Ole----I don't think that during our Civil War the weapons had made shock cavalry tactics obsolete. I'm a Griffithista and think the effects of the rifle musket are overstated as is shown by the times when properly led cavalry did press mounted charges home. Indeed I think a Brown Bess armed battalion of Wellington's Peninsulars was at least as dangerous to approach as any regiment of our Civil War save those armed with repeating rifles such as the 7th Illinois.
I've often wondered at what would have happened if Meade had had a brigade or two of European style heavy cavalry to throw at the retreating wreckage of "Pickett's Charge".
Anyway I think the fact that properly led and motivated cavalry did drive home mounted attacks against infantry and even fortifications shows that the cavalry problem was one of mindset and tactics and not any inherant weakness of cavalry of the time.
Ole----I don't think that during our Civil War the weapons had made shock cavalry tactics obsolete. I'm a Griffithista and think the effects of the rifle musket are overstated as is shown by the times when properly led cavalry did press mounted charges home. Indeed I think a Brown Bess armed battalion of Wellington's Peninsulars was at least as dangerous to approach as any regiment of our Civil War save those armed with repeating rifles such as the 7th Illinois.
I've often wondered at what would have happened if Meade had had a brigade or two of European style heavy cavalry to throw at the retreating wreckage of "Pickett's Charge".
Anyway I think the fact that properly led and motivated cavalry did drive home mounted attacks against infantry and even fortifications shows that the cavalry problem was one of mindset and tactics and not any inherant weakness of cavalry of the time.
Kind Regards
Irishtom,
You mention Gettysburg. If I remember right Union General Kilpatrick ordered a cavalry charge on Longstreet's far right. His subordinate refused( Saying it was suicide) then final relented and charges the confederate position only to be slaughter by mini balls.
A well timed and place cavalry charge was still effective in the civil war but it relied on proper moment. The cavalry was still the best units to have to chase down a routed army. Just think, if Gen. Lee had one or two brigade of cavalry on the first day of the Gettysburg battle, there would not have been a day two...
Just a notion or two....
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It is interesting to note that the word Cavalry has many different meanings. This of course dates back many, many years.
This past weekend, at Clarksville, Tn. these differences were discused at length. There was also a discussion as to who was a true Cavalryman during the war. The speaker at the conference stated that Stewart was what a true cavalryman had been before and at the early part of the war.
As the war progressed and to its end, Forrest had become what would be considered the "New and Improved Cavalryman".
He made this observation based on extensive study of all of the cavalry both Union and Confederate. He also stated that though Wilder was not a cavalry man, he and Forrest were very much alike in there thinking and actions.
For added effect, he mentioned that Forrest's cavalry operations were studied by Rommel and they are still apart of the War College training.
If you compare the old cavalry with the new cavalry, the inovation that Forrest and some what that of Wilder, set the standard for the Cavalry of the future.
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If you compare the old cavalry with the new cavalry, the inovation that Forrest and some what that of Wilder, set the standard for the Cavalry of the future.
What innovations are those? Other then Wilder being very well armed as infantry went? During the early days of the Great War some British regular cavalry, who had the same superb musketry training as the regular infantry and could lay down the "mad minute" with their SMLEs, did excellent service on the tactical defensive as infantry.
But I don't see arming horsemen with the latest rifle as much of an innovation, nor do I see the notion of mounted infantry as an innovation either. Nor the notions of irregular and partisan warfare or deep raiding.
My nomination is John Buford. He was a hard fighter and had a good brain, and the two connected.
Stuart was an example of a slightly out dated school of cavalry.
Forrest and Sheridan...I'm going to agree with Eric Wittenburg here in regards to their status being overrated.
Sheridan had enough good quality troops and generals that it was hardly a magnificient accomplishment (very good to have done, but hardly worth rousing applause as something amazing) that he should have smashed Early into the dust at least as badly as historically. Similarly, his performance as Cavalry Corps commander was disappointing. Aggressive and determined, but not good. The Confederates should have been torn apart by his forces if he was as good as he is sometimes claimed to be. The battle results do not indicate that the Confederates cavalry was gutted to the point of uselessness.
Forrest was a mounted infantryman/irregular, which however valuable, is not quite the same thing. Nevertheless, I would not want to face him in battle. Or deal with him as someone raiding my supply lines. I just can't say he qualifies as a Great Cavalry leader just because what he did do was successful anymore than I can say that Meade was a great artillery commander because of Gettysburg on July 3, to exagerate the point a tad.
Regarding mounted charges...
The effective range of a Brown Bess is less than a hundred yards, and usually more like thirty.
The effective range of a Civil War rifle is several times that.
That, assuming equal accuracy by the shooters, tears horsemen apart.
