Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
McClellan would have claimed an even larger Army of Rebels, but in all seriousness, Kernstown was HUGE. If McDowell's large Corps had been present during the Seven Days, and present north of the Chickahominy River so as to help Porter's isolated Corps, the war might have ended during the summer of 1862. Then again, something tells me the South would have fought on for a long time even if Richmond had fallen.
Kernstown also proved to completely unnerve the Washington authorities, and this upset of Lincoln, Stanton, and the leading men of the Republic quickly filtered through to McClellan, who was as quick to unnerve, himself. Thus one move by Jackson competently handled by the Union men on the scene servred to undo a good bit of the good already done on the Union side, immeasurably aiding the Confederates. I don't know that the effects of this fight were put to rest before Meade took over the Eastern army. Of course a good deal of that too was Jackson's move after this seemingly like a scepter up and down the Shenandoah Valley, spooking all the Union armies within a hundred miles. But the audacity of Kernstown started it all.
It also served as notice to all who would heed that neither competency, brilliance, nor the respect of men and lords would shield one if the malignant spirit of one Thos J 'Stonewall' Jackson descended upon one. The very able General Richard Brooke Garnett ran afoul of the vicious side of Jackson here, basically ruining his career and ultimately his life. This side of Jackson would remain to the fore alongside his brilliant capacity to move and strike and for all his Godfearingness and bullheadedness. Quite a complex villain/saint is Confederate General TJ Jackson.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
While I don't doubt the personal integrity of Garnett, I don't think Jackson a villian for levelling charges against him. There was, at bottom, one fundamental charge against Garnett - that he retreated without orders. That charge was true.
I sympathize with Garnett's position. He men were about out of ammunition, he was facing a considerable force increasing in size, and he didn't know that Jackson was funneling reinforcements toward the stone wall. But (couldn't you just feel that 'but' coming) the decision to retreat was not his to make. That is why there is a chain of command. Reinforcements were on their way, and IMO Garnett's decision changed what might have been a victory, or at least an orderly withdrawal, into a rout.
Russ- True indeed about the facts of the case at Kernstown. Garnett's withdrawal was made on his own initiative while, unbeknownst to him, reenforcements were on thier way. However I must disagree as to Garnett's culpability here. He did order the retreat, and it did degenerate into a rout. And here is my big 'but', so to speak, it was a decision made by the commander on the field at the time and place. There is a necessary chain of command, and there is a time of initiative and decision necessary to be taken by subordinate commanders. Garnett's brigade had been fighting, engaged heavily, in fact, for several hours, against increasing numbers of Federals, more than his numbers, and his men were without the protection of a stone wall that Fulkerson's brigade had on the left. Kimball was coming with 3,000 men onto Garnett's right. Ammunition exhausted, Garnett made a decision based on urgency, had he time to run down Jackson, ask for orders, and put them into action, precious time would be lost, too much time actually, and affairs would have taken matters into its own hands. His men would have withdrawn without orders, individually or in small groups, those remaining would have been overrun, and a rout would have ensued then and there. Instead, Garnett acted on discretion and removed the men from an impossible situation, (both factual and in the eyes of Garnett and his men,) and attempted to withdraw orderly and under control. This was a decision of necessity made by the commander on the spot.
I do not see that he disobeyed orders unless he had positive orders not to retreat under any circumstance, which I cannot discover to be the case. Jackson was off to the right at the time overseeing artillery fire, and the decision was one requiring the discretion of the man on the scene. Unfortunately, one of Jackson's great failings was his insistence on utter control of his 'chain of command.' He wanted his subordinate commanders to do no thinking, but go where he said and do what he said, in a word, be automotons. Where this kind of thing can have success, Jackson himself provides the proof. But where it is, in the long run, a guarantee for disaster, was a sore point all along with his commanders, deprived of battlefield discretion and understanding the inherent dangers, and Lee himself, who admonished Jackson more than once to trust moreso his subordinates and let one or two of them in on his thinking. We see at Jackson's brilliant flank march and attack at Chancellorsville that once Jackson was removed from the scene by his wounding, his successors were unsure of affairs other than that a surprise flank attack had taken place.
To compare Jackson to Lee, Jackson's practice of depriving decision, knowledge, and authority to his principal commanders contrasts very much with Lee's use of the discretion of his commanders. Lee got the best out of his principle men, where Jackson was often in conflict with them. I would go on to say that his handling of two principal subordinates, Richard Ewell and AP Hill, hampered rather than aided their development to greater command responsibilitires in the ANV.
Lastly I would say that Jackson's insistence on fighting to the last man and holding the line or giving the enemy the bayonet was sadly outdated and if ever put to the test in extreme circumstances, such as with Garnett's brigade on Sand Ridge at Kernstown, was a disaster waiting to happen. With seasoned veterans understanding the grimness of the order and with their commanders at their sides, such an order might be undertake before being overrun, to gain some needed advantage, but a subordinate commander without positive orders to do so should never. Had Garnett stayed as was Jackson's desire, Jackson should have been on hand to order it; besides which the line would have melted into a rout and/or massive surreneder of troops and/or whole regiments would have ensued. Garnett did what his ability, understanding, and training required of him, in my humble estimation. It is what any trained and sane commander would do, again in my estimation.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
I agree with much of your post. Although I agree with your thoughts on Jackson's command style, I'm disinclined to argue with success. It worked for him. Lee's style worked for him.
There are two points with which I disagree. First, that "I do not see that he disobeyed orders unless he had positive orders not to retreat under any circumstance..." Garnett was ordered to a certain position. That was the last order he received. Therefore, he was under orders to be in that position until ordered to the contrary. He was not ordered to the contrary, but acted without orders to the contrary. Seems like a perfect example of retreating without orders to me. 'Positive orders' not to retreat are unnecessary when orders to be in a position are in place.
