Confederacy's Last Hurrah

[william42]

By Wiley Sword, about the battles of Franklin, Nashville, Spring Hill. I don't know if this book is already reviewed on this forum. I checked through the search and could not find it, but could have missed it.

I'm just in Chapter 2, but two paragraphs have caught my attention and I thought maybe they are worth posting. The first is about Jefferson Davis

P. 20 "An 1828 graduate of West Point, Davis considered himself perhaps foremost a military man. His Mexican War service had brought him fame and success as colonel of the 1st Mississippi Rifles, 'the hero of Buena Vista'. Close friendships and character judgements formed at the academy and during the Mexican War were frequently the basis for Davis's wartime decisions when it came to appointments of personnel. Often perceptive and logical in his value judgments, many of his assessments were sound, as in the case of Albert Sidney Johnston. Yet others were so bad as to prove ultimately ruinous. As the war progressed increasingly unsatisfactorily, it was Davis' decisions about his generals and their campaigns that perhaps contrubuted the most to the ultimate defeat of the Confederacy. If Jefferson Davis was strong-willed in supporting what he considered to be an unjustly criticized commander, he too often was a terrible judge of his generals' abilities. Among the worst such scenarios were those of Braxton Bragg and John Bell Hood."

P. 21
"Embittered by the suggestions of incompetency from his own subordinate generals, and disgraced by the formal petitions for his removal, Bragg left the army in December 1863, retaining harsh memories of those whom he felt had conspired against him. Although finally disenfranchised from the Army of Tennessee, Bragg had so factionalized the western command structure that deep-seated personal antagonisms and rival cliques remained in his aftermath. Although perhaps the most despised general associated with any Confederate army, he was soon given another influential assignment - special military adviser to President Jefferson Davis. Davis' stubborness in the Bragg matter provided a revealing insight to one of the president's most glaring weaknesses: he simply would not allow himself to be proven wrong in his judgments. Having endured enormous pressure and abusive criticism for his pro-Bragg decisions, he flaunted Bragg's prominence by calling the embittered North Carolinian to his side as a close military confidant. ... In early 1864 Bragg was thus on the scene in Richmond and of key influence when several of the most far-reaching decisions to affect the war effort in the west were made."

Terry

[samgrant]

Sword is a fairly well respected CW historian.

I have the book you mention, in one of my stacks of books filling the living room floor. Haven't read all of it yet, but have found it useful in researching aspects of Hood's woeful campaign into Tennessee.

[ole]

Sword is highly readable and quite thorough. I've heard others more critical than I praise his work highly. Review it when you're finished.
Ole

[william42]

I'll give it my best shot Ole. Gotta have the book back to the library in 10 days, and I'm makin' notes.

Terry

[william42]

This book is pretty good. I'm not familiar much with events in the west, aside from Shiloh and Perryville.

It's fascinating to learn of the behind-the-scenes manuevering by Davis, Bragg, and Hood to put Hood in command of the AOT. Bragg seemed to have sabotaged the effort for Confederate victory just to exact revenge on his enemies in the AOT, and Davis seemed more than willing, almost eager to accept Braggs endorsement of Hood. Seems like personal vendettas seriously crippled the effort in the west after the reassignment of Johnston.

