Meade had no idea if Lee would stop in southern Pennsylania or Maryland and go into a defensive position. Does anyone on this site know what Lee really did after Gettysburg?
Read Retreat form Gettysburg, Kent Masterson Brown.
Pursuing a retreating force of any size can be a tricky movement to manage -- expecially when it's Lee and the AoNV. The proper way to do is to get a force ahead of him to block his escape, and follow him with another.
Most are familiar with the topography. A brigade at each gap in South Mountain, with artillery, could make a much larger force pay a painful price for trying to force a gap.
I can understand Lincoln's frustration -- this was a golden opportunity. Grant may have shown a bit more energy in pursuit, but I'd hope he had the sense to exercise due caution. It's possible to run down a regiment or brigade, but an army? And Lee?
I don't think so.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Poor Meade hardly had time to hang his hat before he found himself in command in the largest battle of the war. It is remarkable enough that he apparently maintained his composure and adequately managed that battle. Did he have enough time in that emergency to know all about the possible escape routes of his enemy and/or the dispositions of his disparate troops which might have intercepted them?
On the other hand, one might say that Meade was of that cautious character of the Army of the Potomac which originated with McClellan and persisted throughout.
I tend to give him the benefit of the doubt, being thrust into that maelstrom.
We might assume that if he were Grant, the story would have been different, but would even Grant, with 2 days notice, have been able to manage that battle and create an effective pursuit?
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Remember that Meade was a Pennsylvanian and likely knew the terrain. And I don't see in the days of battle where he lost track of where his divisions were.
I, too, give Meade the benefit of the doubt. Under the circumstances, his laxity while Lee made his retreat was and is disappointing, but is understandable.
The only way I can see of getting a force in front of Lee would be by train to Harpers Ferry. Such a move would have required emptying Washington. Of course, Lincoln would not do that -- so it would appear that he and Halleck were content do no nothing except to complain about Meade's inaction.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Once, again we have the problem than Lincoln faced all through his relations with his generals. Trying to get them not to immerse themselves in all the problems of their commands and realize that the opposing army commander has just as many worries and problems as they did and if defeated probably more.
The biggest battle of the war has just been fought and the smaller army was defeated and was rapidly retreating, yet the victorious (and larger) army has 'more' problems than the one defeated?
Even with Meade's lackadaisical pursuit, he still managed to bring Lee to ground at the Potomac (with a little help from the weather) and managed to hold off, just long enough for Lee and his army to escape.
If the timorous Meade could catch up to Lee, is it reasonable to assume Grant could have don less? I would argue that if Grant had Lee against a swollen river, the ANV would have had to 'fight' to 'continue' their retreat.
Remember that Meade was a Pennsylvanian and likely knew the terrain. And I don't see in the days of battle where he lost track of where his divisions were.
I am from Rhode Island. I spent my first 18 years of life here. and I do not know EVERY scrape of ground, every twist and turn, every hill. PA is ALOT bigger Than RI. What part of PA was he from?? Unless he was from the immediate area around Gettysburg assuming he would know the terrain just because he is from there is a little much to ask. Especially back then when traveling more than 100 miles was a week long trek.
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Correction: Meade was born in Cadiz, Spain. He received appointment to the USMA from Pennsylvania. Trumping all that, though, is that he was a division commander in the First Corps on September 17, 1862.
Besides being a topographical engineer, he had first hand knowledge of the approaches to South Mountain, the difficulty of pushing through the gaps, and the territory between it at the Potomac.
He knew the territory and the roads.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
There is little disagreement that Meade's pursuit of Lee and the retreating ANV was 'lax'. The question for this board is whether the pursuit was 'Too' lax.
In point of fact, Meade's pursuit was not bady planned (given his determination 'Not' to press Lee's retreat too directly). Not unlike Grants final pursuit of Lee to Appomattox, except Meade demanded no undue exertion on the part of his army.
Longstreet reached Hagestown on the 6th of July just a few miles from Williamsport. Meade reaches Funkstown (a few miles south of Hangerston) on the '12th' and camps his army, careful to keep plenty of distance from the ANV at Williamsport. That evening, Meade calls another Council of War, which (of course) votes (5 - 3) not to attack and Meade decides that he cannot overrule his subordinates. Later than evening, Meade receives a very uncharacteristic message from Halleck (so uncharacteristic, that one can legitimately infer he is expressing Lincoln's thoughts rather than his own) "Yours of 5:00 P.M. is received. You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment and make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Reinforcements are pushed on as rapidly as possible. Do not let the enemy escape." Characteristically Meade's feelings are hurt, although, the next day, the 13th (the day Lee's bridges across the Potomac are completed), Meade decides to attack 'the next day' on the 14th, by which time Lee's army is back in ol' virginny and Meade snaps up some casualties and prisoners from Pettigrew's rear guard, including Pettigrew, who was killed during Meade's crushing attack.
As I noted, that Meade was lax in his pursuit is not in doubt, only whether he was too lax. In his job of shooing the southen geese back across the Potomac, Meade, Like Lee, was almost undone by the Potomac being almost in flood stage.
Lincoln micromanaged the war in the east too much. Of course, one can partially understand that when one looks at his early appointments to command in Virginia.
Lee's retreat from Gettysburg was a masterpiece for an army severely damaged and out of long range artillery ammunition. Of course, most historians write "Battle Books," and avoid retreats.
Lee basically told his infantry -you have three days to march to the Potomac River.
Lincoln's picture of what should happen was colored by many civilian leaders, among them that great military strategist of the Civil War, Simon Cameron. (Sarcasm here fellas)
I do not think there was ever an army in the world, that could successfully assault a Lee army in a defensive position, with its back up to a river, less than 10 days after a huge battle. Only in 1865, would Lee's army dissolve into nothingness.
As for Grant wiping out Lee's army, he certainly didn't wipe out General Pemberton's army at Vicksburg in one fell swoop. And it took him a few months to take care of Lee's army, when Grant really did show on the scene.
Lee's retreat only 'appears' to have been a masterpiece, because it was successful with little loss. He was only impeded by the weather and terrain. If Meade had been anotheir of those impediment Lee's retreat would probably have been less masterly.
Lincon, seldom let others (civiliam or military) do his thinking for him, even, his Sec'y of war Edwin M. Stanton.
Meade certainly agreed, with those who believe that no army (certainly not the AoP) could have defeated Lee, by aggressive action, even after Gettysburg. Fortunately Lincoln and Grant did not agree.
Williamsport, would not have required wiping out the ANV; accepting Lee's surrender would have been sufficient.
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