburg, they were not in the free and clear, but still to face the massive Petersburg forts and works built by the Confederates over the course of the war. These Union men had seen enough of what the Reb army could do if given half a moment- and here where these gigantic works...

This is not to say that the points brought forward in this thread are mitigated, only to bring them together with this angle. By all means the works at Petersburg should have been taken immediately upon coming upon them, just that the very nature of the works themselves combined with the fatigue, loss, and experience of the army compelled a fateful hesitation. Once this chance was lost, Grant realized he could do no more for the time by maneuver and settled down to seige, which was of course, a winning strategy, as General Lee well knew.
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  #8  
Old 11-21-2005, 03:26 PM
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Ewc,
What caused Grant to take the James river-City Point route south? Since his maneuvers required him to ultimately cut the railroads, wouldnt the western and southern sides of the city be of greater military value since the aim was to keep Lee and Johnston separated? If sheridan was instantly sent after Cold harbor to destroy the valley, that would allow Grant to use the Orange and Alexandria and Southside railroad via O&A connection at Lynchburg for supply. Your thoughts?
respectfully,
Matt
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  #9  
Old 11-21-2005, 03:45 PM
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Quote:
Originally Posted by ewc
Grant's whole Overland campaign was a business of driving on defensvie positions and his maneuverings were attempts to bypass and fight the Rebs outside of prepared defensive positions. It is a great credit to Lee and his army to manage to keep just enough ahead of the Army of the Potomac to get into or throw up earthworks, sometimes by the barest. That said, one must remember that weaponry had made this a war of the defensive, and troops on the offensive were at the disadvantage, almost ruinously when facing prepared works. By the time the Armies of the Potomac and the James had crossed to the south side of the James River and advanced on Petersburg, they were not in the free and clear, but still to face the massive Petersburg forts and works built by the Confederates over the course of the war. These Union men had seen enough of what the Reb army could do if given half a moment- and here where these gigantic works...

This is not to say that the points brought forward in this thread are mitigated, only to bring them together with this angle. By all means the works at Petersburg should have been taken immediately upon coming upon them, just that the very nature of the works themselves combined with the fatigue, loss, and experience of the army compelled a fateful hesitation. Once this chance was lost, Grant realized he could do no more for the time by maneuver and settled down to seige, which was of course, a winning strategy, as General Lee well knew.
Regarding the fiascos the AOP experienced at Petersburg, the ones I'm curious about is when they were on the defensive. The battles I have mentioned are all examples of that...the Union forces being on the defensive and suffering humiliating defeats...often while they had a numerical advantage.

To digress a bit, I am beginning to seriously doubt Grant's "right-left" strategy. It seems to me he could have severed the RR's with a break ****her south...something it took him a while to do. Reams Station, etc. was pretty far south...but he just had his men sit there. A RR-busting expedition seems like it should have been agressively pursued either. I think Grant was hamstrung by holding the breakthrough of the Confederate lines as an opportunistic objective...this bound him to the Confederate lines and unfocused on breaking the RR...should have been two seperate tasks.

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  #10  
Old 12-05-2005, 09:14 AM
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nbforrest,

I forgot to mention that I'm doing an extensive OOB for the nine offensives of the Petersburg Campaign. It is located at my Petersburg Campaign Project page for you and anyone else who is interested.
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