Civil War History - The Eastern TheaterDiscuss any and all battles, movements, and events occuring in the Eastern Theater here! This includes any actions in tha area east of the Appalachian Mountains in the vicinity of the river capitals of Richmond and Washington D.C.
Durning the Battle of Fredericksburg, I think General Burnside, in some places, gets a bad rap for somethings that werent his fault. Also, I think people blame Burnside for the bloody assaults on Marye's heights, deeming them bloody and stupid, and pointless... but they had a point. But first, the first thing that is controversal is the pontoons.
McClellan actually requested pontoons be prepared on november 6 and Burnside requested pontoons in his november 9th telegraph to washington which also outlined his plan for the campaign. by november 12, however, there were only 12 servicable pontoons in richmond, and Burnside assumed that McClellans order had been carried out, which it wasnt. It took the oder 6 days to get to the engineers near the upper potomac because the message had been sent by water to avoid bushwackers and telegraph taps. On november 15, burnside wired washington in regards to the pontoons and General Daniel Woodbury responded saying that the 50th new york engineers ahd arrived on the 14 from berlin/harpers ferry with 36 boats and that another 40 were expected the next day. Woodbury figured they could be ready to go by the 16 or 17 depending on when the quartermaster got them the wagons and horses they needed, but he also told halleck on the that he would need 5 to 6 days to prepare.
When Spauldings 50th new york engineers arrived, woodbury told them to put their train into to depot, bascilly countermanding the orders spaulding received in McClellans note. So Spaulding no longer thought that burnside needed him. Spaulding was told on the 16th to prepare a pontoon train for the AoP, and woodbury ordered that two trains be prepared, one would go by water to Aquia landing and then to AoP and another would go by land. November 16 past and the 17 was wasted arguing with the Quartermaster, and the 18th was spent looking for teamsters for the 270 horses and 500 unborken mules that would pull hte train. On the 19th of November the 50th finally started, the overland train started in the rain in the early morning and was only able to cover 8 miles by 11 pm. the next day they awoke early and by 10 pm they reached Occoquan creek, which was high and swift. They had to unpack and bridge the stream on november 22 when the rain subsided, but spaulding found the roads impassable for a pontoon train and decided to float the boats down to aquia landing while the wagons continued on, lighter. Spaulding did not arrived at the AoP until november 25 in a heavy down pour.
Burnside had no contact with Spaulding and trusted the war department and quatermaster Meigs to supply and move them.
So, as is sometimes stated, i believe that the war department should take the heat for this one.
Furthermore, Burnside has been said to have been inactive while he was waiting for his pontoons. This too is not so. Burnside knew that his plan had begun to fall apart when the pontoons didnt arrive.
- November 20: General Reconnaissance party to US FOrd.
*Identified and studyed possible crossing points*
- November 27: Burnside meets with lincoln at aquia landing to disscuss. There burnside explained his problems and told lincoln he was willing to venture a crossing in the face of the enemy, but it would be risky, and went on to say he was gettting pressure from halleck, and lincoln assured him that "the country will wait until he ........ is ready.
-November 28: Burnside holds a secret conference with lincoln to disscuss a crossing at the unprotected skinkers neck.
-December 3: Briefs his generals on the move to skinkers neck
* Jackson's men ahve arrived*
*Naval forces under commodore Harwood agree cover the crossing.
-December 4: Shallow draft naval units move up the river and become engaged around skinkers neck..bring Jackson's attention to it.
-December 5: Burnside moves towards skinkers neck. Scouts report confederate troops moving in across the river (early's divison). Burnside orders troops into camp on the side of the road.
-December 6: Troops return to camp
-December 9: Burnside orders a coucil of war at noon. Decided to attack the seam where jackson and longstreets lines meet
-December 10: "sets the wheels in motion" and troops inssued 3 day rations and 6 rounds each. Naval forces move up the river again.
As you can see Burnside was not sitting idle while lee strengthed his lines.
