Jackson in the 7 Day Battle at Richmond

[ben_ross]

<u>Beaver Dam Creek</u>
Jackson was not suppose to engage at all. It was a march of Manuever, not attack. He was suppose to bare well to the left and march to Cold Harbor..which one was not specified, but it can be assumed it was New Cold Harbor. Lee is to be blamed for changing his orders. When Lee met with his high command, they talked about what he wanted done. Jackson took notes. But when jackson got his orders, there were a few changes...leading to possible confusion. Yes, Jackson was late, but look at the circumstances.

Gaines's Mill}

Jackson was led astray by a guide, but he still go his men to the field to do some darn good fighting. Hood's men are credited with the intial break through in a classic bayonet Charge.

<u>Savage's Station</u>

Many Many people blame Jackson for not moving here. But they often over look the order he recieved from Chilton of Lee's staff. This poorly drafted order gave Jackson the impression that he was not suppose to cross the river, but he was to remain on the north side and protect the upper fords.

<u>Glendale</u>

This was probably his worst battle ever. It seems that Jackson was suppose to hold Franklin in his front while Lee attacked in Franklines rear and towards Malvern Hill. Jackson started doing this with his artillery barrage, but he could have followed it up with infantry demonstrations, but he did not. Then there is the issue of the fords. Stephan Sears states that moving to these would have been using to much discretion in Lee's orders to pursue the enemy and cross White Oak swamp at the bridge. Any attack at the bridge would have been a bloody repulse too...just keep that in mind.

<u>Malvern Hill</u>

Jackson wanted to flank them I believe, but Lee decided on the plan he and Longstreet came up with and it was a bloody mess.

[tjjackson]

I tend to weigh in with the group that attributes Stonewall's performance during the 7 days to exhaustion, but i also add his and his men's unfamiliarity with the terrain. In the Valley he had Hotchkiss's excellent maps, and most his men were valley men and knew the valley intimately. Once they arrived around Richmond, the entered swamps and other land that they had no clue about and how to handle it aggressively.

Also Jackson was showing signs of his exhaustion towards the end of his valley campaign. His plans and preps at Port Republic were not up to his best efforts, and i attribute this to exhaustion as well. Robert Tanner's excellent book "Stonewall in the Valley" helps explain this much better than my poor attempt here.

[gary]

Kind of hard to blame Jackson when he had neither decent guides or decent maps to speak of. Jackson didn't know the Peninsula like he knew the Valley (or had willing guides like those in the Valley). So, when Jackson got lost, who was to blame? Jackson or Lee? Clearly Lee as Lee didn't provide guides or maps to an army that was to turn the Peninsula campaign in his favor. Furthermore, the Confederates had over a year to learn the area but dithered and did no cartography. That would hurt later when columns became lost and had to retrace their steps.

But then why did Jackson assure them he'd be there? Doubt was expressed that he could achieve the timetable, could but he steadfastly maintained he'd be there. Lee asked him when could he get in place. Not told him to. Jackson should have known better. It was his responsibility.

[ben_ross]

Where did you want him to be...just wondering?

Yes Jackson was running behind, but alot of that was out of his hands. Also his orders were confusing and unclear.

[jackbluelight]

I'd say that it's pretty hard to lead an army while you asleep under a tree.

[ben_ross]

Thats somewhat over simplifying things Casey. Jackson had somewhere b/w 25-30 artillery pieces in action throughout the day. Jackson's mission that day was to hold the Feds. in place. He could have succedded in doing this with active demonstrations, but he did not, and yes, troops were able to be sent to Glendale.

[lrd89]

Not much I can add, I think it was just exhaustion after the Valley campaign.

[ole]

Most certainly he and his troops were exhausted; however, being Lee's right arm, he should have been savvy enough to leave himself some wriggle room. A top general will take into consideration such factors as troop exhaustion, unfamiliar terrain, availability of competent guides, lack of maps, et al.

Exhaustion cuts him a bit more slack than he deserves in this particular situation. When you factor in confusing orders he comes out looking better, but still carrying fault.

Ole