Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
Shane: You mentioned Joe Johnston as a "great." Why? What did he accomplish? He is one of the most difficult CSA achievers to nail down. Steven Woodward, one of the most prolific writers on the CW has little good say on JJ. In fact, it is amusing to read Woodward as he rarely criticizes Bragg while never missing an opportunity to slam JJ. Anyway, what did JJ accomplish? Where and when did he strut his stuff and demonstrate the right to have "great" put in front of his name?
As I stated just recently on the 'Lee's Legacy' thread, all the great leaders are subject post-bellum to all types of adulation, criticism, admiration, blame, and are co-opted for just about any obscure, obtuse, and 'Oh boy!!' theory anyone wished to present. Here we have a publishing historian who lambastes Johnston and he is not unique on that score. I recently bought the "North & South Journal" (vol.5 No.6) with an article by Steven H Newton which presents a very good case for Old Joe. Newton presents an argument which I had earlier used in some Johnston threads in this forum. The basis of the argument is the philosophical differences between General Johnston and President Davis of conducting warfare in the Civil War. Newton goes into the principles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, which if anyone is interested, (and it is fascinating reading,) I refer you to the magazine.
As Davis is responsible for military affairs in the Confederacy, Johnston is beholden to his chief to carry out his assignments. Needless to say, Johnston disagreed markedly with Davis's war plans and aims. Briefly, Johnston believed in the necessity of husbanding men and resources, yield space for opportunity and concentration, and fortresses to buttress mobile armies. Davis believed in taking the war to the enemy, holding territory, thus dispersing men & resources, and in using interior lines to create opportunity. The friction between the two leaders led to misunderstanding, lost opportunities, and finally personal animosity serious enough to adversely affect the Confederacy.
Joe Johnston is high on my list of great commanders of the Civil War. Was he a complete general? The answer is no- there were none in the Civil War, if there are ever any. Johnston was unable to cooperate with his Nation's leader and implement his leader's plans, much like what hobbled General McClellan's effectiveness for the Union. The responsibilty for this must be placed on Johnston's shoulders, alike for McClellan. The failure of the relief of Vicksburg and the loss of an army, a vital fortified city, and the gathering of troops which could have been effectively used elsewhere points directly to this conflict between the philosophies of our protagonists.
That is the negative. Two events illustrate the greatness of Johnston. The first is his deception of General Patterson in front of Harper's Ferry while moving his command by stealth and by train to the developing battlefield along Bull Run in July of '61. Forget not that although Patterson's performance here did not redound to his credit, (and he was besieged by conflicting and confusing orders,) he was none-the-less one of the very few Union commanders experienced in leading large commands in active campaign. Johnston's use of the railroad to move large bodies of troops from one front to engage in another was at that time innovative. He was the first ever to do it, a major achievement, which became almost a calling card for the ACW. Had he been knocked out of the war at this battle, he would be remembered as a great commander of this war for this feat alone, although winning the battle helps in this regard.
His other worthy accomplishment in the war is his face-off with General Sherman in Georgia in the spring and summer of '64. That winter taking over from the ineffective and dispiriting Bragg, he restored the Army of Tennessee to fighting trim and high morale. His formidable defensive positions and deft touch to Sherman's moves has Shelby Foote poetically calling this campaign between Sherman and Johnston the 'Red Clay Minuet' and the 'Grand Waltz'. And such it is, a campaign which is a thing of beauty. Here is where we see Johnston best applying his principles of warfare- stout fortified places, concentration of strength, commit only to advantage, yield space for time, and take advantage of opponents' errors by thrusts of a highly mobile force. Given Sherman's preponderance of numbers, Johnston's strategy proves both effective and, I believe, mandatory. Of course, it ultimately doesn't jive with Davis's wishes (and thinking;) Johnston is removed before Atlanta and a Davis style fighter, the pugnacious Hood, placed at the helm of the Army of Tennessee. I will only say about this that God (and the Yankees) allowed one or two AoT veterans to live to tell the tale of those dreadful few months. In it, I see Johnston's policy vindicated. Later on, as Sherman's legions were plowing north through the Carolines, who was there best able to put before Sherman's blue tide but Johnston? Any hope left to the Confederates then rested on what the wily generals, Lee and Johnston could do to unite their armies before the opposing Union juggernauts engulfed them. Alas, it was not to be. Could it have been done, these were the men who could have done it. The last great hope of the Confederate Nation was Lee and Johnston.