Next, Burnside is blamed for his unclear orders. This is a situation where i believe he deserves to take some blame but not all of it. Franklin, in a conference with burnside and reynolds, told them that his attack could work if he a) could move his men closer to the enemy lines under the cover of dark and then advance and b)if he had hookers Grand Division in reserve in case of disaster. Now burnside can be blamed for his lack of speed in giving the orders. He had a hard time deciding what to make the objectives, his maps were wrong so he had a hard time determing the routes the forces would take. Realizing that he was running late he sent his unclear orders along with a rider to Franklin. The rider was told to tell Franklin that more official orders would follow. But Franklin decided to go ahead and attack. Now the delay was burnsides fault, but once franklin lost his hopes for suprise, i think i would have made sense to what for the "official" orders.
Now the Bloody Attacks on Marye's Heights were meant to be nothing but a diversion and support for Franklin... keeping Longstreet in Place and preventing reinforcements from going to Jacksons aid. Now Darius Couch was the one who ordered his second Division, Hancock, to his first divisons, French, support, and in turn howards batterd division to its aid...Giving the attack a life of its own. Now Couch feared a rebel counter-attack, and inturn called on the ninth corp for more help, but it seems to me that burnside cant be blamed for this portion of hte bloody attack.
BUt we all know that that was only the first half of the action on that front. Later after some minor action and a another union repulse along Hazel Run, Burnsided ORDERED Franklin to renew the attack on the left, and Therefore assumed he should attack Marye's heights again to support that attack. Thus Hooker was sent over the river and griffin attacked. And again we all know that franklin did not advance again, so the "supporting" action really looked like the main attack.
Thanks for this perspective and information. I'm just starting to do a little research on the Battle of Fredericksburg (have almost finished a book on Chancellorsville)and I do appreciate this detailed information.
I would Recommend Francis O'Reilly's "The Fredericksburg Campaign"
I loved this book and it was the source of information in my post above. There is so much to read isn't there...
Ben, this book sounds great and im off to the city tomorrow to buy more civil war books, I'll have to see if i can order that on in. I think im better off ordering on the net though, as many Australian searches i did didn't have it
Read Thomas Ward Osborne's book. Maj. Osborne complains that the bridges could have been built upriver and away from the town, sparing the pontineers from the dens of the hidden sharpshooters. Don't forget that Meager's Irish Brigade could have crossed when they first arrived but weren't permitted to. They watched as Lee rushed troops into the area.
Even if they pontineers hadn't been delayed for eleven hours (giving Jackson time to arrive to reinforce Lee's right flank), what was the logic of storming the stone wall? Nah, Burnsides fought a stupid battle for which many of his men suffered.
Sure I read the above and agree that the "original" plan was to pin down Longstreet so that the major attack could break Jackson's line. One Federal captain wrote: "Our whole Grand Division was massed here, and we could distinctly see the enemy's earthworks on the hills back of Fredericksburg... The whole army could easily see the work laid out for them, and the men were anything but enthusiastic over it. They could tell at a glance how impossible it would be to take the works that had been quietly in progress of building for weeks, while their commander waited until their finish before attacking them." So, many knew an assault against Longstreet would be futile.
What went wrong was when Burnsides became obsessed with the Mayre's Heights instead of the Confederate right flank. Burnsides' mistake worked to Lee's advantage.
You stated that Burnside became obsessed with the heights when he should have been attacking the confederate right. The first assault on the heights was to support the attack on Jackson, and keep Longstreet in place.
Later in the day, Burnside sent orders to his commanders to resume the attack on the confederate right and then for the troops in front of the heights to resume their supporting attacks. The problem was that Franklin didnt follow those orders, and Hooker and Co. did.
I agree that Franklin certainly didn't follow orders and was called to account for it (he was removed). However, lest we forget, even after the numerous failures against Longstreet, Burnsides personally wanted to lead a charge and it was only because many of his generals including Hooker objected to its futility that he desisted.
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