Second, we can only speculate what would have happened had Garnett tried to hold. I don't think things could have turned out any worse than they did had he tried. It may have given the federals reason to pause, and given Jackson the necessary time to get fresh troops and ammunition to the site. Bad things can happen when subordinates second-guess their commanders.
russ- I understand what you are saying about orders. I can't argue too much because I am not an expert ionn the ins and outs of the protocol the army uses for orders or did at that time. I can certainly understand a commander's thinking in saying- 'You go there' and looking later fully expecting that You were there. To have it not be so can mess up the best miltary planning. What I am questioning is the propriety of removing a subordinate commander's discretion. Fitz John Porter got in a heck of alot of trouble for not following orders and attacking Jackson at 2nd Bull Run when he had Longstreet's whole corps in his way, or Gouverneur Warren's removal from command at Five Forks because when he came into action against Pickett sweeping his lines, he did it not precisely where and not quickly enough to suit Sheridan. As to whether Jackson was correct on protocol, I will defer to what you have said on the matter. Perhaps my debate rests moreso on the practical effects of order- carry out. Removing the man on the scene's discretion on carrying out an order or meeting a threat is playing with fire, in my eyes. Especially if carrying out this order will entail the sacrifice of his men. In a situation such as this, I would think it would be necessary for a commander to receive a clear order to do so or understand the necessity of the case for him to undertake such a sacrifice. Garnett weighed the risks of staying or retreating and obviously felt that retreat was indicated. And he wasn't a militia reservist or political or rookie general who didn't understand the military situation. If Jackson needed him to stand or die on that spot against all the furies of hell and to the last man, he needed to be there or at the very least get word there that that must be done. The men may have pulled out on their own anyway, have panicked. This is what Garnett was trying to prevent- panic and unnecessary sacrifice. It is obvious that I consider Jackson's handling of this situation at fault even with the law of chain-of-command on his side.
Garnett attempted to forestall a rout he saw coming by ordering his wavering, ammunitionless troops to retreat. The rout came anyway. This withdrawal (and rout of course) did discomfit Jackson, who conceivably may have blunted Kimball's advance long enough to get away. That we won't know either. These were no ordinary troops routing,this was Stonewall's own Stonewall Brigade, who had been through the fire, battle tried and true. For them to pick up and run surely meant the the Federals weren't coming on with daisies. Of course, this discomfiture of his plans upset Jackson, entirely understandable. Unfortunately, Jackson is a master scapegoater. When things went awry it never seemed to be his fault. Here at Kernstown, he is misinformed by Ashby, his cavalry chief as to the Yankee numbers, and what the #@## does Garnett think he is doing with MY brigade. He sacked Ashby for a few days until he realized he wasn't going to tame these Valley riders during this campaign and they might as well have a leader they will respond to. But the infantry, especially his old brigade, was going to feel the full weight of his jackboots. And they came down on Garnett.
The business of hold/retreat, automoton/discretion aside. The fault of this defeat still belongs to Jackson. Given Ashby's reconnaissance of the field and dispositions, he did not look things over for himself. He attacked superior forces in a superior position with a weary (from forced marches) force. Kudos to Jackson for having the audacity and confidence to engage, but shame on him not for losing, but for shifting the responsibility for this from himself onto others. It could be that Jackson expected the highest standards from the infantry and especially these men, and persecuted Garnett as an object lesson to his other then and future commanders. However, he also established bad relationships with Winder, Garnett's successor, AP Hill, and others who you were in his way if you did not mindlessly follow orders. Some of that is needed, but commanders are supposed to think as well. A fine line it is I guess it all comes down to.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
btw- Despite my criticism of Jackson and his conduct at and after this battle, with fighting it, he fulfills his mission of tying up Union forces in the Valley and preventing the movement of these forces to the succor of an insecure McClellan on the Peninsula, thus materially aiding the Confederacy, arguably adding years to her existence as well as greatly upsetting the brass in Washington, with wonderful results. And he was just getting started!! All in all, a topper of a day for the Confederacy.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
It is, no doubt, a fine line. The discretion of a subordinate is very tricky. It seems the general rule that, if a subordinate exercises discretion, they'd better be right. :-)
I agree with you regarding Fitz-John Porter. He's was one of the best Union general officers, and as long as McClellan was in command, Porter's star was rising. Porter truly got the shaft. He was guilty of nothing more than being the former army commander's disciple. I see a difference between Porter's and Garnett's problems. Both were outnumbered, but Garnett had to know that reinforcements were available even if he didn't know if or when Jackson would send them. Porter was alone on his part of the field. Warren is a little different. He'd been slow and cautious so many times in the Overland Campaign. That he was removed on one of the occasions that he wasn't being slow and cautious is ironic but, in the end, not IMO unjust.
Jackson, as commander, is responsible for the outcome of the battle. But that does not leave either Ashby or Garnett without fault.
Separate from Garnett's guilt for retreating without orders is the issue of appropriate punishment. In this I fault Jackson for not recognizing, or choosing not to recognize, the circumstances. Lee always achieved great results with the slightest of reprimands, and I believe Jackson could have done so as well. He should have just told Garnett, in private, that reinforcements were coming and that, in the future, he must wait for them. I believe that Garnett, and the rest of Jackson's command, would have learned more and better from such.
russ- Well said! I still have a hard time though associating the terms 'guilt' and 'fault' with Garnett at Kernstown. Had Jackson reacted as you outline, surely twould have been best for everyone and for the cause he served. However, Jackson's reaction was 100% Jackson, and the stripes on this particular tiger were never going to change. An avoidable blemish the whole mess, one would think, but in the end, more certain than avoidable, a shame.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
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