I'm prepared to cut Meade a little more slack than most. He's a new corps commander, and he just fought the bloodiest battle in the history of the North American continent. His army had been marching for the better part of a month, and there were undoubtedly supply issues.
Given Lincoln's hands-on approach to managing his generals, I also would be interested to know what specific directions he had given Meade.
Was General Meade Too Lax Pursuing General Lee's Retreat from Gettysburg?
Sad experience had shown Lincoln that he had to ride close herd on his Generals, many of whom seemed, timid, recalcitrant and/or disaffected.
Many assume that Grant was granted a free hand in the operations of his campaign. Not really true, as Lincoln grew to trust Grant, over time, he granted him a little more freeway than other, less talented Generals. But the President (and the War Dept.) kept a close on his actions and were quick to call him to account it he, Lincoln, misunderstood or did not agree with those actions.
I have looked over this thread with sincere interest. In my mind, there is only one response. Yes, Gen Meade was too lax.
I would pose a question to you learned gentlemen. What was the standard practice of the day? Armies had been fighting pitched battles with ranks, files, lines, columns and volley fires for centuries. What exactly was the standard response to a broken attack? Would it not be "counter-attack"?
Seriously gentlemen, what was the "right" thing to do? The Army of Northern Virgina was in disarray. It was defeated and demoralized. it was strung out for miles limping back to the Potomac River.
Yes, Gen Meade was too lax. Far too lax.
I understand that his army had been handled pretty roughly. I understand that they would've had to stumble over the remains of thousands of dead and wounded men. I understand, but they could have done it. They would have done it. They should have done it. Gen Meade was too lax. Far too lax and the war dragged on and many more men died in vain for it.
"What exactly was the standard response to a broken attack? Would it not be "counter-attack"?"
Fredericksburg is often cited as Gettysburg with a flip-flop of circumstances. The Confedrates had the advantage of terrain and defense. If this is true, and your premise also true, then why didn't Lee attack Burnside when he "broke" the piecemeal attacks? Was Lee "lax?"
Make no mistake, gentlemen. I am not suggesting that Meade shouldn't have attacked. All I am saying is I'm not prepared to second-guess the commander on the spot because of my perceptions. When you put somebody in a subordinate role, then you must give them a little latitude in how they carry out your orders. If not, they call it micromanaging.
Again, just my opinion.
__________________ David
"I refuse to have a battle of wits with an unarmed person" diddyriddick
Was Meade too Lax in pursuing Lee after Gettysburg?
The point is Most of Lincon's Generals needed to be micromanaged. If left to themselves, they tended to sit and gather supplies, while bleating for more reinforcements. All having carefully considered and logical reasons that precluded any possibility of any 'real' success against the enemy.
It was all that Lincoln could do to keep Meade in the field at all, after Gettysburg. Meade wanted to pull back and rest, refit and resupply for some indefinite time. (when had Lincoln not heard that before from his generals?)
I can sympathize with Meade (as did Lincoln), but the war was just not going to be won by accepting that Not being defeated was the best that could be expected from a battle or campaign.
One only has to follow the exchange of messages between the War Dept. (in whose telegraph office, Lincoln practically lived during the Gettysburg crisis) and Meade's Hdqtrs. When Meade finally starts after Lee, his descriptions of the destitute state of his army, would lead one to believe he was describing any one of various confederate armies.
Meade later testified before the JointCommittee on the Conduct of the War concerning Gettysbur and commented on the events of the evening before Lee's final escape, when Meade called a Council of War concerning whether to attack Lee or not in which he testified "I represented to those generals, so far as I knew it, ......I told them that I had reason to believe, from all I could ascertain, that General Lee's position was a very strong one, and that he was prepared to give battle and defend it if attacked; that it was not in my power from a want of knowledge of the ground, and from not having had time to make reconnaisance to indicate any precise mode of attack or any precise point of attack, that, nevertheless, I was in favor of moving forward and attacking the enemy and taking the consequences; but that I left it to their judgement, and would not do it unless it met with their approval." What could less than confident corps commanders infer from that less than ringing declaration of confidence?
Later in his testimony, Meade, on request from the chairman of the Committee, on his estimate of the relative size of the two armies, replies "My opinion about that was that Lee was, as far as I can tell, about 10,000 or 15,000 my superior." The question is not whether his estimate was correct, but why was he even entertaining the idea of attacking the numerically superior ANV, if he 'really' believed that his army was that outnumbered, much less offering it as an option to his subordinates?
In most of his reports, any forward or aggressive movementnt is fraught with uncertainty and unanticipated difficulties, that almost always necessitates delays and cancellations of movements and/or attacks while every retrograde movement is accomplished with skill and dispatch.
Although it does not seem so in these posts that I do not like Meade, I, in fact, like him very much and will defend him against unfair attacks, but I do not blind myself to the fact that there was a reason, that a Grant (and not a Meade) was needed to direct the Northern Military to ultimate victy..
In reading all I could about General Meade prior to, during and after Gettysburg, all the associated elements under his Gettysburg Campaign; it is evident from the Official Records of the Rebellion; the reports by his officers had locations in many different locations days after the Battle at Gettysburg; to me indicates they were on the move and not sitting on their tail bones.