Certainly, a cavalry charge that somehow did slam home was still a nasty thing, but that was not at all easy. I think that makes it an outdated tactic, on the whole.
The effective range of a Brown Bess is less than a hundred yards, and usually more like thirty.
The effective range of a Civil War rifle is several times that.
That, assuming equal accuracy by the shooters, tears horsemen apart.
Certainly, a cavalry charge that somehow did slam home was still a nasty thing, but that was not at all easy. I think that makes it an outdated tactic, on the whole.
Nice post.
But I must disagree on the rifle-musket thing. I think the longer range was of little practical use and especially against something as fast moving as a cavalry attack. The low velocity and looping trajectory of rifle muskets makes range estimation and sight setting much more important than with modern flat trajectory rifles. I doubt very much that a typical Civil War infantry unit would get many hits on anybody at long range much less a fast moving cavalry attack.
I think it was the increased rate of fire of breechloading and then magazine rifles that destroyed the general effectiveness of cavalry not the increased range of rifle muskets.
Let me put it this way, if you can kill horsemen at thirty yards with a musket, you can kill them at two hundred with an Enfield. That's an extra few shots you can get in.
Certainly, long range shooting was miserably inaccurate. But it is impossible to hit something with any accuracy with a musket at the ranges one could potentially do so with a rifle.
As someone nearsighted and a nonshooter, I'm not sure how far human effective range is with either as a matter of eyesight and aim goes.
But the idea that a rifle (or rifled musket) is not at least somewhat more effective is missing the fact that troops were armed with them because rifles (or rifled musket) worked better.
Agreed on the rate of fire from breechloaders or machine guns (shudder). That turned it from risky (and difficult) to definate suicide.
Hard to tell without much use of mounted charges (which is at best circumstantional evidence on their ineffectiveness, at least without knowing why they were underused).
Let me put it this way, if you can kill horsemen at thirty yards with a musket, you can kill them at two hundred with an Enfield. That's an extra few shots you can get in.
Certainly, long range shooting was miserably inaccurate. But it is impossible to hit something with any accuracy with a musket at the ranges one could potentially do so with a rifle. ...
It isn't really a matter of how much smash is available at a given range. I don't think you're going to want to open up on an assault until you can hit pretty hard, and that usually meant 50-60 yards or so. Maybe someone with first hand experience can pitch in and 'splain the theory behind this.
But back to the edges of the topic - what were/are the purposes of cavalry. I don't think its value was so much a force multiplier in a tactical sense - shock attacks, as it was useful for screening your movements from the enemy's, finding his dispositions, performing limited interdiction, and maintaining a military presence in the face of a potentially hostile population. I don't think this role has really changed - you don't send in a helicopter assault to do a tank's job, and you don't use an Abrams to find out what's going on the other side of the hill or clear out a hilltop twenty miles away.
And this is where Sheridan at least has something none of the others did - he operated in hostile territory, and did so effectively. In fact, the whole character of Union cavalry use in the east changed with his arrival.
This shouldn't take away from Forrest; he never had a real opportunity in northern soil.
It is, however, impossible to discuss Stuart without thinking of Adams County, PA. Whether or not he erred, it's clear he could have been "righterer" in providing both intel and screening for Lee.
Regarding guns: Yeah, I'm more aware from my reading of how much infantry and artillery are hindered on the attack by the advantages of rifled muskets than cavalry. It certainly did not turn attacks into slaughters in general.
But 50-60 yards with a rifle is easy shooting (for the gun) and the end of effective for a musket, that would matter.
I dispute that Sheridan performed effectively. Read Wittenburg's Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of General Philip H. Sheridan. for a good explaination.
Nevertheless, for one reason and another, the Confederate cavalry was far less able to interfer with Federal plans in 1864 than 1862, and a certain amount of credit must be given to the commanding officers of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.
Regarding Stuart and Forrest...yeah. Forrest was a tough customer, and Stuart in June of 1863...well...somehow things did not add up well for him. I'm not sure where exactly one can say he did wrong, but it wound up with the best three brigades of the AoNVA's cavalry and its commander unable to assist Lee. Even assuming Stuart did everything right, it went wrong.
As for cavalry commanders, if that's still what this thread is about, I say that it is like apples and oranges (to coin a phrase) to compare the cavalries of the Eastern theater with those of the Western. In the more compacted area of the Eastern campaigns, the cavalries would act in the more traditional activities such as scouting and screening, etc., within the command of a larger army. In the wide, wide West however, there was more opportunity for a Forrest or a Morgan to act largely independantly to get behind enemy lines and create havoc tearing up communications and picking on somewhat isolated outposts.
So their functions were different in a way that makes them difficult to compare.
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