"The basis for selection of Hood as the Army of Tennessees new commander provided an important insight into the administrations thinking. As early as July 12th Davis had asked the opinion of Robert E. Lee about Hood as a successor to Johnston. Lees reply was ambiguous, stating that Hood was ' a bold fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off'', but he was uncertain that Hood possessed some of the qualities necessary for a commanding general. Davis, who went through the motions of cabinet approval for removal of Johnston, also sought Braxton Braggs recommendation of a successor. At the time there appeared to be only two practical choices: Hood and General William J. Hardee. Hardee was the senior corps commander in the Army of Tennessee, had temporarily commanded the army following Braggs removal, and seemed to have Robert E. Lees endorsement. Yet Bragg was distrustful of Hardee and considered him among the conspirators who had ardently sought his ouster. Hood, in private conversations with Bragg, portrayed Hardee as lacking in aggressiveness, and in the same mold as Joe Johnston. Bragg needed little persuading. On July 15th he wired Davis that Hood was the best man for the job, being 'far better' than other officers of the army. In an aside, however, Bragg wrote that Hood was not a man of genius or a great general, possibly leaving the door open for Braggs own reappointment. On july 17th Hood was promoted to the temporary rank of full general and urged by Davis on July 18th to do his duty to correct 'a [defensive] policy which had proved so disastrous.'" (Authors brackets)


"Confederacys Last Hurrah", Wiley Sword


Terry

[william42]

Well, believe it or not, I have not finished this book. It's very detailed as most battle accounts are, and I just finished the chapters on Spring Hill. When I got to the end of the Spring Hill battle section, I realized if someone asked me, "What happened at Spring Hill?", I would have said, "I don't have a clue." The battle was so confusing and convoluted that I could not give an accurate summary at all of what I had just read.

So I had to go back and re-read it before moving on up to Franklin. The events at and around Spring Hill are confusing, speaking for myself only, of course. It seems as though Spring Hill was a huge comedy of errors, miscommunication, hesitation, too much caution, and a whole myriad of other things that went wrong for the Confederates, including incorrect maps. The episode at Spring Hill was a very lucky break for the yankees, though. Sword places most of the blame on Cheatham and Hood, and I think that's probably correct. It seems that Forrest and Cleburne were the two clearest thinkers in the whole Spring Hill debacle, but the two of them were not enough to salvage the golden opportunity that Hood had for a brief shining moment to annihilate Schofields army there. Forrests diversionary movements to distract Gen Wilsons Union Cav worked very well, and allowed him time to get his main force to Spring Hill. Unfortunately, Hood was late getting there because of an inaccurate map, and plodding, slow movements due to his overestimation of Federal strength, and Forrest had to watch helplessly, low on ammo, while the yankees moved up the road, and out of reach. The author stated that in his opinion, had Cleburne led Cheathams division that day instead of Cheatham, things would have very likely turned out better for the Confederates. Miscommunication between generals caused Cleburne to position his division to attack south towards Columbia, and Cheatham to attack north towards Spring Hill. Hood had changed his orders and had not seen to it that Cleburne was apprised. In other words, the whole affair was a cluster from the get-go for the AOT, and in the end Cheatham ended up suspending his attack in its entirety. He did not attack at all due to intelligence that the yankees had them outflanked on the right, when in reality the number of yankees on the right was quite small, possible one company. Cheatham was a divisional commander who had been placed in corps command for the first time, and was overly cautious that he would screw up and lose his corps command. All these misfortunes combined allowed the yankee army to escape destruction in Spring Hill, and move on to Franklin. "Cheatham blinked in the face of destiny", as Sword puts it. As I stated before it takes approx 3 chapters to cover the events leading up to and including the Spring Hill episode, and I've left a lot out here, but if you want to know the whole story, it's worth the read in my opinion.

The author, Wiley Sword, does mention at least twice in the Spring Hill chapters that he believes Hood was a bit foggy or dull-headed possibly due to his use of laudanum, to help him sleep. However, he does not come out and state for a fact that Hood did indeed use that substance. But the mention is there.

Terry

[Eric]

Hi, I just had to jump in here about Spring Hill. The number of Federal troops on John Brown's right flank (Cheatham's Corps) was actually at least one regiment, the 100th Illinois, plus one company of the 40th Indiana. It may have only been 300 or so men, but it was enough in the deep twilight to spook Otho Strahl, John Brown, and Frank Cheatham.