(Message edited by Ewc on January 14, 2003)
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
Wow... I can't add anything to that. I've always thought that Johnstons Georgia Campaign should be written of in textbooks when it comes to facing a vastly superior force. What he did might be best realized by traveling the path and viewing some of the battlefields. I think no leader of the CW realized the use of terrain like Johnston.
His actions at the time of Vicksburg I think can be laid at the door of Jeff Davis and an inept CSA General at Vicksburg. Grant certianly didn't help matters any either.
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
Excellent ecw and the first time I have seen a good analysis of JJ. However, I have a couple of comments and/or questions.
I agree Johnston was efficient at organizing his men and placing them correctly and I assume that his grand strategy of a defensive/offensive would have better than the patchwork quilt the CSA used that was more reactionary than proactive and was certainly uncoordinated at every stage.
However, Johnston was his own worst enemy in allowing himself to become embroiled in political antics with Louis T. Wigfall. As you said Johnston is to blame here. It was not his job to set war goals or dictate military strategy.
Beyond that my problem is that Johnston seemed completely wedded to Jomini's theory of having an ideal system in place before committing to battle. Problem was Johnston could not move unless it was a "perfect system." And like McClellan, he also had a multiplication fetish and kept increasing enemy numbers. IMO Joe Johnston became over concerned with having the perfect system before moving. “He [Johnston] would neither initiate a battle nor stand and receive an enemy attack unless everything was perfect.” [Jefferson Davis and His Generals, Woodward pg 177]. I think he made the perfect system the goal rather than targeting victory.
I also think that JJ comes out on the plus side of history because he is always compared to Hood. I can recall a thousand comments about Johnston usually coming down to, "He was right. Look what Hood did?" or "Johnston would never have ordered the suicide attacks at Franklin." or "Johnston would never have turned to Tennessee instead of following Sherman." Johnston thus becomes the quintessential “what if?”
I think that I have decided that Johnston's reputation is veneer rather than substance. He didn't risk defeat and therefore avoided it. In my mind Johnston's image rests on inertia, evasion, diversion, and distraction. He didn't screw up like Hood therefore he must have been good. His complaints against Davis were accurate; therefore he was a savvy general. Never mind that Hood's actions have nothing to do with Johnston's achievements or lack thereof or that Davis' business was not Johnston's.
I also can't resist your conclusion that there was "no complete general." I believe that Grant was the ultimate "complete general" as T. Harry Williams called him. He comprehended grand (global today) strategy; understood that he took direction from his Commander in Chief and didn't mess with politics; was a good organizer and ran his armies efficiently; knew how to select and work with subordinates; didn't dabble in sideline spats; had excellent leadership qualities; good tactical sense; was a brilliant theater strategist; his skills during a battle couldn't be equaled (Shiloh); was decisive; kept moving and fighting; had a well honed geographical acuity; and he succeeded where others failed. Shees, what did he lack?
Shilo? Shilo? Connie, you have to be kidding me! Grant and Sherman were anything but skilled during Shilo. They where lucky not be selling firewood and recieving medication after that fiasco.
Sean: Before sticking to that statement, I think you better reread Larry Daniels or Wiley Sword to review just how brilliant Grant's onsite battlefield skills were at Shiloh. I think most believe that Grant's calm demeanor and quick decision making during the first day saved he day for Union. While there is great room for criticizing his prebattle decisions, from the moment he jumped on the riverboat Grant's orders and battlefield skill leaves little room for second guessing.
Grant was about as brilliant at Shilo as Lee was at Malvern Hill!
Regardless, You cannot excuse Grant or Shermans actions. A commander is in command and is held responsible for the safety, security, morale, and fighting condition of the troops. This responsibility is just not granted to them on the first day of the battle.
