Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
The artillery was in plain sight. Lee's attack on Malvern Hill was uncoordinated and lacked artillery support (or had only ineffectual support). Lee forgot the lesson of Malvern Hill because of growing confidence arising out of his victories at Antietam (he survived whereas he should have lost), Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. He thought his men were unbeatable and was confident they could break the center of the Union line at Gettysburg.
Lee also thought that at Gettysburg, his own massed artillery hub to hub on Seminary Ridge and focused on a single point of the Union defenses would be crucial to his success- showing he indeed understood the lessons of artillery. Unfortunately besides having the well earned faith in the mettle of his men, he had too much faith still in Napoleonic charges.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
When one says that Lee thought his men were unbeatable or the like, I think that is a bit off the mark. I think Lee's decision was much more complex. At Gettysburg he had his back against the wall in a way. He had the foresight to see he needed a dramatic victory to win. He was willing to take the chance of attacking, knowing that it was now or never. He would never have the chance of an offensive victory on Northern soil. He had seen his men do near impossible things before, so I'm sure that he thought that maybe, just maybe, the impossible could happen. So to some degree I do agree with the idea that Lee thought his men were unbeatable. But that is only part of the answer. That's my interpretation at least.
Also, I disagree that Lee was somehow using Napoleonic tactics. Not really. The idea of ACW generals blindly using outdated Napoleonic tactics just isn't really true. Certainly there were very distinct remnants of Napoleonic tactics (such as the above posted reference to the massed artilley on Seminary Ridge). However, those vestiges of Napoleon were simply the tactics of the day. Both armies were using the most up to date tactics in the world. Lee wasn't launching some foolish Napoleonic attack. (The attack itself is not really Napoleonic. A Napoleonic frontal attack would be columnar, not linear. Columnar attacks were very rare occurances and as such elicited a lot of comments, such as at Rappahannock Station). Nor were Grant's Cold Harbor attacks Napoleonic in nature. I just see the Napoleonic theory as being a myth. Tactics of the ACW were in sort of a transitionary period...there were plenty of more modern ideas being used, but necessity mandated that some Napoleonic influences remained. Can't really be applied to Lee's attack. That's my take on it, at least.
Respectfully
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
NB- I appreciate your spirited defense of the venerable General Lee. Of course when one says that believing his men to be invincible led him to serious error what I understand that to mean is that in situations where his men were given an objective with any reasonable degree of success that they would prevail. I do not believe it means that his men could overcome situations in which they were decidedly at ill advantage. It does mean though that even if, God forbid, they should be at such disadvantage due to accident, poor planning, or poor leadership, that they would not fail to give of their very best. And it also means that it was up to him and his senior officers to see that such advertable seriious disadvantages did not hamper his army.
As well, when one speaks of Napoleonic charges, whether or not they were of Napoleonic origin , one means the slow advance of lines of men shoulder to shoulder, designed to close on the enemy to get one shot off before continuing the advance at the point of the bayonet. Such tactics were designed of course for the smoothbore musket age and were outdated with the advent of the rifled musket. Still, such advances took place and one such instance was Pickett's Charge. Of course Lee felt that the charge had in its' favor the disruption of the Union defenses by his pont-de-feu cannonade as well as other considerations (such as the perceived weakness of the Union center due to movement of Blue soldiers to succor the flanks.) Otherwise, it is unlikely he makes this charge. He did not expect his men to achieve the impossible; he honestly felt the movement could, hence had every chance, to succeed. He understood as well that casualties would be severe, but that the chance of success warranted the move, perhaps he felt even that casualties would be nightmarish but that conditions dictated the necessity of the move. Either way, he felt his army was of a caliber to pull it off, and that it was a thing that must be done, like at Malvern Hill. Either way, he understood the responsibilty was entirely his, and that some marked risk must be taken to achieve great things.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
Two brilliant posts in a row! Thank you NB and ewc! Not Napoleonic -- but justified, however costly, in light of the political situation. I feel better now about the apparent foolishness of the PPT assault on the 3rd day. It was, on the surface, incredible -- but the only possible action given the time and circumstances.
This kind of discourse is the immense value of this forum. I so appreciate this kind of input.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Forrest mentioned Grants assaults at Cold Harbor. Does anyone think those were justified as well? Was it possible that the Confederate positions could have been flanked? Was that tried? I'm not all that familiar with Cold Harbor except for the fact that Grant sent his men against Lees very well fortified, entrenched forces, and that the Federals suffered enormous casualties. I believe there were more than 2 assaults upon the works and they both failed miserably. Could these frontal attacks be compared with Lees at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg, and be considered justified as well? Was there no other way to try to carry the works besides a suicidal frontal assault? Questions about Cold Harbor that I've always had. Thanks.
Terry
__________________ "In this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realized by every one." Abraham Lincoln - August 18, 1864 Speech to the 164th Ohio Regiment
I have read, somewhere(?), that the Union attacks at Cold Harbor were uncoordinated, piecemeal, so to to speak, and this allowed the Johnnnies to concentrate their fire on those pieces of the attack as they occured.
It is suggested that if the entire Union line attacked at once, the outcome might have been significantly different.
Perhaps someone with a more detailed knowledge of that battle can follow up on this idea.
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"It was a very peculiar time." - Franklin D. Cossitt
Ancestors in USA Army: 6th IA Inf, 11th IL Cav, 1st AL Cav; 122nd NY Inf; 6th MI Cav; 35th MA Inf; 100th IL Inf; 1st CO Inf/Cav; 22nd IN Inf
I'd say that the June 3 attack was probably not justified under the circumstances. The June 1 attack, yes. Had the June 2 attack come off under acceptable conditions, that would have been justified as well. But I think that the June 3 attack, without proper appraisal of the situation, was not appropriate. Grant was not in the do or die situation Lee was in at Gettysburg.
I have come to view Lee's actions at Gettysburg with more sympathy as time as passed. On the surface, the July 3 attack was sheer folly. But I think the circumstances render Lee's actions quite understandable. Certainly trying to get into the mind of Lee is largely speculative, but even though I have explored the mistakes Lee made throughout the war (and he did make mistakes, as he was the first to admit) I have come to admire his generalship even more. I suppose to some extent I view Grant more sympathetically as well. I used to see Grant's success as just due to numbers, requiring only a rather mediocre general. I have come to see that Grant's very willingness to use his numbers was a pronounced attribute that won the war. At the same time, I still have a rather negative view of Grant's tactical actions in Virginia.
Respectfully
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
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