On the night of March 24, 1865, General Gordon led an attack on Ft. Stedman that broke through the union lines but was repulse by the morning of the March 25, 1865.
It was Lee's last offense attempted to break the siege at Petersburg.
The question is: Was the act of assaulting Ft Stedman on of sound military planing, or an act of desperation, or an act folly?
It was consider by some an embarrassment for Lee....
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"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Poor scouting or lack of knowledge of the terrain. After Fort Steadman was captured, three columns were supposed to capture the nearby Union redoubts or forts. Two got lost and returned to Steadman. The third (going towards Fort Friend) was en-route but driven back by a Union counter-attack. Had these columns succeeded, there would have been a breakthrough.
Knowing Grant though, he would have done exactly what he did. Counter-attack all along the line until the Confederates also lost integrity and collapsed. Grant would not have pulled back but would pressed on anyway.
like a defeated boxer throwing a final flurry of punches, Lee lost 3000 men he could not replace. Artillery up and down the Union line supported Gen. Hartranft's counterattack and the four hour battle had no effect on the Union line. If anything it weakened the rebel line and laid the groundwork for the final Union push
As tully points out the whole assault on Ft. Stedman was disaster for Lee. In some ways it was a smaller version of Gettysburg. Lee tries a desperate act against the odds and fails. He losses manpower that he can't afford without anything in return.
With Gettysburg, his decision and leadership was not in questioned but there was some grumbling after the Ft. Stedman failure.
A note: Gordon made all the decision in where to assault the union line and how. Lee just over saw the operation.
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"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
By 1865, the Army of Northern Virginia was not going to defeat the Army of the Potomac.
By 1865, the war was lost in Virginia. Sherman's army was also not far away.
The Confederate armies fought long after the war was lost. Strategically Sherman's march to Savannah and Hood great defeat in Tennessee had effectively ended the war.
The Confederacy fought to the very last. Some armies fight to the very end. The Army of Northern Virginia was one of them.
No one can say that victory was within their grasp. By Appomattox, the ANV was a shell, not an army.
Lee was given to audacious moves when, if successful, the battle might be won. Consider Malvern Hill: if he had taken it, the AotP would have been shattered and strewn across several states. Consider Chancellorsville: Splitting his army three times. He was this close to shattering the AotP. With vastly fewer numbers -- it paid off, but it was an audacious risk. Consider Day 3: Not much could be gained by driving Meade back to the Pipe Creek Line, except that the impact on northern morale can only be imagined if he had forced a Union retreat from Gettysburg. And then we have Ft. Stedman.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Lee knew that it was unlikely that Grant could be forced to end the siege, but the plan was to penetrate the line and destroy or at least damage the Union Supply base at City Point, forcing Grant to shorten his Line and leave more room for Lee to pull out of Petersburg and retreat South rather than West.
Lee assigned almost half his army to Gen. Gordon for the assault, weakening his own lines for the attempt. Grant realized it and as soon as the Confederate attack was contained he ordered a general advance by his forces and elements of II and VI corps captured the entrenched picket lines in their respective fronts.
Unlike against Meade at Gettysburg, a do or die effort, better be successful against Grant.