Also, the evidence indicates Hood did want both Cleburne's and Bate's divisions to perform the same actions, i.e. move forward in echelon toward the pike and then swing south to face Columbia. The problem is that Cleburne gets attacked by Bradley's Brigade and his division ends up turning to the right, or north, to face this threat. Once Cleburne's men rout Bradley's troops they pursue the Federals for at least a half mile. However, once this happens Bate is forced to move to his right just to find Cleburne's left. Then when Brown moves up and connects with Cleburne's right and prepares to move forward he is notified of the force threatening his right flank. Compounding Brown's problem was that Bedford Forrest's cavalry had been pulled back by sundown and was no longer protecting his right flank. This is why A. P. Stewart is moved up, specificially to support the right of Cheatham's corps, which was held by Brown's Division.

And the laudanum issue has no merit because there is not a single piece of documentary evidence to support even the suggestion. I feel that a number of recent scholars have done history a terrible disservice by continuing to promote such things.

[william42]

Hi Eric, thank you for the corrections. I had a long post typed out, but the reply form timed out on me and I lost it all. (I think you can go 5 minutes before you have to click on 'submit' or 'preview', or you lose it all.) I forgot to keep hitting the preview button as I was typing.

Anyway, the gist of it was, your figure of 300 is correct, not my figure of 100. And I also stated that Cleburne was operating under Hoods earlier instructions, while Cheatham was not. Actually it was Cleburne who was positioned correctly, per Hoods revised instructions, and Cheatham who had not gotten the word to position himself to attack south towards Columbia, who was following Hoods earlier instructions. I had that reversed. Please feel free to add anything else as it sounds as if you know the battle quite well. Take care, and welcome to the board. Good to have you.

Terry

[william42]

Eric, I just realized that you're the author of the new book on the Spring Hill/ Franklin battles. Well, of course you know the battles well then!. I've been reading the thread about your book, but I didn't put the two together until just now. Thank you again for your input on this thread. I'm looking forward to reading your book when I can get a copy. As I said, it's great to have you here on the board. We have another author here as well. Gary Yee, "Gary", on the board has just finished a book on sharpshooters that is close to coming out soon I believe. There may be other authors out there as well. It's nice to have such informed folks among us.

Terry

[Eric]

Terry, Not to get too technical, but I have always questioned whether there was really confusion in Hood's orders or Cheatham just remembered them incorrectly. Keep in mind, both Cleburne and Bate approached the pike in echelon so they could turn and face Columbia once they reached the road. Honestly, I think Cheatham's memory was cloudy. It makes no sense that Hood would want two of Cheatham's divisions effectively veering away from one another. Unfortunately for Hood (and Cheatham), Cleburne becomes engaged. Once things happens, as I mentioned before, Cleburne shifted his direction to the north, or toward Spring Hill. Bate is then told to connect with Cleburne's left and soon Brown moves into position on Cleburne's right. Again, I think previous scholars have tended to take Cheatham's account literally and never really stacked it up against other facts. In my opinion, Cheatham's account has inaccuracies that need closer evaluation, just like Hood's. One other thing to keep in mind. Neither Hood or Cheatham wrote about Spring Hill until many years after the war, other than Hood's official report. Hood started the post-war activities by writing his memoirs, which were published after his death. Hood's version of events prompted Cheatham to offer a rebuttal, which came forth in a presentation to a group in Louisville, Kentucky and was later published in the Southern Historical Society Papers. Both men's accounts are important, but should be used carefully because unfortunately they are presented almost like a legal team's defense brief at times rather than an objective presentation. One interesting thing about Cheatham's before I close. In his paper Cheatham presented his version of events and then included a number of letters from the likes of A. P. Stewart, John Brown, and William Bate. Cheatham stated that after Brown had stopped due to the threat on his right flank, Cheatham told Brown to throw back his right brigade and attack anyway. Very interesting is the fact that in Brown's own letter, meant to bolster Cheatham's case, Brown said he never received such an order after halting. In fact Brown said he received no further orders at all.