Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
I have come to view Lee's actions at Gettysburg with more sympathy as time as passed. On the surface, the July 3 attack was sheer folly. But I think the circumstances render Lee's actions quite understandable. Certainly trying to get into the mind of Lee is largely speculative, but even though I have explored the mistakes Lee made throughout the war (and he did make mistakes, as he was the first to admit) I have come to admire his generalship even more. I suppose to some extent I view Grant more sympathetically as well. I used to see Grant's success as just due to numbers, requiring only a rather mediocre general. I have come to see that Grant's very willingness to use his numbers was a pronounced attribute that won the war. At the same time, I still have a rather negative view of Grant's tactical actions in Virginia.
A fantastic military history study the ACW is , chock full of what ifs. Same can be said for ol Sam Grant fighting in the eastern theater versus the western theater in 1862. Grant and Sherman certainly had plenty of design faults but tough to argue against the fact that they understood the manpower issues and Southern vulnerabilities in the spring of 1864
and at least strategically knew that the times called for attempting to bludgeon Lee and the other CSA armies over the proverbial head to achieve final victory objectives. NB your point well taken on Grant's willingness to use his numbers in 64, makes one wonder what might have been if McClellan had a similar willingness in front of Richmond in 62 and didnt dither aeound witha splendid army.
That's one of the key differences between Grant and McClellan. Grant knew he could win through numbers and Little Mac was afraid to take casualties (a trait among generals which seems to inevitably lead only to heavy losses over a long period of time). The numbers issue is often used to disparage Grant. I'm sure you have heard plenty of people say "Grant only won because of numbers". But I see his very willingness to use his numbers as a virtue that should be recognized. Now, that doesn't mean I think Grant was a great tactician (although there is a rather odd contrast between his performances out west and in the east).
To go back to Malvern Hill, I think it should be recognized that Lee didn't blindly throw his men into a foolish frontal assault. Remember that part of the Confederate plan was to catch the Union artillery in a crossfire and damage the gun line before sending in the infantry. The superior Union artillery cut up Lee's artillery, rendering this part of the plan a failure. Also remember that Lee tried to strike both of McClellan's flanks. Certainly his attack on McClellan's left was not the main thrust but it was limited further by the terrain. His attack on the Union right was actually quite heavy but devolved into a disorganized mess. Most people forget the infantry fight on the Union right, a nasty disorganized affair on both sides with regiments from different brigades, divisions, and even corps being blindly thrown into the fight together. I think it's a bit odd that people seem to ignore the quite large number of Union casualties on Malvern Hill. Certainly the loss ratio was very favorable to the North, but it wasn't as much of the lop sided affair it is often portrayed as. So...Lee's attack was a fiasco, no arguing that. But he did have a plan and he tried to execute it. It failed for several reasons and Lee must bear the blame for that. But it was not just a foolish dash into massed Union guns. A sad example of what happens when a battle spins out of control. The Seven Days probably contained many of Lee's weaker moments, but he was able to adjust to army command in a remarkably short time and hone a relatively new force into a very fine army.
Respectfully
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
Lee walked in the same kind of artillery slaughterhouse at Malvern Hill, as the one he sent Pickett's Charge into at Gettysburg.
The Army of the Potomac didn't always give Lee the same defensive look, for every battle.
Both Malvern Hill and the Gettysburg defense have the same common figure -Gen. Henry J. Hunt - artillery. In both locales, Lee never expected the defensive response, he received.
Malvern Hill is definitely one of the interesting battles of the second year of the ACW, and one that is best understood, I think, if one goes and visits the site if they are at all able. I myself only live two hours away from Richmond and was able to get down to the Richmond battlefields earlier this year. Malvern Hill would have to be one of the most pristine and best preserved fields that is in the East to this date. The NPS has done a superb job of cutting back overgrowth and the field is almost identical to period photographs of the battlefield.
