Given the totality of the circumstance, Meade's newness to command of such a large formation, the size and ferocity of the battle just fought and the fact that Meade was on the ground with an eyeball on the conditions, unlike Halleck, Stanton or Ol'Abe I'll accept his judgement.
Ruff,
Not to pick and parse from your entire post, but that last sentence is right on the money. I concur.
Based on his actions and reports Meade indicated that he had no confidence of defeating Lee or the ANV any time soon, if ever.
In the end it was the 'judgement' of Lincoln, The Commander in Chief, that counted the most and he judged that Meade's judgement was faulty as to whether the AoP was capable of defeating the Lee and his army.
Even Grant admitted that the ANV could not be defeated in one single battle. That shows more to the tenacity of the ANV than the lax of any commander.
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
'If' true, why did Lincoln bring in Grant, if it were just a matter of fighting a 'series' of battles?
Was it because, Lincoln had no confidence (looking at Meade's previous record as army commander) that Meade could or would fight even one offensive battle, much less a series of them?
'If' true, why did Lincoln bring in Grant, if it were just a matter of fighting a 'series' of battles?
Was it because, Lincoln had no confidence (looking at Meade's previous record as army commander) that Meade could or would fight even one offensive battle, much less a series of them?
I'd be reluctant to conclude that Lincoln had no confidence in Meade. Rather, he saw out there a man who won more than he lost over three years. Meade won one grand battle. Which would you pick as a war commander? In Grant, Lincoln finally found his general.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Lincoln had absolutely no clue how fast General Robert E. Lee beat a retreat back to the Potomac River and Virginia.
And it seems, over 140 years later, many historians also have no clue how fast Lee moved to Virginia, otherwise many students of the war would also have a clue.
If it wasn't for a flooding Potomac River, Lee would not have stopped on the eastern side of the Potomac River, allowing even part of Meade's army to get even near the Army of Northern Virginia.
Lee pulled off a great retreat. He had an advantage in that Meade's infantry had to use gaps that the Confederacy blocked for a time, to allow their main body to escape.
Meade had no idea if Lee would stop in southern Pennsylania or Maryland and go into a defensive position. Does anyone on this site know what Lee really did after Gettysburg?
Lincoln and military strategist is a rather obvious oxymoron. But no one seems to ever question Lincoln and his judgment in this situation.
HDQRS. OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C., July 11, 1863.
Major-General GRANT, Vicksburg:
...Meade has thus far proved an excellent general, the only one, in fact, who has ever fought the Army of the Potomac well. He seems the right man in the right place. Hooker was more than a failure. Had he remained in command, he would have lost the army and the capital.
Give my kindest regards to my old friends among your officers. I sincerely wish I was with you again in the West. I am utterly sick of this political hell.
Yours, truly,
H. W. HALLECK.
The fact that Halleck liked a certain General, is not a recommendation. It should be viewed as a red flag, warning that such a general fought the way Halleck would have fought. IMO not a good sign.
P.S. Lincoln was trying to end the war victoriously for the Union, using poor (in some cases, very poor) clay.
In point of fact, Lincoln was very aware that Meade would not have even seen Lee, if not for the high waters of the Potomac, thus his rage and sorrow.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1863—1 p. m.
Major-General MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
The enemy should be pursued and cut up, wherever he may have gone. This pursuit may or may not be upon the rear or flank, as circumstances may require. The inner flank toward Washington presents the greatest advantages. Supply yourself from the country as
far as possible. I cannot advise details, as I do not know where Lee’s army is, nor where your pontoon bridges are. I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee’s army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 14, 1863—2.30 p. m. (Received 3.10 p.m.)
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President conveyed in your dispatch of 1 p. m. this day, is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army.
GEG. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding.
Note the short time line between telegraph dispatches. We all know what President Lincoln did concerning the latter dispatch.
Does anybody know what sor tof numbers had nto fought yet from the AoP? How much of a reserve had Meade held back after 3 days of such intense fighting? These men were not supermen, they were us. If these men were so tired it could have been almost impossible to find enough men to activate a decent pursuit. A few regiments would not be good enough. Lee could have helf them off in the mountian passes as long as his heart desired. It would have taken a significant, and unengaged force ot make this pursuit. So what kind of numbers were we talking about that Meade had at his disposal rested up? certainly not an entire corp... maybe a division? I doubt a division would have been enough. It might have taken an entire corps to dislodge Lee before he was ready to go, and frankly I don't think another full scale battle coudl have been fought at this point. Certainly the numbers weren't available to carry it out. it would have been exhausted, bloodied, hungry men. Granted Lee's army was in bad shape as well, but they had alot more to lose if this battle ever happened and would have fought harder than they ever had before. Meade knew this, he wasn't stupid.
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
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