The other observation I have made; is that the Cavalry under General Buford, as shattered as it was had guts and desire to pursue General Lee and not let him escape. Now, it is undisputed that Buford was below half strength and logically could not do but so much. Another oversight of generals and others who did not promote Buford to Major General until he was on his deathbed--nor was he nominated for a Medal of Honor (which I think he deserves). The rest of the Cavalry wasn't in much better shape, thanks to General 'Kill Cavalry' Kilpatrick--he destroyed Farnsworth and his unit on an unnecessary charge.
Another consideration concerning Meade's Army verses Lee's Army. It is easier to retreat and be the one starting a run in any direction. It is much harder to pursue. The other being, size of an army--which Lee's army was much smaller thus, making it compact yet--just as lethal as any big cumbersome army. This was found to be a anchor drag for Grant vs Lee as it was for Meade vs. Lee.
Meade was in pursuit of Lee heading to Gettysburg weeks before the battle. The army was then given to him just days prior to the great battle; he had to depend on the wisdom of all his corps commanders and draw on their experiences as well as for the first time it seems, getting advice from others--especially Pope shines out as a glaring example of a 'know it all' and knew nut'n thus the slaughter at Second Bull Run/Manassas.
Third consideration, which is common sense--you (Meade) had won a huge battle, why press the luck and turn the win into a defeat if pursue Lee and be clobbered by superior forces? This is where Longstreet visionary plans to have a counter-attack/defensive attack poised after Picket's charge. Thus hindsight judged Longstreet harshly--but, at the time of the Confederate offensive--he had McLaws and Hood in position to counter-attack/defensive posture.
Meade's army was still new to Meade, he had not had a chance to have a grand review or a big meeting with all the corps commanders, as they were on previous orders by Hooker--days ride from one another's travel;
only when Buford spotted the turn of Lee's Army; did any idea Lee was where he was.
I think, under consideration of what General Meade was in his position and the many Corps with lost strength--he did not pursue with infantry which is slowest. And, the task of fresh forces should have been ordered as to swing around and meet the enemy, as General Couch and French did somewhat. If anything, fresh troops from the middle military District, e.g. Loudoun, Fairfax, Middleburg, Leesburg, Winchester should have used the railroads to make haste as to refuse the lines of pursuit. With Meade's troops either he could pursue, perhaps move as to fan out and see which route he would take for an escape, e.g. Shenandoah mountains where he used them as a shield before; the eastern side of Meade's Army; from where most of Reynold's and other Corps came from and return down into Maryland--then into Virginia; or Lee could have continued on into Pennsylvania and turn--going through Maryland as Early did to attack Washington.
Weather and road conditions. In riding the Manassas/Bull Run battlefields as late as 1993; the ruts of the heavy artillery are still evident all these years past. Lee described in that campaign the horses could not make progress hauling wagons of flour, the mud was shaved by the axles; the horses were exhausted as men were who manually turned the wheels.
With Gettysburg, the road conditions were much the same and continued to rain. All horses and mules would have had problems; Lee's army having several hour's start in the retreat; horses in such mud may make progress of 1 1/2 mile an hour. Then on top of that; the state of the horses and mules. Kilpatrick's and Pleasonton's Cavalry were in a long battle with the CSA Cavalry, with three Generals, to include F.H. Lee and two others--Stuart did not participate; so he was fresh when the retreat came on. Stuart's Cavalry wasn't as damaged as Buford's--thus held Buford back due to lack of men and ammunition for the carbines. Buford's horses were barely rideable as Buford was guarding the railroad supply trains during the battle at Gettysburg with no rest.
But, for all the 'arm chair' generaling all of us can do--there is absolutely no replacement of the judgment of the commanding general on the field.
Meade has my confidence. Use the victory to boost my soldier's moral which was terribly low; fight another day. One has to gather the fragments and make them all one 'fist' of an army arm to do any damage to Lee--after Gettysburg all I think he would be able to do was to harass and maybe cause more loss on his side. I think Meade did very well.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
Fredericksburg is often cited as Gettysburg with a flip-flop of circumstances. The Confedrates had the advantage of terrain and defense. If this is true, and your premise also true, then why didn't Lee attack Burnside when he "broke" the piecemeal attacks? Was Lee "lax?"
You make a point sir, but Gen. Lee at Fredericksburg is not quite comparable to Gen. Meade at Getteysburg.
Firstly, at Fredericksburg, Gen. Lee was defending his homeland. Gen. Burnside was trying to conqure the South. I imagine Gen. Lee watching the destruction of the blue clad army and asking, "Why don't those people just go home?" He did not want to kill any more of them or destroy the United States of America. He just wanted to be free.
Secondly, at Fredericksburg, Gen. Burnside was already north of the Rappahannock River. In order to complete the rout, Gen. Lee would have had to cross the river in front of the Army of the Potomac. A defeated and demoralized army, but an army none the less. Again, I imagine Gen. Lee watching the the blue clad soldiers withdrawing and thinking, "Finally, they're going home!"
At Gettysburg, it was completely different. The Army of the Potomac had the high ground and the Army of Northern Virginia had turned their backs and staggered away. It was a race to the Potomac River and Gen. Lee would have had to cross that obstacle under the guns of Gen. Meade. Not the same proposition, by a long shot.
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