By the way, a Gen. Benham of the Engineers informed Meade that the pontoon bridgings had arrived at Harpers Ferry, ready to be towed wherever Meade decided, on the 9th of July. Buford, Custer, Kilpatrick etc. on the South side of the Potomac across from Falling Waters and Williamsport would have forced Lee to fight his way out his pocket or surrender.
I wonder if Meade was familiar with the axiom that ' If one wants to avoid a hard fight, you have to leave a line of retreat open'?
In the famous unsent Letter by Lincoln to Meade, immediately after Lee's escape the Pres. noted his thoughts on the matter among which "And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the battle at Gettysburg, but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fifty-five miles, if so much, and Couch's movements was very little different." Whether Lincoln was correct in his estimation, is not as important as it was indicative of the kind of information that he was receiving, much of it from Meade's Hdqrs and how he was interpreting that information. Lincoln thought he was asking for maximum effort and Meade thought he was asking the impossible. From the record it is hard to argue that Meade gave maximum effort in his pursuit of Lee, after Gettysburg. Just as from the record, of evehts from the CW, it is hard to argue that such a pursuit (maximum effort) was impossible.
Later in the same letter Lincoln writes "Again my dear neneral, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape."
Meade had been in army command a week at most, and after taking extremely heavy casualties, he's faced with 1 dead and 2 badly wounded Corps Commanders, not to mention wounded/dead in brigade command and lower. So you have to get command structure in place. Does he feel confident of a tough pursuit of ANV without Reynolds, Sickles, and Hancock and putting people in Corps command on the spot that had never been there before.
Someone asked about reserves and who had not fought. My mind is mush to day at work but almost the entire V or VI corps had not done hardly any fighting as they were not on the field til mid afternoon on the 2nd.
As for bringing Grant east, Grant was brough east to take overall command of Union forces, not the AoP specifically. But Grant chose to go into the field with he AoP. If you want to get on Meade for being lax, it was for his lack of initiative post Gettysburg leading into the winter of 63/64. Longstreet's corps had been dispatched to Tennessee yet Meade did not bring on a general engagement with ANV at this time. Big mistake.
Few argue that Meade's litany of woes was not accurate or valid. Given that Lincoln had hear similar litanys from most of his generals, both successful and unsuccessful, over the last 3 year, used as excuses for failure, it was fortunate for Meade that the beleagured President was so inately fair and forgiving beyond the kin or most of us ordinary mortals, that he did not give into his very real anguish and disappointment and needlessly drive out of the service a very good corps commander.
As for bringing Grant east, Grant was brough east to take overall command of Union forces, not the AoP specifically. But Grant chose to go into the field with he AoP. If you want to get on Meade for being lax, it was for his lack of initiative post Gettysburg leading into the winter of 63/64. Longstreet's corps had been dispatched to Tennessee yet Meade did not bring on a general engagement with ANV at this time. Big mistake.
Mostly agreed, Jamie. Am wondering, however, how much of Meade's inaction was due to Lincoln.
All of his "find and smash Lee's army" had come to naught. From Ball's Bluff through Chancellorsville, the strategy hadn't worked. So maybe he had no more new ideas?
Consider that Abe may have become content to hold Lee in place while the Confederacy was being rolled up from the west. The AoP was licking its wounds and getting healthy and fat while the burden of fighting shifted to a commander with whom Abe apparently had more confidence.
Just a thought.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Looking through the officer ranks of the Eastern Armies, it did not take a genius to realize, there was nobody significantly better than Meade, but many, significantly worse. Lincoln was content to leave Meade in command; if he couldn't trouble Lee very much, Meade could, at least, keep the AoP out of trouble until Grant could be brought East.
Grant was the obvious rising star in the Union Ranks and barring unforseen events, he was headed for higher commands. But, the inadequacies of Meade, probably made up the President's mind much sooner than even he expected.
I believe there was some residual opposition in the the gov't and the Administration to Grant's rise to influence, but the sight of Meade tramping around Northern Virginia, while success in the West followed in Grant's path, drove active opposition underground, if not quell.
So, in that respect, at least, Meade's fruitless efforts after Gettysburg, perhaps served a good purpose, in the end.
Ole I pretty much agree with you there. I don't think Meade had the creative offensive thought to go at Lee in an extended campaign. The only attempt he really made was Mine Run but that doesn't get anywhere and showed not much initiative, but he at least could've kept Lee busy enough to not allow him to send Longstreet west.
Bear in mind also that Meade lost a lot of veteran troops immediately after the battle to go to New York and put down the draft riots. The infantry troops most effective in a pursuit were on trains going the opposite direction.
It is always easier to find 'more' reasons 'not' to do something, than it is for 'doing' something.
Too bad, Lincoln had heard all of Meade's reasons for avoiding facing Lee a second time, for the last two years, from most of his unsuccessful generals.
No doubt they (AoP) were hurt. No doubt they were appalled by the carnage in front of them. But they could've ...... They should've ..... Lee expected 'em to.
I'm prepared to cut Meade a little more slack than most. He's a new corps commander, and he just fought the bloodiest battle in the history of the North American continent. His army had been marching for the better part of a month, and there were undoubtedly supply issues.
Given Lincoln's hands-on approach to managing his generals, I also would be interested to know what specific directions he had given Meade.
Just my thoughts.
__________________
David
"I refuse to have a battle of wits with an unarmed person" diddyriddick
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Was Meade Too Lax ........ ? 
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