Was General Meade Too Lax pursuing Lee after Gettysburg?
Once again the historical record is pretty clear. Lee begins his retreat on the evening of July 4 and was across the Potomac by the morning of 14 July and Meade crosses the same river on 17, 18 And 19 July.
If the rain had not delayed Lee, the AoP (or Meade) would have never even seen the ANV. Which, judging from Meade's July 4, Congratulatory Address to the AoP, would seem to have been his intentention all along.
At Fredricksburg, Burnside had 30,000 uncommitted troops and big guns on high ground across the river. A counterattack by Lee against the Union troops would have the probable effect of turning a Confederate victory into a draw or possibly a Confederate loss. At the very least, the Confederates coming out of their prepared positions were going to take heavy losses. And for what? They could have perhaps increased Federal casualties, but at a cost of more of their own.
I also give Meade the benefit of the doubt with regard to launching a counterattack after Pickett's charge. Recall that the charge involved only a portion of Lee's army. Further, Hancock, the commander of the troops in the center, was down. The artillery was no doubt low on ammunition. The Federal troops were no doubt as disorganized by repulsing the attack as Lee was in being repulsed. Meade had his headquarters shelled and was driven away from the field. Any counterattack would have taken too long to organize and would have allowed Lee to prepare to receive it. The counterattacking troops would have had to cross the same open ground as Pickett, et al had to cross to make the "charge." Finally, although the Confederate cannon were out of long-range ammunition, there is no indication they were out of cannister and a massed artillery battery of that size, against troops crossing open ground, would have turned a Confederate disaster into a Union disaster.
Should Meade have pursued Lee more vigorously after July 4th? I think so, in hindsight. I think a Grant would have. I think an 1865 Meade would have. But Meade was new to command of the AoP, his cavalry was blown, and a number of his Corps commanders were dead or wounded - including his two best, Hancock and Reynolds. I think I can "forgive" him for being cautious.
To me, the more serious problem is the lack of initiative in the months between Gettysburg and the onset of winter. What was Meade doing all that time?
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
I agree that Meade was a better (more conident?) army general after Grant assumed command. Although, IMO, it was not so much due to his being more experienced in the command as it was having some one else in ultimate authority both for success and (more importantly) failure.
Should Meade have pursued Lee more vigorously after July 4th? I think so, in hindsight. I think a Grant would have.
It is virtual suicide to make such a pursuit without reassembling a cohesive force that can act in concert. (Probably a reason pursuits were not often attempted.) However, if there was ever a time a time for throwing troops on a suicide mission, this was one.
But this would not have been a pursuit of a McDowell or Pope; this was a matter of pursuing commanders who knew how to position rear guards -- all of whom would be men who knew how to fight. It would have required spreading bodies of Union soldiers across southwestern Pennsylvania and western Maryland in the dubious hope of catching and destroying the AoNV. I gotta go with whoever went with the commander on the ground.
I can empathize with Lincoln's frustration, but he wasn't there and he wasn't a military man. The big picture supposes that Meade missed the finest opportunity to end the war in 1863. But did he?
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
P.S. Timewalker, Meade in Northern Va. was emulating Lee in Southern Pa, i.e., Tramping through the countryside looking to see what turned up.
Even after Meade learned of Longstreet's being sent West, it instilled no confidence in Meade that he could actually attack and defeat Lee.
P.S. Timewalker, Meade in Northern Va. was emulating Lee in Southern Pa, i.e., Tramping through the countryside looking to see what turned up.
Even after Meade learned of Longstreet's being sent West, it instilled no confidence in Meade that he could actually attack and defeat Lee.
Emulating Lee was generally a good idea, but I don't think emulating his actions in PA is the model to follow.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Was General Meade Too Lax Pursuing Lee After Gettysburg?
If it is a given that Meade was, in fact, a better Army Commander (better, as in doing what was needed to win the war) And More Confident (as in willing to take greater risks than when he was Army Commander on his own), then that would indicate that he was 'capable' of doing those things necessary to win the war had he wanted.
It was Meade's Obvious lack of confidence in himself, as Army Commander i.e., in sole command (and, possibly, a lack of confidence in his army) that was the core problem facing Lincoln after Gettysburg.
It was not suicide, virtual or otherwise, to keep pressing south to interpose an army between Lee and Richmond (and his supplies) and force Lee to attack on Meade's chosen ground.
Grant had difficulty with the plan, but he did not have the luxury of a swollen river facing Lee, who had lost his pontoon train.
Twenty Four hours would have been all Grant needed to get across the Potomac before Lee, IF he had decided not to attack at Williamsport.
Meade was no Fool and a competent general, I am sure that he saw the opportunity, but, as we know, he had convinced himself that clearing the North Bank of the Potomac of enemy soldiers was the goal of his campaign.
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
The counterattacking troops would have had to cross the same open ground as Pickett, et al had to cross to make the "charge." Finally, although the Confederate cannon were out of long-range ammunition, there is no indication they were out of cannister and a massed artillery battery of that size, against troops crossing open ground, would have turned a Confederate disaster into a Union disaster.
You would have to expect the initial assault and at the moment in time that it is repulsed, the counter has to come right on the heels with a corps sitting in reserve so that it has not lost cohesion. Meade really doesn't have one, they're all on the line. Best I see he could've done would've been to gamble and to pull Sedwick off of his left (or some portion of VI corps) and really that would've been some gamble...Lee had a penchant for hitting a flank....
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Was General Meade Too Lax pursuing Lee after Gettysburg? 
Linear Mode