The terrain was not very hosptitable to flanking movement. The Union troops had chosen a very good and very defensible position. As has been noted, if Lee had moved to the Union left, he would have been under naval gun fire from the James, and the other flank was not very conducive to the movement of masses of men. All in all, Malvern Hill is one of those battles that shouldn't have been; Lee should have held back, knowing that McClellan was not going to fight, hadn't made one offensive move the entire Seven Days, and would probably pull back to his defenses around Harrison's Landing anyhow. Malvern Hill was the end of the line, and because it was so well defended and could so easily be defended, it was a mistake to even attack it.
As a little side note on Napoleonic tactics, while the tactics of the Civil War were not wholly those of Napoleon, it was where they had their roots, and it was how the men had been trained to fight. However, with the advent of much more deadly, longer range weapons, the generals soon realized these tactics would not do, and we see the beginning of trench warfare in American military doctrine.
Ummmm.....probably not. But then again, none of the frontal assaults such as those at Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg, and all of those like them should not have been made. With the weapons that were in use, it was going to be highly costly whichever way the charge turned out. Unfortunately, these tactics were part of those taught to the officers, and it wasn't until the end of the war that the commanders were realizing that these tactics were costing too many lives and weren't particularly successful most of the time. Even without Malvern Hill having happened, Lee never should have ordered Pickett's Charge, because he was attacking high ground that was stacked with artillery and men, and there was not a chance he would have been able to take it.
I wholeheartedly agree. I haven't been to Malvern Hill but actually do want to go there because I want to see the hill that Lee attacked to see what he saw. I have done the same at Gettysburg and looked out from Lee's statue, but Lee thought his artillery would suppress or wipe away the Federals there, but he thought the same things at Malvern Hill too! So, not only should Lee have not made the charge at Gettysburg just from what he would've seen at Gettysburg, but he also should have had the benefit of experience.
A bit of a rush here, but Lee almost had to take that chance -- on both occasions. Both were an opportunity to conclude the war -- cost be danged. It was worth the risk and, unfortunately for Lee, the numbers came up wrong. More later.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I guess I should clarify just a bit. I don't think it was necessarilly a smart tactical decision to send frontal assaults against positions such as those at Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg, or Gettysburg, because these types of assaults were doomed to failure. In each of these examples, a commander sent his men at a position in which the opposing force held a commanding position with superior artillery placement, and the weapons of the time made it extremely hazardous to attempt such a movement. At Malvern Hill, Porters men had well placed artillery with a wide field of fire. The Confederates on the other hand were having to rotate batteries in and out of position to take on the Union artillery. At Fredericksburg, Burnside was just plain foolish, and nothing was to be gained by the frontal assault he ordered but alot of dead and maimed men. And Gettysburg is one that I am most critical off. I do understand that Lee had a chance to win the war. But he had men like Longstreet saying that it was foolish and that it was doomed to fail. With war becoming as technologically advanced as it was, frontal assaults were obsolete. Flanking was becoming the method to driving the enemy off by making their position untenable. WWI was the same way; generals ordering frontal assaults on positions that contained weapons that made it too costly. Even though a successful Pickett's Charge would have been costly. Though I admire men like Grant and Lee, I think they needed to rethink tactics just a bit, because the frontal assault was past its prime.
__________________ "The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize." George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796
Not much to add except that Lee seemed to be over-brimming with confidence as to what was possible and what was not. Wonder why that was? He got bit hard enough at Malvern Hill and seemed to forget at Gettysburg.
Correct me if I'm way off base here, but it seems that, with a few exceptions, the Federal gunners generally outshot their Reb counterparts. Assuming that's a correct observation, could that all be due to Reb ordnance? Or over-expectation of artillery capabilities in general?
Not familiar with the layout of Malvern Hill, but at Cemetery Ridge, picture this: draw a horizontal line on a wall. Back off to the far side of the room. If you can still see that line, try throwing darts at it. Gives you an idea of what the Reb artillery was looking at. Just a line against a great big backdrop and close doesn't count. That kind of shooting happens only in a dream.
From the Federal line: pretty much anywhere you hit on that wall counts. Lee/Longstreet were dreaming if they thought any amount of Reb artillery could take out the thin blue line of Federal guns.
Just a thought.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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