With this in mind, both Grant and Sherman were questionable during Shilo. Grant and Sherman both made poor decisions that could have cost them the day. Grant's bacon was saved by men who took to their own course of action. Grant formed a defensive line of troops on the run. If you have ever been to Shilo, that defensive line though formidable, is not very large.
Read the Shilo question and answer in the Western Thread of the Dispatch post.
In Reference to Sherman,Grant, I mean before the battle of Shilo began.
Though Grant was tenacious, I due find him lacking like Lee in many instances. Grant was on the ropes after Shilo and the Union was lucky Lincoln made the decision allowing him to stay.
Lincolns decision cannot be judged in light of 64. Johnston was in command in Virginia (Lee was still the desk jockey) and what evidence did Lincoln have Grant was destined for greatness? Lincoln made a gamble that would eventually pay off without him really knowing it. Lincoln made similiar decisions with other commanders and look what it led to!
I think Grant staying was more a part of providence or blind luck then Lincoln having a keen eye for leadership. I think Grant like Lee gets credit where it is not deserved and both men have failure swept under the rug.
They always said Grant was cool under fire, I wonder if it was because he was tone deaf? I have heard of men stating shells were exploding around him has he went on about his work like nothing was occurring. I am not doubting he could focus on the task at hand however, if he was tone deaf that may have been a silly little asset. Cant hear the shell, cant duck and cover! LoL! Any truth to this?
Wellll, Sean, being tone deaf is not the same as being stone deaf. Grant's hearing was fine as far as I know, but he couldn't distinguish musical notes, which is why he didn't end up in the fife and drum corps. I think the quote attributed to him was that he knew two tunes, one was Yankee Doodle and the other one wasn't.
His not being rattled by shells may have come from selective hearing, similar to my pug dog's. She can't hear me calling her to come in, even when she's sitting on the front step, but if I whisper 'treat' she can hear it from across the lawn!
Agreed Zou, there was absolutely nothing wrong with Grant's hearing. His nervous system, however, was a little different than the rest of us. Music, he claimed was like a physical scrapping along his nerves and even as a child in church, he would be almost in pain when the choir sang. At Sackett's Harbor he would flee Julia and his new son rather than endure the regimental band as it played each evening in front of their quarters. According to the Georgetown neighbors he was that way even as a child.
Lloyd Lewis relates one telling incident in his book. While carrying the 4 year old Ulysses through town, Jesse was stopped by some older boys who thought it would be amusing to shoot a black powder pistol off near the boy's ear. Jesse told them to go ahead. According to the neighbors, Ulysses didn't so much as blink when the loud rapport of the muzzleloader went off. Yet he fully absorbed the impact. A week later while ill, Ulysses was told by the neighbor lady who came to help nurse him that she would prepare a packet of powder for him to drink. He began to cry inconsolably screaming that it he drank the powder it would blow him up.
The Rev. O.H. Tiffany who was Grant's pastor in New York claimed that Grant told him that music of all kinds tortured his nerves and "that in church he always experienced a feeling of relief as each stanza of the hymn was sung and so disposed of." It was probably why Jesse and Hannah, who indulged him in all things, did not make him attend church constantly as a boy and why he was never baptized. According to his biographer Lloyd Lewis, "His nervous system was curious one -- not twitching so much as an eyelid when shells or cannon went off right beside his head, yet raw and sore when brass bands, church congregations or the finest operatic talents or symphonic orchestras made music. Georgetown neighbors tell about this in his babyhood, his son, his aides and friends remark it in his middle and later life. It may hold the key to his incredible imperturbably at Shiloh and the Wilderness. He was not a dumb or insensitive man at all . . . and he was an 'iron man,' but how much of it was an odd nervous system?" [Letters from Lloyd Lewis, page 79]
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Grant's hearing was fine as far as I know, but he couldn't distinguish musical notes, which is why he didn't end up in the fife and drum corps. I think the quote attributed to him was that he knew two tunes, one was Yankee Doodle and the other one wasn't. 
Linear Mode
