Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
NB- very perceptive as always. I must say though that I believe you are a bit hard on Grant. I think he did as well as anyone could have hoped, certainly Lincoln felt that, and his hopes were very high. Remember that Grant came into a situation not of his making and had to do the best he could with it, and against ol Bobby Lee and a desperate foe no less. That he (Grant) got the Army of the Potomac moving, clanging and hissing so to speak as opposed to hitting on all cylinders, still he got its mass and might inexorably moving, and with that, strikes one and two against the mighty Lee. That Lee kept fouling off pitches after that with the threat of a dangerous rip to the gap does not diminsh what Grant had done. And both he and Lee knew it meant Lee was in a bad way.
To me, Grant exhibits sterling qualities of generalship in this Overland Campaign, the crossing of the James as you have noted is a crowning point, but also that move around the left after the mauling at the Wilderness, the continuing of the bulldog tactics- even to have and keep up the bulldog tactics, means his mind was, as you say, able to see the bigger picture, and make and adapt plans to meet and sustain it. These are qualities that had been seriously lacking in other commanders, especially those in the East. Look at the problems Grant had with Eastern commanders not under his immediate purview- Buler and his James boys down below Richmond, and Sigel and Hunter out in the Valley- flat, miserable failures. The Valley fiasco wasn't amended until he sent his own man, Sheridan, out there. And do what he might with Butler, you can cover a turd in gold and gems all you want, but it's still a turd, so with Butler. Grant found out, and very sagely adjusted to the fact that this particular turd was unflushable just now.
What's more, Grant's overall strategy at Petersburg as to the siege was sound, his overall picture clear. Keep the pressure on Lee, don't give him room to move, wear him down, entrench and rest his own army, extend the flanks, and keep wary of a possible move by Lee, and watch for Sherman. This is a winning strategy, and Grant had it with foresight as we do with hindsight. I will give the man great credit for that.
What's more, Lee knew it too. I have no doubt whatsoever that Lee knew if he could not turn the Army of the Potomac back once it crossed the Rapidan, all bets were off. I give Lee credit too for doing the best he could with what he had on hand. After the Rapidan crossing and the Federals secure on the Southern side, it was a question of only what the North would do- that meant he and the South must hold on with all their might till come what may. And so they did. That hard core element in Lee's army and that which remained throughout the South, I don't know so much that they believed that they would win by the fall and winter of '64/'65, but that they would not give up the fight till the heavens fall. And so they did.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
My view of Grant is a bit paradoxical. I do tend to criticize his tactical abilities (in VA at least) but at the same time I believe he was the right man for the job. I don't think he really showed great tactical skill during the Overland or Petersburg campaigns. Of course there are exceptions, and I always make sure to give Grant his due credit for the crossing of the James. But I just don't think that Grant tactics were superior to Lee's. During his time out west Grant was able to act quickly and successfully. His Vicksburg campaign was everything the Overland campaign was not. But one must remember that Grant was facing the likes of Pillow, Floyd, and Pemberton out west. I think that Grant had the skills to defeat those fellows, but not Lee. Also Grant was hindered, I think, by the AOP itself. The AOP didn't exactly have a reputation for being fast moving and hard hitting. Add to that some rather mediocre corps commanders and a fairly mediocre army commander and Grant had a mess on his hands. Certainly the added responsibilites of commanding all of the Northern armies also took a great deal of Grant's effort. Yet, it still remains that Grant's tactics in VA didn't really work. He had the winning strategy, which he should be commended for, but I don't think he had the tactical finesse to close the deal. I consider Lee perhaps the greatest general to emerge from the war, so I can still be sympathetic towards Grant since he was facing the master general, as it were. But in the end Grant remains open to criticism for his tactics, at least in my mind. His control, or lack thereof, of the Petersburg operations really raise some questions in my mind that are not very positive for Grant.
Respectfully
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
Excellent points and well expressed, NB. It may be as you say, i just don't see it quite so regarding Grant. As you point out, he wasn't working with his faithful old Army of the Tenessee, nor with his tried and true subordinate commanders. And he also had the Washington establishment too close and itchy fingered and persnicaty for comfort to worry about, even with all the help Lincoln could give him. Granted, some of his head on tactics were not winners, but he had to do something about the ANV constantly getting in his way. What's more, he did not persist in the tactic at a point once it was shown to be ineffective. At Petersburg, the Army of the Potomac had been battered down. I say that is by Lee's doing more so than Grant's failure at tactics. Ans as to having to take on Lee, that was the great bugaboo in the East. Grant used what the Army of the Potomac supplied, and that is might, to grapple Lee's bear. It seems to me that that is how best and perhaps only how this particular bear was going to be vanquished.
Did Grant not perform as well on the tactical level as previously? That may be. I think it comes down to that you would not call it great, whereas I still would. As to Grant's tactics being open to criticism, I concede the point, with the qualifier that all commanders are. To me, what I find most important is that Grant put the War in the East in winnable terms, and proceeded to do it. And I am rather certain you will agree with me on that. regards, ed
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I appreciate the discussion and I do certainly agree with the statement that Grant made the war in the East winnable. The monkey wrench thrown into any analysis of Grant, or any general, is the usage of words like "great". When on the one hand I credit Grant with using war winning strategies but then criticize his tactical skills, I am personally not even sure what sort of words I should describe Grant with.
It seems to me that Grant wasn't able to exercise a lot of control over the AOP, due to the factors mentioned earlier, and others I am sure. That's probably what makes me criticize his tactical skills the most. He could develop some fine plans but often was unable to react to the changing situation. Once the ball got rolling, his creativity seemed to stall sometimes. For example, some of the smaller assaults he ordered at Spotsylvania just baffle me. What on earth good could they have done, dashing a division or so against the Confederate lines?
Respectfully
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
The monkey wrench thrown into any analysis of Grant, or any general, is the usage of words like "great".
Heartily agree, NB. "Great" is lavished far too carelessly to have retained much meaning.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
It seems to me that Grant wasn't able to exercise a lot of control over the AOP, due to the factors mentioned earlier, and others I am sure. That's probably what makes me criticize his tactical skills the most. He could develop some fine plans but often was unable to react to the changing situation. Once the ball got rolling, his creativity seemed to stall sometimes. For example, some of the smaller assaults he ordered at Spotsylvania just baffle me. What on earth good could they have done, dashing a division or so against the Confederate lines?
Respectfully[/quote]
NB-are you citing Upton's temporary puncture of the line early in the Spotsylvania campaign as an example of one of the smaller assaults? I loved the concept of that one, the failure to throw follow on strength into the breech was however a great example of Federal tactical ineptitude that could have probably saved incalcuable Union losses later between the 10th and 12th. I whole heartedly agree about the baffling nature of the attacks after Upton's brief success. I am still trying to reconcile if Warren's assaults on Anderson on the right of the same battle were tactical blunders or Warren's sluggishness and timid nature as a corps commander. Also have a hard time tying in "Great" with Grant, but then again was it not Meade's job to coordinate the tactical execution of Grant's strategic planning? How does the board rate the advance of Grant's generalship between the Battle of Belmont through Shiloh, Vicksburg, Overland through to Petersburg?
"We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to James River. If he gets there, it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time."
__________________ -
"It was a very peculiar time." - Franklin D. Cossitt
Ancestors in USA Army: 6th IA Inf, 11th IL Cav, 1st AL Cav; 122nd NY Inf; 6th MI Cav; 35th MA Inf; 100th IL Inf; 1st CO Inf/Cav; 22nd IN Inf
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
